IP Library Granted Patent US 11,023,605
Granted Patent B1
US 11,023,605 · App. 15/492,485 · Granted Jun 1, 2021

Data access threat detection and prevention

Inventors: Victor Salamon (Edmonton, CA); John Afaganis (Fort Saskatchewan, CA)
Assignee: EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
G06F21/6218G06F3/0622G06F3/0653G06F3/0689G06F21/55G06F2221/034
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,023,605
App. No.
15/492,485
Granted
Jun 1, 2021
Kind
B1
Abstract

Data access threat detection and prevention modules are implemented proximate to data storage, e.g. in disk array controllers. The modules may be implemented in hardware or firmware. The modules monitor IOs from the disk array controllers to access managed drives. IOs exhibiting access parameters that deviate from a whitelist or match a blacklist are deemed to be suspicious. The whitelist may be created from monitoring normal, safe IOs and storing associated access patterns. In response to detection of suspicious activity the modules may halt or slow subsequent IOs, e.g. IOs to the same data, all data, an associated logical device, or the managed drive.

Claims (41)

1. An apparatus comprising:

a block-based storage array that stores data for a plurality of host computers without knowledge of file-level data structures, comprising:

a plurality of computing nodes that perform authentication and process data access commands from ones of the host computers to logical block addresses of a logical production volume, each of the computing nodes comprising at least one processor and non-transitory memory;

a plurality of disk arrays that are undiscoverable by the host computers, each disk array comprising a plurality of data storage drives, each disk array connected with one of the computing nodes and storing production volume data; and

a plurality of disk array controllers, each disk array controller connected between one of the computing nodes and one of the disk arrays such that the disk array cannot be accessed by bypassing the disk array controller, and configured to detect malicious data access threats without reliance on authentication, each disk array controller comprising at least one malicious data access threat detector that monitors data access communications transmitted from ones of the computing nodes to ones of the disk arrays, detects suspicious data access based on analysis of the data access communications wherein the suspicious data access is perpetrated by a malicious user who has already been authenticated by one of the computing nodes or who has already bypassed authentication procedures of one of the computing nodes, the suspicious data access characterized by one or more of:

block access exceeding a predetermined contiguous range;

block read access indicating theft;

block write access indicating erasure;

block accesses (read or write) larger than a predetermined value or smaller than a predetermined value;

block accesses occurring at an unusual time;

block accesses exhibiting a predetermined duration between the accesses;

block accesses exhibiting a predetermined frequency between the accesses; and

access to a restricted block range at a frequency greater than a predetermined value,

and applies protection rules in response to detection of suspicious data access.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 wherein each managed drive comprises one of the data access threat detectors.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 wherein each disk array controller comprises a processor, and wherein each data access threat detector is implemented in firmware via which the processor connects to ones of the managed drives.

4. The apparatus of claim 3 wherein each data access threat detector monitors IOs from the processor of the disk array controller in which that data access threat detector is implemented and stores access parameters associated with the monitored IOs.

5. The apparatus of claim 4 wherein the stored access parameters comprise a whitelist of non-suspicious access parameters.

6. The apparatus of claim 5 wherein the suspicious data access is detected based on deviation from the whitelist of stored data access parameters.

7. The apparatus of claim 4 wherein the access parameters comprise at least one of number of blocks accessed by each IO, time duration between IOs, and frequency at which blocks are accessed.

8. The apparatus of claim 4 wherein the suspicious data access is detected based on matching stored access parameters with a blacklist of suspicious data access parameters.

9. A method comprising:

in a block-based storage array that stores data for a plurality of host computers without knowledge of file-level data structures, comprising a plurality of computing nodes that perform authentication and process data access commands from ones of the host computers to logical block addresses of a logical production volume, each of the computing nodes comprising at least one processor and non-transitory memory, and a plurality of disk arrays that are undiscoverable by the host computers, each disk array comprising a plurality of data storage drives, each disk array connected with one of the computing nodes and storing production volume data:

monitoring data access communications transmitted from ones of the computing nodes to ones of the disk arrays using a disk array controller connected between one of the computing nodes and one of the disk arrays such that the disk array cannot be accessed by bypassing the disk array controller;

detecting suspicious data access without reliance on authentication based on analysis of the data access communications wherein the suspicious data access is perpetrated by a malicious user who has already been authenticated by one of the computing nodes or who has already bypassed authentication procedures of one of the computing nodes, and detecting the suspicious data access based on at least one characteristic selected from the group consisting of:

block access exceeding a predetermined contiguous range;

block read access indicating theft;

block write access indicating erasure;

block accesses (read or write) larger than a predetermined value or smaller than a predetermined value;

block accesses occurring at an unusual time;

block accesses exhibiting a predetermined duration between the accesses;

block accesses exhibiting a predetermined frequency between the accesses; and

access to a restricted block range at a frequency greater than a predetermined value; and

applying protection rules in response to detection of suspicious data access.

10. The method of claim 9 comprising monitoring the data access communications in each managed drive and detecting the suspicious data access based on analysis of the data access communications.

11. The method of claim 9 wherein each disk array controller includes a processor, and comprising monitoring data access with firmware via which the processor connects to ones of the managed drives.

12. The method of claim 11 comprising monitoring IOs from the processor of the disk array controller in which the firmware is implemented and storing access parameters associated with the monitored IOs.

13. The method of claim 9 comprising analyzing the data access communications by comparing monitored IOs with stored access parameters.

14. The method of claim 13 comprising storing at least one of number of blocks accessed by each IO, time duration between IOs, and frequency at which blocks are accessed.

15. The method of claim 13 comprising detecting the suspicious data access based on deviation from a whitelist of non-suspicious access parameters.

16. The method of claim 13 comprising detecting the suspicious data access based on matching stored access parameters with a blacklist of suspicious access parameters.

Assignments (4)
RELEASE OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PATENTS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED AT REEL/FRAME (053546/0001) Recorded Jun 23, 2022
From: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A., AS NOTES COLLATERAL AGENT
To: DELL MARKETING L.P. (ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.); DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; EMC CORPORATION; DELL MARKETING CORPORATION (SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC. AND WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.); EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
Reel/Frame 071642/0001 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Apr 22, 2020
From: CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES INC.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; EMC CORPORATION; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
To: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.
Reel/Frame 053546/0001 →
SECURITY AGREEMENT Recorded Mar 21, 2019
From: CREDANT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL INTERNATIONAL L.L.C.; DELL MARKETING L.P.; DELL PRODUCTS L.P.; DELL USA L.P.; EMC CORPORATION; FORCE10 NETWORKS, INC.; WYSE TECHNOLOGY L.L.C.; EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
To: THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.
Reel/Frame 049452/0223 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 20, 2017
From: SALAMON, VICTOR; AFAGANIS, JOHN
To: EMC IP HOLDING COMPANY LLC
Reel/Frame 042081/0862 →