Attestation in optical transport network environments

1. A method comprising:

receiving, by a relying node in an optical transport network environment, attestation information in a trail trace identifier of an optical unit from an attester node in the optical transport network environment;

verifying a trustworthiness of the attester node by identifying a level of trust of the attester node from the attestation information;

controlling network service access of the attester node through the relying node in the optical transport network environment based on the level of trust of the attester node identified from the attestation information; and

in response to a determination, by the relying node, that the attester node has become compromised as a result of receiving second attestation information from the attester node, discontinuing transmission of data between the relying node and the attester node.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the relying node is in a first domain and the attester node is in a second domain, and the trail trace identifier is included in a tandem connection monitoring communication defined by a tandem connection monitoring communication scheme, wherein communicating between the first domain and the second domain requires traversal of at least one node other than the relying node and the attester node.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the attestation information is a canary stamp which includes include a signed measurement associated with the attester node for verifying trustworthiness of the attester node.

4. The method of claim 2 , wherein the receiving of the attestation information in the trail trace identifier comprises receiving the attestation information at any domain level defined by the tandem connection monitoring communication scheme.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the determination that the attester node has become compromised further comprising:

determining by the relying node that the attester node has become compromised;

sending a message to additional nodes in the optical transport network environment identifying the attester node as compromised; and

discontinuing transmission of data on a link between the relying node and the attester node.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the second attestation information indicates that the attester node has become compromised.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein information is passed to network elements using the link between the relying node and the attester node, the information communicating that at least a portion of the link is not trustworthy.

8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the information communicating that at least a portion of the link is not trustworthy specifies a specific type of trustworthiness concern.

9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

prior to the receiving of the attestation information in the trail trace identifier of the optical unit from the attester node in the optical transport network environment, exchanging a communication key using quantum key distribution.

10. The method of claim 9 , prior to exchanging the communication key, the method comprising:

identifying the attester node by an attester node identifier and an environment identifier.

11. A system comprising:

at least one processor; and

a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions stored thereon which, when executed by the at least one processors, cause the at least one processors to:

receive, by a relying node in an optical transport network environment, attestation information from an attester node in the optical transport network environment;

verify a trustworthiness of the attester node by identifying a level of trust of the attester node from the attestation information;

control network service access of the attester node through the relying node in the optical transport network environment based on the level of trust of the attester node identified from the attestation information; and

in response to a determination, by the relying node, that the attester node has become compromised as a result of receiving second attestation information from the attester node, discontinue transmission of data between the relying node and the attester node.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the relying node is in a first domain and the attester node is in a second domain, and the attestation information is included in a tandem connection monitoring communication defined by a tandem connection monitoring communication scheme, wherein communicating between the first domain and the second domain requires traversal of at least one node other than the relying node and the attester node.

13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the attestation information is a canary stamp which includes include a signed measurement associated with the attester node for verifying trustworthiness of the attester node.

14. The system of claim 12 , wherein the receiving of the attestation information comprises receiving the attestation information at any domain level defined by the tandem connection monitoring communication scheme.

15. The system of claim 11 , wherein the determination that the attester node has become compromised further comprising instructions to cause the at least one processors to:

determine by the relying node that the attester node has become compromised;

send a message to additional nodes in the network identifying the attester node as compromised; and

discontinue transmission of data on a link between the relying node and the attester node.

16. The system of claim 15 , wherein the second attestation information indicates that the attester node has become compromised.

17. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions stored thereon which, when executed by a processor, are effective to cause the processor to:

receive, by a relying node in a first domain, attestation information from an attester node in a second domain, wherein communicating between the first domain and the second domain requires traversal of at least one node other than the relying node and the attester node;

verify a trustworthiness of the attester node by identifying a level of trust of the attester node from the attestation information;

control network service access of the attester node through the relying node in the first domain based on the level of trust of the attester node identified from the attestation information; and

in response to a determination, by the relying node, that the attester node has become compromised as a result of receiving second attestation information from the attester node, discontinue transmission of data between the relying node and the attester node.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein the attestation information is a canary stamp which includes include a signed measurement associated with the attester node for verifying trustworthiness of the attester node.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein the determination that the attester node has become compromised further instructions to cause the processor to:

determine by the relying node that the attester node has become compromised;

send a message to additional nodes identifying the attester node as compromised; and

discontinue transmission of data on a link between the relying node and the attester node.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 19 , wherein the second attestation information indicates that the attester node has become compromised.