Derived unique random key per transaction

1. A method for using symmetric cryptographic keys between two entities comprising a device and a host, comprising:

initiating, by the device, a transaction involving a first original data, wherein the first original data needs to be protected;

deriving, by the device, a first cryptographic key based on an initial key and a first number, wherein the first cryptographic key is unique to the transaction, and the first number is randomly generated; and

protecting, by the device, the first original data with the first cryptographic key;

generating, by the device, a first parameter based on the first number;

sending, by the device, the protected first original data and the first parameter to the host;

initiating, by the device, another transaction involving a second original data, wherein the second original data needs to be protected;

deriving, by the device, a second cryptographic key based on the first key and a second number, wherein the second cryptographic key is unique to the transaction and is different from the first key, and the second number is randomly generated;

protecting, by the device, the second original data with the second cryptographic key;

generating, by the device, a second parameter based on the second number; and

sending, by the device, the protected second original data and the second parameter to the host;

wherein deriving the first cryptographic key comprises:

running a first function with a previously generated key as input to determine a first key, wherein the previously generated key is an output of the first function for a previous transaction; and

running a second function with the first key as input to determine the first cryptographic key.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first original data comprises one or more of a payment card number, a financial account number, a password, a social security number, a name, an address, an email address, any Personally Identifiable Information (PII), a security object, and a seed for key-generation.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first number is randomly generated based on a random number generator using various entropy methods, comprising one of:

physical or logical chaos of computing system components;

unpredictability of capturing biometric sample data; or

uncertainty of measuring quantum states.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the initial key is deleted after the first key is generated.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein deriving the second cryptographic key comprises:

running the first function with the first key and the second number as input to determine a second key; and

running the second function with the second key as input to determine the second cryptographic key.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the first key is deleted after the second key is generated.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second number is randomly generated based on a random number generator, comprising one of;

physical or logical chaos of computing system components;

unpredictability of capturing biometric sample data; or

uncertainty of measuring quantum states.

8. A device, comprising:

a network interface; and

a processing circuit configured to:

initiate, by the device, a transaction involving a first original data, wherein the first original data needs to be protected;

derive, by the device, a first cryptographic key based on an initial key and a first number, wherein the first cryptographic key is unique to the transaction and the first number is randomly generated;

protect, by the device, the first original data with the first cryptographic key;

generate, by the device, a first parameter based on the first number;

send, by the device, the first cryptographic key and the first parameter to a host;

initiate, by the device, a second transaction involving a second original data, wherein the second original data needs to be protected;

derive, by the device, a second cryptographic key based on a first key and a second number, wherein the second key is unique to the second transaction, and the second number is randomly generated;

protect, by the device, the second original data with the second cryptographic key;

generate, by the device, a second parameter based on the first number; and

send, by the device, the second cryptographic key and the second parameter to the host.

9. The device of claim 8 , wherein the processing circuit is further configured to delete the initial key after the first cryptographic key is generated.

10. The device of claim 8 , wherein the processing circuit is further configured to delete the first key after the second cryptographic key is generated.