Global positioning system spoofing countermeasures
Concepts and technologies directed to global positioning system spoofing countermeasures are disclosed. Embodiments can include a system that comprises a processor and a memory that stores computer-executable instructions that configure a processor to perform operations that include identifying a mobile transportation equipment that includes an electronic logging device and a low-power wide area device, where the electronic logging device obtains GPS location data from a GPS receiver unit and the low-power wide area device obtains independent location data via a narrow band path of a low-power wide area network. The operations can include determining that a spatio-temporal misalignment exists between the independent location data and the GPS location data for the mobile transportation equipment, and providing spatio-temporal data alignment. The operations can include determining that a GPS spoofing attack has occurred, and creating a GPS spoofing alert for the mobile transportation equipment.
1. A system comprising:
a processor; and
a memory that stores computer-executable instructions that, in response to execution by the processor, cause the processor to perform operations comprising:
identifying a mobile transportation equipment comprising an electronic logging device and a low-power wide area device, wherein the electronic logging device obtains global positioning system (GPS) location data from a GPS receiver unit and the low-power wide area device obtains independent location data via a narrow band path of a low-power wide area network,
obtaining the GPS location data and the independent location data,
determining that a spatio-temporal misalignment exists between the independent location data and the GPS location data for the mobile transportation equipment,
providing spatio-temporal data alignment that generates electronic logging device estimates and low-power wide area device estimates,
determining that a GPS spoofing attack has occurred based on the electronic logging device estimates and the low-power wide area device estimates,
creating a GPS spoofing alert for the mobile transportation equipment, and
generating an hours of service correction command that includes the GPS spoofing alert, wherein the hours of service correction command instructs the electronic logging device to update an hours of service log with corrected route data and spoofing time identifiers corresponding to the GPS spoofing attack.
2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the independent location data includes mobile terminal location response data that is joined to local data sensor measurements.
3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the electronic logging device maintains an hours of service record that tracks movement of the mobile transportation equipment based on the GPS location data.
4. The system of claim 1 , wherein the operations further comprise:
detecting that an off-duty driving mode was activated on the mobile transportation equipment; and
obtaining a location obfuscation constraint parameter that defines an allowable deviation distance for the mobile transportation equipment.
5. The system of claim 4 , wherein the operations further comprise in response to determining that a deviation distance exceeds the allowable deviation distance provided by the location obfuscation constraint parameter, generating the corrected route data representing an actual location of the mobile transportation equipment during the GPS spoofing attack.
6. The system of claim 4 , wherein the operations further comprise in response to determining that a deviation distance does not exceed the allowable deviation distance provided by the location obfuscation constraint parameter, withholding the GPS spoofing alert from being provided to the electronic logging device until the deviation distance exceeds the allowable deviation distance.
7. A method comprising:
identifying, by a network server executing a processor, a mobile transportation equipment comprising an electronic logging device and a low-power wide area device, wherein the electronic logging device obtains global positioning system (GPS) location data from a GPS receiver unit and the low-power wide area device obtains independent location data via a narrow band path of a low-power wide area network;
obtaining, by the network server, the GPS location data and the independent location data;
determining, by the network server, that a spatio-temporal misalignment exists between the independent location data and the GPS location data for the mobile transportation equipment;
providing, by the network server, spatio-temporal data alignment that generates electronic logging device estimates and low-power wide area device estimates;
determining, by the network server, that a GPS spoofing attack has occurred based on the electronic logging device estimates and the low-power wide area device estimates;
creating, by the network server, a GPS spoofing alert for the mobile transportation equipment; and
generating, by the network server, an hours of service correction command that includes the GPS spoofing alert, wherein the hours of service correction command instructs the electronic logging device to update an hours of service log with corrected route data and spoofing time identifiers corresponding to the GPS spoofing attack.
8. The method of claim 7 , wherein the independent location data includes mobile terminal location response data that is joined to local data sensor measurements.
9. The method of claim 7 , wherein the electronic logging device maintains an hours of service record that tracks movement of the mobile transportation equipment based on the GPS location data.
10. The method of claim 7 , further comprising:
detecting, by the network server, that an off-duty driving mode was activated on the mobile transportation equipment; and
obtaining, by the network server, a location obfuscation constraint parameter that defines an allowable deviation distance for the mobile transportation equipment.
11. The method of claim 10 , further comprising in response to determining that a deviation distance exceeds the allowable deviation distance provided by the location obfuscation constraint parameter, generating, by the network server, the corrected route data representing an actual location of the mobile transportation equipment during the GPS spoofing attack.
12. The method of claim 10 , further comprising in response to determining that a deviation distance does not exceed the allowable deviation distance provided by the location obfuscation constraint parameter, withholding, by the network server, the GPS spoofing alert from being provided to the electronic logging device until the deviation distance exceeds the allowable deviation distance.
13. A computer storage medium having computer-executable instructions stored thereon that, in response to execution by a processor, causes the processor to perform operations comprising:
identifying a mobile transportation equipment comprising an electronic logging device and a low-power wide area device, wherein the electronic logging device obtains global positioning system (GPS) location data from a GPS receiver unit and the low-power wide area device obtains independent location data via a narrow band path of a low-power wide area network;
obtaining the GPS location data and the independent location data;
determining that a spatio-temporal misalignment exists between the independent location data and the GPS location data for the mobile transportation equipment;
providing spatio-temporal data alignment that generates electronic logging device estimates and low-power wide area device estimates;
determining that a GPS spoofing attack has occurred based on the electronic logging device estimates and the low-power wide area device estimates;
creating a GPS spoofing alert for the mobile transportation equipment; and
generating an hours of service correction command that includes the GPS spoofing alert, wherein the hours of service correction command instructs the electronic logging device to update an hours of service log with corrected route data and spoofing time identifiers corresponding to the GPS spoofing attack.
14. The computer storage medium of claim 13 , wherein the independent location data includes mobile terminal location response data that is joined to local data sensor measurements.
15. The computer storage medium of claim 13 , wherein the operations further comprise:
detecting that an off-duty driving mode was activated on the mobile transportation equipment; and
obtaining a location obfuscation constraint parameter that defines an allowable deviation distance for the mobile transportation equipment.
16. The computer storage medium of claim 15 , wherein the operations further comprise in response to determining that a deviation distance exceeds the allowable deviation distance provided by the location obfuscation constraint parameter, generating the corrected route data representing an actual location of the mobile transportation equipment during the GPS spoofing attack.
17. The computer storage medium of claim 15 , wherein the operations further comprise in response to determining that a deviation distance does not exceed the allowable deviation distance provided by the location obfuscation constraint parameter, withholding the GPS spoofing alert from being provided to the electronic logging device until the deviation distance exceeds the allowable deviation distance.