Device attestation including attestation-key modification following boot event
A device including a network interface, a memory and a processor. The network interface is configured to communicate with a verifier over a communication network. The memory is configured to store multiple layers of mutable code, the layers identifiable by respective measurements. The processor is configured to generate, for a given boot cycle, a nonce associated uniquely with the given boot cycle, to receive a challenge from the verifier for attestation of a given layer of the mutable code, to calculate an attestation key based on (i) a Unique Device Secret (UDS) stored securely in the device, (ii) a measurement of the given layer taken by another layer, and (iii) the nonce generated for the given boot cycle, to calculate a response for the challenge, by signing the challenge using the attestation key, and to send the response to the verifier for verification of the given layer.
1. A device, comprising:
a network interface configured to communicate with a verifier over a communication network;
a memory configured to store multiple layers of mutable code, the multiple layers being identifiable by respective measurements; and
a processor, configured to:
for a given boot cycle, generate a nonce associated uniquely with the given boot cycle;
receive a challenge from the verifier for attestation of a given layer of the mutable code;
derive an attestation key depending on (i) a Unique Device Secret (UDS) stored securely in the device, (ii) a measurement of the given layer taken by another layer, and (iii) the nonce generated for the given boot cycle;
calculate a response for the challenge, by signing the challenge using the attestation key that was derived depending at least on the nonce associated with the given boot cycle; and
send the response to the verifier for verification of the given layer.
2. The device according to claim 1 , wherein the attestation key comprises a symmetric key that depends on the nonce, and wherein the processor is configured to calculate the response by signing at least the challenge using the symmetric key, and to send both the response and the nonce to the verifier.
3. A method, comprising:
in a device that communicates with a verifier over a communication network,
storing in a memory of the device multiple layers of mutable code, the multiple layers being identifiable by respective measurements;
for a given boot cycle, generating a nonce associated uniquely with the given boot cycle;
receiving a challenge from the verifier for attestation of a given layer of the mutable code;
deriving an attestation key depending on (i) a Unique Device Secret (UDS) stored securely in the device, (ii) a measurement of the given layer taken by another layer, and (iii) the nonce generated for the given boot cycle;
calculating a response for the challenge, by signing the challenge using the attestation key that was derived depending at least on the nonce associated with the given boot cycle; and
sending the response to the verifier for verification of the given layer.
4. The method according to claim 3 , wherein the attestation key comprises a symmetric key that depends on the nonce, and wherein calculating the response comprises signing at least the challenge using the symmetric key, and sending both the response and the nonce to the verifier.