Deceiving attackers accessing active directory data
Endpoints in a network execute a sensor module that intercepts commands. The sensor module compares a source of commands to a sanctioned list of applications received from a management server. If the source does not match a sanctioned application and the command is a write or delete command, the command is ignored and a simulated acknowledgment is sent. If the command is a read command, deception data is returned instead. In some embodiments, certain data is protected such that commands will be ignored or modified to refer to deception data where the source is not a sanctioned application. The source may be verified to be a sanctioned application by evaluating a certificate, hash, or path of the source. Responses from an active directory server may be intercepted and modified to reference a decoy server when not addressed to a sanctioned application.
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a computer system, a first response from an active directory server;
(a) replacing, by the computer system, a first reference in the response with a second reference referencing a decoy server to obtain a modified response;
(b) returning, by the computer system, the modified response to a source application referenced by the first response,
wherein the first response is a response to a request for session data received from the active directory server; and
wherein the first reference is an address of an endpoint logged in to an administrator account on the active directory server.
2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:
intercepting, by an agent executing on the computer system, the first response from a function of an operating system on the computer system that is programmed to interface with the active directory server.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the second reference is a credential to authenticate with respect to the decoy server.
4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the second reference effective to authenticate with respect to a service executing on the decoy server; and
wherein the method further comprises:
receiving, by the decoy server, an attempt to access the service by the source application using the second reference;
in response to the attempt, performing, by the decoy server, access of the service; and
monitoring, by the decoy server, activities of the source application with respect to the service.
5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising performing (a) and (b) in response to determining, by the computer system, that the source application is not in a list of sanctioned applications.
6. The method of claim 5 , wherein determining that the source application is not in the list of sanctioned applications comprises determining that the source application does not have a certificate matching one of the sanctioned applications.
7. The method of claim 5 , wherein determining that the source application is not in the list of sanctioned applications comprises determining that a hash of binary code for the source application does not match a hash of one of the sanctioned applications.
8. The method of claim 5 , wherein determining that the source application is not in the list of sanctioned applications comprises determining that a path to binary code corresponding the source application does not match a path to one of the sanctioned applications.
9. The method of claim 5 , further comprising:
receiving a third response from the active directory server;
(c) determining that the third response is addressed to a first sanctioned application that is one of the sanctioned applications; and
in response to (c), returning data from the third response to the first sanctioned application.
10. A system comprising one or more hardware processing devices and one or more memory devices operably coupled to the one or more hardware memory devices, the one or more hardware memory devices storing executable code effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
receive a first response from an active directory server;
(a) replace a first reference in the response with a second reference referencing a decoy server to obtain a modified response;
(b) return the modified response to a source application referenced by the first response,
wherein the first response is a response to a request for session data received from the active directory server; and
wherein the first reference is an address of an endpoint logged in to an administrator account on the active directory server.
11. The system of claim 10 , wherein the executable code is further effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
intercept, by an agent executing on the system, the first response from a function of an operating system executing on the system that is programmed to interface with the active directory server.
12. The system of claim 10 , wherein the second reference is a credential to authenticate with respect to the decoy server.
13. The system of claim 10 , wherein the second reference is effective to authenticate with respect to a service executing on the decoy server further comprising the decoy server; and
wherein the system further comprises a decoy server that is programmed to:
receive an attempt to access the service by the source application using the second reference;
in response to the attempt, perform access of the service; and
monitor activities of the source application with respect to the service.
14. The system of claim 10 , wherein the executable code is further effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
perform (a) and (b) in response to determining that the source application is not in a list of sanctioned applications.
15. The system of claim 14 , wherein the executable code is further effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
determine that the source application is not in the list of sanctioned applications comprises determining that the source application does not have a certificate matching one of the sanctioned applications.
16. The system of claim 14 , wherein the executable code is further effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
determine that the source application is not in the list of sanctioned applications comprises determining that a hash of binary code for the source application does not match a hash of one of the sanctioned applications.
17. The system of claim 14 , wherein the executable code is further effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
determine that the source application is not in the list of sanctioned applications comprises determining that a path to binary code corresponding to the source application does not match a path to one of the sanctioned applications.
18. The system of claim 14 , wherein the executable code is further effective to cause the one or more hardware processing devices to:
receive a third response from the active directory server;
(c) determine that the third response is addressed to a first sanctioned application that is one of the sanctioned applications; and
in response to (c), return data from the third response to the first sanctioned application.