Global navigation satellite system integrated circuit and associated communication system and associated identification and positioning method

1. A global navigation satellite system (GNSS) integrated circuit (IC), comprising:

a GNSS circuitry, arranged operably to receive a to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal;

a memory, arranged operably to store a plurality of ephemeris aiding data candidates, wherein the ephemeris aiding data candidates are not provided by the GNSS circuitry; and

a processor, arranged operably to determine whether the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal based on an ephemeris aiding data reference in the ephemeris aiding data candidates,

wherein the GNSS IC comprises a valid time reference, and the processor is arranged operably to obtain the ephemeris aiding data reference from the ephemeris aiding data candidates based on the valid time reference.

2. The GNSS IC of claim 1 , wherein the processor is arranged operably to determine that the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal when a difference between a parameter of the ephemeris aiding data reference, and the parameter of to-be-identified ephemeris data in the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is greater than a threshold.

3. The GNSS IC of claim 2 , wherein the processor is arranged operably to perform positioning based on the ephemeris aiding data reference rather than the to-be-identified ephemeris data in response to an attack event in which the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal.

4. The GNSS IC of claim 3 , wherein the ephemeris aiding data candidates are provided by a Wi-Fi receiver.

5. The GNSS IC of claim 1 , comprising:

a real-time clock, arranged operably to provide a valid clock time,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to consider the valid clock time as the valid time reference.

6. The GNSS IC of claim 1 , comprising:

a transmission interface,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to receive a valid time through any of the transmission interface and the non-GNSS receiver, and consider the valid time as the valid time reference.

7. The GNSS IC of claim 1 , wherein the processor is arranged operably to consider a GNSS time of the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal as the valid time reference.

8. The GNSS IC of claim 1 , wherein the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a first to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal, and the ephemeris aiding data reference is a first ephemeris aiding data reference,

wherein the GNSS circuitry is arranged operably to receive a second to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal comprising a second GNSS time after receiving the first to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to treat one of ephemeris aiding data candidates except for the first ephemeris aiding data reference as a second ephemeris aiding data reference based on the second GNSS time when the second GNSS time falls outside of a time range corresponding to the first ephemeris aiding data reference,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to determine whether the second to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal based on the second ephemeris aiding data reference.

9. A communication system, comprising:

a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) integrated circuit (IC), comprising:

a GNSS circuitry, arranged operably to receive a to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal;

a memory, arranged operably to store a plurality of ephemeris aiding data candidates, wherein the ephemeris aiding data candidates are not provided by the GNSS circuitry; and

a processor, arranged operably to determine whether the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal based on an ephemeris aiding data reference in the ephemeris aiding data candidates;

an antenna, coupled to the GNSS IC,

wherein the GNSS IC comprises a valid time reference, and the processor is arranged operably to obtain the ephemeris aiding data reference from the ephemeris aiding data candidates based on the valid time reference.

10. The communication system of claim 9 , wherein the processor is arranged operably to determine that the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal when a difference between a parameter of the ephemeris aiding data reference, and the parameter of to-be-identified ephemeris data in the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is greater than a threshold.

11. The communication system of claim 10 , wherein the processor is arranged operably to perform positioning based on the ephemeris aiding data reference rather than the to-be-identified ephemeris data in response to an attack event in which the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal.

12. The communication system of claim 11 , wherein the ephemeris aiding data candidates are provided by a Wi-Fi receiver.

13. The communication system of claim 9 , wherein the GNSS IC comprises:

a real-time clock, arranged operably to provide a valid clock time,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to consider the valid clock time as the valid time reference.

14. The communication system of claim 9 , wherein the GNSS IC comprises:

a transmission interface,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to receive a valid time through any of the transmission interface and the non-GNSS receiver, and consider the valid time as the valid time reference.

15. The communication system of claim 9 , wherein the processor is arranged operably to consider a GNSS time of the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal as the valid time reference.

16. The communication system of claim 9 , the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a first to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal, and the ephemeris aiding data reference is a first ephemeris aiding data reference,

wherein the GNSS circuitry is arranged operably to receive a second to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal comprising a second GNSS time after receiving the first to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to treat one of ephemeris aiding data candidates except for the first ephemeris aiding data reference as a second ephemeris aiding data reference based on the second GNSS time when the second GNSS time falls outside of a time range corresponding to the first ephemeris aiding data reference,

wherein the processor is arranged operably to determine whether the second to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal based on the second ephemeris aiding data reference.

17. An identification and positioning method, performed by a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) integrated circuit (IC), comprising:

providing a plurality of ephemeris aiding data candidates, wherein the ephemeris aiding data candidates are not provided by a GNSS circuitry;

receiving a to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal;

providing a valid time reference in the GNSS IC;

obtaining an ephemeris aiding data reference from the ephemeris aiding data candidates based on the valid time reference; and

determining whether the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal based on the ephemeris aiding data reference in the ephemeris aiding data candidates.

18. The identification and positioning method of claim 17 , comprising:

determining that the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal when a difference between a parameter of the ephemeris aiding data reference, and the parameter of to-be-identified ephemeris data in the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is greater than a threshold; and

performing positioning based on the ephemeris aiding data reference rather than the to-be-identified ephemeris data in response to an attack event in which the to-be-identified broadcast GNSS signal is a spoofing signal.