IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,282,956
Granted Patent B2
US 12,282,956 · App. 17/668,936 · Granted Apr 22, 2025

Securing distributed electronic wallet shares

Inventors: Michael Nolan (Maynooth, IE); Davide Carboni (London, GB); Ned M. Smith (Beaverton, OR)
Assignee: Intel Corporation
G06Q40/04G06Q20/36G06Q20/3825G06Q20/3829G06Q20/401H04L9/0637H04L9/0891H04L9/12H04L9/3236H04L63/123H04L9/50H04L67/104H04L2209/805
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,282,956
App. No.
17/668,936
Granted
Apr 22, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

Methods and systems are provided for securing distributed shares of an electronic wallet. An example method includes provisioning a plurality of devices each hosting an e-wallet share with enhanced privacy identification (EPID) private keys for the e-wallet share. A signature is posted for the e-wallet share to a blockchain. A determination is made as to whether the e-wallet share is compromised, and, if so, posting a revocation list comprising the signature for the e-wallet share to a blockchain.

Claims (72)

1. A method for securing distributed shares of an e-wallet in multiple devices, comprising:

configuring, by a first device, a plurality of devices each hosting an e-wallet share with corresponding private keys generated with a privacy-enhanced attestation algorithm;

receiving at the first device, from one of the plurality of devices, a signature for the e-wallet share corresponding to the one of the plurality of devices;

determining that the e-wallet share is compromised, and, if so, posting, by the first device, a revocation list comprising the signature for the e-wallet share to a blockchain;

receiving, by the first device, an indication of a transaction, wherein one of the plurality of devices is to create the transaction by the e-wallet share, sign the transaction with a private key, and post the transaction to the blockchain;

verifying, by the first device, the signature using a public key for the e-wallet share;

comparing the signature to the revocation list;

aborting the transaction if the signature is on the revocation list;

prompting a user for a transaction approval for a transaction from the e-wallet share;

signing the transaction;

updating an e-wallet balance for the e-wallet share; and

sending a balance synchronization message to the plurality of devices each hosting the e-wallet share.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the privacy-enhanced attestation algorithm includes enhanced privacy identification (EPID).

3. The method of claim 1 , comprising:

sending a wake signal to the plurality of devices from a device hosting the e-wallet share.

4. The method of claim 3 , comprising:

returning an acknowledgment message for the balance synchronization message; and

adjusting a balance based, at least in part, on the balance synchronization message.

5. The method of claim 1 , comprising:

dividing an amount for a transaction by a number of seller e-wallet shares to form fractional transactions; and

confirming that a sum of the fractional transactions does not exceed a threshold amount for a seller e-wallet.

6. The method of claim 5 , comprising increasing the number of seller e-wallet shares used for the transaction if the sum of the fractional transactions exceeds the threshold amount for the seller e-wallet.

7. A non-transitory, machine-readable medium, comprising instructions that, when executed, directs a processor to:

configure, by a first device including the processor, a plurality of devices with a corresponding plurality of e-wallet shares with private keys generated with a privacy-enhanced attestation algorithm;

receive, by the first device, from one of the plurality of devices, a signature from one of the plurality of e-wallet shares based, at least in part, on a public key for the one;

if the one has been compromised, post, by the first device, the signature to a revocation list on a blockchain;

receive, by the first device, an indication of a transaction, wherein one of the plurality of devices is to create the transaction by the e-wallet share, sign the transaction with a private key, and post the transaction to the blockchain;

verify, by the first device, the signature using a public key for the e-wallet share;

compare the signature to the revocation list;

abort the transaction if the signature is on the revocation list;

prompt a user for a transaction approval for a transaction from the e-wallet share;

sign the transaction;

update an e-wallet balance for the e-wallet share; and

send a balance synchronization message to the plurality of devices each hosting the e-wallet share.

8. The non-transitory, machine-readable medium of claim 7 , comprising instructions that, when executed, directs the processor to:

send a signal to the plurality of e-wallet shares from the one of the plurality of e-wallet shares after it has completed a transaction; and

send a balance synchronization message to the plurality of e-wallet shares from the one.

9. The non-transitory, machine-readable medium of claim 7 , comprising instructions that, when executed, directs the processor to:

determine a fractional transaction to be allocated to each of the plurality of e-wallet shares; and

match a total sum of fractional transactions to spending limits for an e-wallet link to the plurality of e-wallet shares.

10. The non-transitory, machine-readable medium of claim 9 , comprising instructions that, when executed, directs the processor to:

map shares of an e-wallet for a buyer to shares of an e-wallet for a seller; and

sign a fractional transaction using a public key for each of the shares of an e-wallet for a buyer.

11. The non-transitory, machine-readable medium of claim 7 , comprising instructions that, when executed, directs the processor to:

confirm that a signature used by an e-wallet share is valid; and

clear a transaction.

12. A device for securing distributed e-wallet shares, comprising:

a processor; and

storage to store instructions to direct the processor to:

configure, by the device, a plurality of devices each hosting an e-wallet share with corresponding private keys generated with a privacy-enhanced attestation algorithm;

receive at the device, from one of the plurality of devices, a signature for the e-wallet share corresponding to the one of the plurality of devices;

determine that the e-wallet share is compromised, and, if so, posting, by the device, a revocation list comprising the signature for the e-wallet share to a blockchain;

receive, by the device, an indication of a transaction, wherein one of the plurality of devices is to create the transaction by the e-wallet share, sign the transaction with a private key, and post the transaction to the blockchain;

verify, by the device, the signature using a public key for the e-wallet share;

compare the signature to the revocation list;

abort the transaction if the signature is on the revocation list;

prompt a user for a transaction approval for a transaction from the e-wallet share;

sign the transaction;

update an e-wallet balance for the e-wallet share; and

send a balance synchronization message to the plurality of devices each hosting the e-wallet share.

13. An apparatus for securing multiple distributed e-wallet shares, comprising:

means for configuring, by a first device, a plurality of devices each hosting an e-wallet share with corresponding private keys generated with a privacy-enhanced attestation algorithm;

means for receiving at the first device, from one of the plurality of devices, a signature for the e-wallet share corresponding to the one of the plurality of devices;

means for determining that the e-wallet share is compromised, and, if so, posting, by the first device, a revocation list comprising the signature for the e-wallet share to a blockchain;

means for receiving, by the first device, an indication of a transaction, wherein one of the plurality of devices is to create the transaction by the e-wallet share, sign the transaction with a private key, and post the transaction to the blockchain;

means for verifying, by the first device, the signature using a public key for the e-wallet share;

means for comparing the signature to the revocation list;

means for aborting the transaction if the signature is on the revocation list;

means for prompting a user for a transaction approval for a transaction from the e-wallet share;

means for signing the transaction;

means for updating an e-wallet balance for the e-wallet share; and

means for sending a balance synchronization message to the plurality of devices each hosting the e-wallet share.

Continuity (2)
Continuation 15859208 · Dec 29, 2017
Related Publication 20220245724A1 · Aug 4, 2022
References Cited (120)
US 5892900A · Ginter et al. · 1999 [cited by applicant]
US 8577795B2 · Clubb · 2013 [cited by examiner]
US 9454723B1 · Cordes et al. · 2016 [cited by applicant]
US 9608829B2 · Spanos · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 10354325B1 · Skala et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 10909541B1 · Maeng · 2021 [cited by applicant]
US 11288740B2 · Nolan et al. · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 11386420B2 · Nolan et al. · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20140012749A1 · Lee · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20140046788A1 · Lee · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20150019320A1 · Menendez · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 20150220928A1 · Allen · 2015 [cited by applicant]
US 20150324789A1 · Dvorak et al. · 2015 [cited by applicant]
US 20160080157A1 · Lundstrom · 2016 [cited by applicant]
US 20160125412A1 · Cannon · 2016 [cited by applicant]
US 20160292672A1 · Fay · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20160328700A1 · Bortolotto et al. · 2016 [cited by applicant]
US 20170011460A1 · Molinari et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 20170053268A1 · Pande · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 20170062072A1 · Ghosh et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 20170287090A1 · Hunn et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 20170330174A1 · Demarinis et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 20170357780A1 · Childress et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 20170364908A1 · Smith et al. · 2017 [cited by applicant]
US 20180006826A1 · Smith · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20180025442A1 · Isaacson · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20180091316A1 · Stradling et al. · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20180109541A1 · Gleichauf · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20180183586A1 · Bhargav-Spantzel et al. · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20180205743A1 · Mciver et al. · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20180302414A1 · Wagner · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20180337769A1 · Gleichauf · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20180345904A1 · Moore et al. · 2018 [cited by applicant]
US 20190034917A1 · Nolan et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20190034919A1 · Nolan et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20190034920A1 · Nolan et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20190034936A1 · Nolan et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20190035018A1 · Nolan et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20190080321A1 · Mundis et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20190080392A1 · Youb · 2019 [cited by examiner]
US 20190108542A1 · Durvasula et al. · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20200119933A1 · Toll et al. · 2020 [cited by applicant]
TW 201828211A · 2018 [cited by applicant]
WO WO2011068738A2 · 2011 [cited by applicant]
WO WO2012161738A1 · 2012 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2013095486A1 · 2013 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2016134039A1 · 2016 [cited by applicant]
WO WO2017197110A1 · 2017 [cited by examiner]
WO 2019066822 · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 11,250,506 B2, 02/2022, Nolan et al. (withdrawn) [cited by applicant]
Illum Software, Inc.: e-Wallet, 2006, pp. 1-25 (Year: 2006). [cited by examiner]
Intel Corp: A Cost-Effective Foundation for End-to-End IoT Security, 2016, White Paper, IoT Security, pp. 1-5 (Year: 2016). [cited by examiner]
Puri, Deepak: IoT Security: Intel EPID simplifies authentication of IoT devices, Sep. 21, 2016, Network World, pp. 1-10. (Year: 2016). [cited by examiner]
Brickell et al.: Enhanced Privacy ID: A Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme with Enhanced Revocation Capabilities, May/Jun. 2012, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 345-360 (Year: 2… [cited by examiner]
Ruan, Xiaoyu: Privacy at the Next Level: Intel's Enhanced Privacy Identification (EPID) Technology, Aug. 9, 2014, Springer Link, pp. 1-32. (Year: 2014). [cited by examiner]
Noubir et al.: Trusted Code Execution on Untrusted Platform using Intel SGX, Oct. 2016, Virus Bulletin Conference, pp. 1-7 (Year: 2016). [cited by examiner]
“#025-Blocksize, SegWit, and Censorship”, Everyday Crypto;, <{hltps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KaH5w8dZPpo&feature=youtube)>, (Feb. 2, 2017), 34 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“A Cost-Effective Foundation for End-to-End IoT Security”, Intel Corp, White Paper, IoT Security, (2016), 1-5. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Final Office Action mailed Apr. 7, 2021”, 15 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Non Final Office Action mailed Jul. 23, 2020”, 18 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Notice of Allowance mailed Jul. 2, 2021”, 15 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Notice of Allowance mailed Oct. 5, 2021”, 11 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Response filed Jun. 4, 2021 to Final Office Action mailed Apr. 7, 2021”, 9 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Response filed Jun. 26, 2020 to Restriction Requirement mailed Apr. 29, 2020”, 10 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Response filed Aug. 3, 2020 to Non Final Office Action mailed Jul. 23, 2020”, 25 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Restriction Requirement mailed Apr. 29, 2020”, 6 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,208, Supplemental Notice of Allowability mailed Mar. 1, 2022”, 3 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Advisory Action mailed Oct. 9, 2020”, 5 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Final Office Action mailed Jun. 23, 2020”, 40 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Non Final Office Action mailed Jan. 2, 2020”, 35 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Non Final Office Action mailed Mar. 17, 2021”, 22 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Response filed May 4, 2020 to Non Final Office Action mailed Jan. 2, 2020”, 36 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Response filed Sep. 23, 2020 to Final Office Action mailed Jun. 23, 2020”, 14 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,211, Response to Advisory Action mailed Oct. 9, 2020”, 11 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Advisory Action mailed Jun. 29, 2021”, 4 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Final Office Action mailed Mar. 12, 2021”, 29 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Non Final Office Action mailed Apr. 30, 2020”, 29 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Non Final Office Action mailed Oct. 15, 2020”, 28 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Non Final Office Action mailed Dec. 7, 2021”, 35 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Response filed Jan. 26, 2021 to Non Final Office Action mailed Oct. 15, 2020”, 14 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Response filed Mar. 10, 2020 to Restriction Requirement mailed Jan. 10, 2020”, 9 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Response filed Jun. 14, 2021 to Final Office Action mailed Mar. 12, 2021”, 13 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Response filed Jul. 12, 2021 to Advisory Action mailed Jun. 29, 2021”, 13 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Response Filed Jul. 30, 2020 to Non Final Office Action mailed Apr. 30, 2020”, 32 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Restriction Requirement mailed Jan. 10, 2020”, 6 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Final Office Action mailed Dec. 9, 2020”, 15 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Non Final Office Action mailed Jun. 16, 2020”, 16 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Non Final Office Action mailed Jun. 24, 2021”, 15 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Response filed Apr. 9, 2021 to Final Office Action mailed Dec. 9, 2020”, 10 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Response filed Oct. 16, 2020 to Non Final Office Action mailed Jun. 16, 2020”, 11 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,216, Examiner Interview Summary mailed Apr. 6, 2021”, 2 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,216, Final Office Action mailed Nov. 25, 2020”, 28 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,216, Non Final Office Action mailed May 18, 2020”, 20 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,216, Response filed Apr. 7, 2020 to Restriction Requirement mailed Feb. 7, 2020”, 11 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,216, Response filed Sep. 16, 2020 to Non Final Office Action mailed May 18, 2020”, 15 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,216, Restriction Requirement mailed Feb. 7, 2020”, 9 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“Multisignature”, [Online]. Retrieved from the Internet: <https://web.archive.Org/web/20171124123130/https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Multisignature>, (Nov. 24, 2017), 3 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“Sovrin: A Protocol and Token for Self-Sovereign Identity and Decentralized Trust”, Sovrin Foundation, Version 1, <https://sovrin .org/wp-content/uploads/20 18/03/Sovrin-Protocol-and-Token-White-Paper.pdf>, (Jan. 2018),… [cited by applicant]
“Tor (anonymity network)”, [Online]. Retrieved from the Internet: <https://web.archive.Org/web/20171109052921/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Tor_(anonymity_network)>, (Nov. 9, 2017), 13 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“Trezor, Bitcoin Security Beyond Bitcoin, Trezor Blog”, TREZOR Blog, Czech Republic, (Nov. 22, 2016), 10 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Brickell, et al., “Enhanced Privacy ID: A Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme with Enhanced Revocation Capabilities”, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 9, No. 3, (May/Jun. 2012), 345-360. [cited by applicant]
Gallagher, Sean, “With deletion of one wallet, $280M in Ethereum wallets get frozen”, www.arstechnica.com, USA, <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/11 /with-deletion-of-{ne-wallet-280-m-in-ethereum-wall… [cited by applicant]
Heilman, et al., “TubleBit: An Untrusted Bitcoin-Compatible Anonymous Payment Hub”, USA, (Jun. 3, 2016), 36 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Lei, Zhang, “MEDAPs: secure multi-entities delegated authentication protocols for mobile cloud computing”, Security and Communication Networks, (May 12, 2016), 13 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Lerner, Sergio Demian, “RSK: White Paper Overview”, Argentina, <https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ec5278f8-218c-407a-af3c-ab71a910246d/RSK%20White%20Paper/o20-%Overview.pdf>, last accessed May 16, 2018, (Nov. 19, … [cited by applicant]
Pentland, et al., “Towards an Internet of Trusted Data: A New Framework for Identity and Data Sharing”, MIT connection Science, USA, (Aug. 2016), 19 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Puri, Deepak, “IoT Security: Intel EPID Simplifies Authentication of IoT Devices”, Network World, (Sep. 21, 2016), 1-10. [cited by applicant]
Rakesh, Gopinath Nirmala, “Improving the Security and Efficiency of Blockchain-based Cryptocurrencies”, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, Master's Thesis, (Jun. 30, 2017), 79 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Ruan, Xiaoyu, “Privacy at the Next Level: Intel's Enhanced Privacy Identification (EPID)Technology”, Springer Link, (Aug. 9, 2014), 1-32. [cited by applicant]
Smith, Ned, “Gateways: The Center of Complexity for Update”, Open IoT Summit, (Oct. 2016), 16 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Sovrin, “Sovrin Provisional Trust Framework”, USA,, (Jun. 28, 2017), 30 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Steven, Goldfeder, “Securing Bitcoin wallets via a new DSA/ECDSA threshold signature scheme”, [Online]. Retrieved from the Internet: <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Securing-Bitcoin-wallets-via-a-new-DSA-%2F-ECDS… [cited by applicant]
Tobin, et al., “The Inevitable Rise of Self-Sovereign Identity”, Sovrin, first release, USA, updated Mar. 28, 2017, (Sep. 29, 2016), 24 pgs. [cited by applicant]
Van Wirdum, Aaron, “Mimblewimble: How a Stripped-Down Version of Bitcoin Could Improve Privacy, Fungibility and Scalability All at Once”, Bitcoin Magazine, <https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/mimblewimble-how-a-stripp… [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Final Office Action mailed Apr. 29, 2022”, 35 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Response filed Oct. 25, 2021 to Non Final Office Action mailed Jun. 24, 2021”, 9 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Final Office Action mailed Nov. 3, 2021”, 17 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Response filed Jan. 20, 2022 to Final Office Action mailed Nov. 3, 2021”, 11 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,213, Notice of Allowance mailed Mar. 7, 2022”, 9 pgs. [cited by applicant]
“U.S. Appl. No. 15/859,212, Response filed Mar. 7, 2022 to Non Final Office Action mailed Dec. 7, 2021”, 14 pgs. [cited by applicant]