IP Library Granted Patent US 12,372,661
Granted Patent B2
US 12,372,661 · App. 18/007,041 · Granted Jul 29, 2025

Computer implemented method for detecting global navigation satellite system signal spoofing, a data processing apparatus, a computer program product, and a computer-readable storage medium

Inventors: David Gomez Casco (Leiden, NL); Gonzalo Seco Granados (Barcelona, ES); Jose Antonio Lopez Salcedo (Barcelona, ES); Ignacio Fernanez Hernandez (Brussels, BE)
Assignee: THE EUROPEAN UNION, REPRESENTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
G01S19/215G01S19/115G01S19/243
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,372,661
App. No.
18/007,041
Granted
Jul 29, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A computer-implemented method is for detecting Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal spoofing. The method includes storing sample sequences of the predictable part and of the unpredictable part of a GNSS signal at a GNSS receiver. The predictable part includes predictable bits and the unpredictable part includes unpredictable bits. The value of the unpredictable bits from which the unpredictable sample sequences are extracted is verified. A first and a second partial correlation between the unpredictable, respectively predictable, sample sequences and a locally stored GNSS signal replica are computed. A predefined metric from the complex valued partial correlations is calculated. The predefined metric is compared with a predefined threshold value. In a zero-delay replay attack, the spoofer estimates the unpredictable bits introduced by a GNSS authentication protocol and introduces distortion into the signal. Detecting this distortion indicates whether the signal under analysis is being spoofed or is authentic.

Claims (34)

1. A computer-implemented method for detecting Global Navigation Satellite System, signal spoofing, the method comprising:

a) digitizing, acquiring and tracking, at a receiver, a GNSS signal from at least one GNSS satellite, the GNSS signal comprising a predictable part and an unpredictable part, wherein the predictable part comprises predictable bits and the unpredictable part comprises unpredictable bits;

b) storing, by the receiver, a sample sequence y pred *(n) of the predictable part and a sample sequence y unpred *(n) of the unpredictable part of the GNSS signal;

c) verifying, by the receiver, a value of the unpredictable bits from which the unpredictable sample sequences are extracted;

d) computing, by the receiver, a first partial correlation B′ unpred between the unpredictable sample sequences and a locally stored GNSS signal replica x and a second partial correlation B′ pred (k) between the predictable sample sequences and the locally stored GNSS signal replica x(n) by:

B′ unpred ( k )=Σ n=1 samples y unpred *( n )* x ( n ); and

B′ pred =Σ n=1 samples y pred *( n )* x ( n ),

and removing a sign of the first partial correlation and the second partial correlation by B unpred,pred (k)=b(k)B′ unpred,pred (k) where b(k) is the value of the bit;

e) calculating, by the receiver, a predefined metric R from the first and the second partial correlation, the predefined metric R being:

R 3 =|1/ N b Σ k=1 N b ( B unpred ( k )− B pred ( k )); and

f) comparing the predefined metric with a predefined threshold value to detect GNSS signal spoofing.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein step b) comprises:

storing, as an unpredictable sample sequence y unpred *(n), a sample sequence y beg *(n) of a beginning part of an unpredictable bit and storing, as a predictable sample sequence y pred *(n), a sample sequence y end *(n) of a later part, such as the end part, of the unpredictable bit; or

storing, as an unpredictable sample sequence y unpred *(n), a sample sequence y beg *of the beginning part of an unpredictable bit and storing, as a predictable sample sequence y pred *(n), a sample sequence y end *(n) of a predictable bit.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein W u,d is a duration of a single one of the stored unpredictable sample sequences and W p,d is a duration of a single one of the stored predictable sample sequences.

4. The method according to claim 3 , wherein W u,d and/or W p,d are greater than 0.05 ms, and smaller than 1 ms.

5. The method according to claim 1 wherein step b) comprises storing sample sequences representing at least a part of at least 50 bits for the unpredictable sample and/or for the predictable sample.

6. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the predefined threshold is based on a cumulative density function of the metric R under the hypothesis that the GNSS signal is authentic.

7. The method according to claim 6 , wherein the predefined threshold is set to a value leading to a false alarm probability of 0.02.

8. The method according to claim 1 , wherein step f) comprises authenticating the GNSS signal when no signal spoofing is detected by:

authenticating the GNSS signal when its predefined metric is below the predefined threshold; and

detecting GNSS signal spoofing when its predefined metric is above the predefined threshold.

9. The method according to claim 1 , wherein step a) comprises receiving GNSS signals from at least four different GNSS satellites, the GNSS signals comprising spreading codes and satellite data, the satellite data including the unpredictable part; and wherein the method further comprises:

g) calculating, by the receiver, the GNSS signals' time of arrival from the spreading codes; and

h) calculating, by the receiver, its a position, velocity and time by demodulating the satellite data.

10. The method according to claim 9 , wherein step f comprises authenticating the GNSS signal when no signal spoofing is detected by:

authenticating the GNSS signal when its the predefined metric is below the predefined threshold; and

detecting GNSS signal spoofing when its the predefined metric is above the predefined threshold, and

wherein steps g) and h) are performed only when at least four GNSS signals from at least four different GNSS satellites have been authenticated.

11. The method according to claim 1 , wherein step b) comprises storing the sample sequence y unpred *(n) of the unpredictable part of the GNSS signal based on randomly selected unpredictable bits; or

wherein step d) comprises calculating the first partial correlation B′ unpred (k) between the unpredictable sample sequences and a locally stored GNSS signal replica x(n) based on a randomly selected subset of the unpredictable sample sequences.

12. A data processing apparatus, comprising means for carrying out the method of claim 1 .

13. A non-transitive computer program product comprising instructions which, when the program is executed by a computer, cause the computer to carry out the method of claim 1 .

14. A non-transitive computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions which, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to carry out the method of claim 1 .

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 9, 2023
From: GOMEZ CASCO, DAVID; SECO GRANADOS, GONZALO; LOPEZ SALCEDO, JOSE ANTONIO; FERNANDEZ HERNANDEZ, IGNACIO
To: THE EUROPEAN UNION, REPRESENTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Reel/Frame 063586/0035 →
Priority Claims (1)
EP 20188808 · Jul 31, 2020 · regional
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20230305167A1 · Sep 28, 2023
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