Preventing replacement and clone attacks using a secure processing environment

1. A device comprising:

a storage device, the storage device including a first physically unclonable function (PUF) and configured to generate a storage device public key and a storage device private key; and

a secure environment, the secure environment including a controller configured for:

transmitting a nonce value to the storage device;

receiving a response from the storage device, the response including a unique identifier (UID) and a digital signature, the digital signature generated using the UID and the nonce value;

validating the digital signature using a public key of the storage device; and

issuing a command to the storage device after validating the digital signature.

2. The device of claim 1 , the controller further configured for receiving the command prior to transmitting the nonce value.

3. The device of claim 1 , the controller further configured for receiving the storage device public key from the storage device in response to a signed replace key command, the signed replace key command received from a key management server and signed using a private key corresponding to a key management server public key stored by the secure environment and the storage device.

4. The device of claim 1 , wherein the response further includes a copy of the nonce value and the controller is further configured for validating that the copy of the nonce value is equal to the nonce value.

5. The device of claim 1 , the controller further configured for receiving a second response from a second storage device and disallowing a command accessing the second storage device upon determining that a second digital signature generated by the second storage device is not valid.

6. The device of claim 1 , wherein the secure environment comprises a trusted execution environment and the storage device comprises one of a persistent storage device or a volatile storage device.

7. A method comprising:

transmitting, by a secure environment, a nonce value to a storage device;

receiving, by the secure environment, a response from the storage device, the response including a unique identifier (UID) and a digital signature, the digital signature generated using the UID and the nonce value;

validating, by the secure environment, the digital signature using a public key of the storage device; and

issuing, by the secure environment, a command to the storage device after validating the digital signature.

8. The method of claim 7 , further comprising receiving the command prior to transmitting the nonce value.

9. The method of claim 7 , wherein the public key of the storage device comprises a public key derived from a physically unclonable function of the storage device.

10. The method of claim 7 , further comprising receiving the public key from the storage device in response to a signed replace key command, the signed replace key command received from a key management server and signed using a private key corresponding to a key management server public key stored by the secure environment and the storage device.

11. The method of claim 7 , wherein the response further includes a copy of the nonce value and the method further comprises validating that the copy of the nonce value is equal to the nonce value.

12. The method of claim 7 , further comprising receiving a second response from a second storage device and disallowing a command accessing the second storage device upon determining that a second digital signature generated by the second storage device is not valid.

13. The method of claim 7 , wherein the secure environment comprises a trusted execution environment and the storage device comprises one of a persistent storage device or a volatile storage device.

14. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium for tangibly storing computer program instructions capable of being executed by a computer processor, the computer program instructions defining steps of:

transmitting, by a secure environment, a nonce value to a storage device;

receiving, by the secure environment, a response from the storage device, the response including a unique identifier (UID) and a digital signature, the digital signature generated using the UID and the nonce value;

validating, by the secure environment, the digital signature using a public key of the storage device; and

issuing, by the secure environment, a command to the storage device after validating the digital signature.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , further comprising receiving the command prior to transmitting the nonce value.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , wherein the public key of the storage device comprises a public key derived from a physically unclonable function of the storage device.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , further comprising receiving the public key from the storage device in response to a signed replace key command, the signed replace key command received from a key management server and signed using a private key corresponding to a key management server public key stored by the secure environment and the storage device.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , wherein the response further includes a copy of the nonce value and the steps further comprise validating that the copy of the nonce value is equal to the nonce value.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , further comprising receiving a second response from a second storage device and disallowing a command accessing the second storage device upon determining that a second digital signature generated by the second storage device is not valid.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14 , wherein the secure environment comprises a trusted execution environment and the storage device comprises one of a persistent storage device or a volatile storage device.