IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,432,260
Granted Patent B1
US 12,432,260 · App. 19/191,580 · Granted Sep 30, 2025

Maintenance and adjustment of encrypted traffic by extracting anchors of trust

Inventors: Ian Macleod (Broomfield, CO); Donald McCarthy (Kingsport, TN); Victor Oppleman (Virginia Beach, VA)
Assignee: PACKET FORENSICS, LLC
H04L63/306H04L63/0442H04L63/0876H04L63/145
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,432,260
App. No.
19/191,580
Granted
Sep 30, 2025
Kind
B1
Abstract

Techniques for inspecting encrypted network communications are presented. The techniques include: intercepting a binary file sent from a resource server to a host computer, where the binary file is configured to facilitate communications between the host computer and a remote server computer; identifying a trust anchor, where the trust anchor is configured to authenticate the remote server computer; replacing the trust anchor in the binary file with a replacement trust anchor, to produce an altered binary file; storing the trust anchor in association with the replacement trust anchor, an identifier of the binary file, and an identifier of the host computer; and passing the altered binary file to the host computer, where the host computer receives the altered binary file instead of the binary file, and where the replacement trust anchor is usable by the host computer to authenticate information in a communication sent by the remote server computer.

Claims (46)

1. A method of inspecting encrypted network communications, the method comprising:

intercepting, by a packet processing computer, a binary file sent from a resource server to a host computer, wherein the binary file is malicious, and wherein the binary file is configured to facilitate communications between the host computer and a remote server computer;

identifying, by the packet processing computer, a trust anchor in a binary stream that contains the binary file, wherein the trust anchor is configured to authenticate the remote server computer;

replacing, by the packet processing computer, the trust anchor in the binary file with a replacement trust anchor, whereby an altered binary file is produced;

storing the trust anchor in association with the replacement trust anchor, an identifier of the binary file, and an identifier of the host computer, wherein the storing is at a storage location that is communicatively accessible by the packet processing computer; and

passing, by the packet processing computer, the altered binary file to the host computer, wherein the altered binary file is received by the host computer instead of the binary file, and wherein the replacement trust anchor is usable by the host computer to authenticate information in a communication sent by the remote server computer.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the binary file comprises malware, and wherein the binary file is requested from the resource server by the host computer after the host computer is compromised.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the packet processing computer is on a network path between the host computer and the resource server.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the trust anchor is at one end of a cryptographic trust chain, wherein another end of the cryptographic trust chain comprises a public key of the remote server computer in an asymmetric cryptographic scheme.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the identifying comprises identifying based on a prior analysis of an instance of the binary file.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the identifying comprises identifying a container data structure for the trust anchor.

7. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

intercepting, by a second packet processing computer, a communication from the remote server computer to the host computer, wherein the communication comprises a digital signature that is configured to be authenticated using the trust anchor;

replacing, by the second packet processing computer, the digital signature by a replacement digital signature, whereby an altered communication is produced, wherein the replacement digital signature is configured to be authenticated by the replacement trust anchor; and

passing, by the second packet processing computer, the altered communication to the host computer, wherein the altered communication is received by the host computer instead of the communication, and wherein the replacement trust anchor is usable by the host computer to authenticate the replacement digital signature.

8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

establishing, by a second packet processing computer, a first encrypted communication channel with the remote server computer using the trust anchor;

establishing, by the second packet processing computer, a second encrypted communication channel with the host computer using the replacement trust anchor; and

transferring, by the second packet processing computer, a communication between the remote server computer and the host computer through the first encrypted communication channel and through the second encrypted communication channel.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein the communication comprises encrypted information, the method further comprising decrypting, by the second packet processing computer, the encrypted information.

10. The method of claim 8 ,

wherein the establishing the first encrypted communication channel comprises establishing a first cryptographic symmetric key, wherein the first cryptographic symmetric key is shared between the second packet processing computer and the remote server computer using the trust anchor, and

wherein the establishing the second encrypted communication channel comprises establishing a second cryptographic symmetric key, wherein the second cryptographic symmetric key is shared between the second packet processing computer and the host computer using the replacement trust anchor.

11. A system for inspecting encrypted network communications, the system comprising: a non-transitory computer readable medium comprising instructions; and at least one electronic processor that executes the instructions to perform operations comprising:

intercepting, by a packet processing computer, a binary file sent from a resource server to a host computer, wherein the binary file is malicious, and wherein the binary file is configured to facilitate communications between the host computer and a remote server computer;

identifying, by the packet processing computer, a trust anchor in a binary stream that contains the binary file, wherein the trust anchor is configured to authenticate the remote server computer;

replacing, by the packet processing computer, the trust anchor in the binary file with a replacement trust anchor, whereby an altered binary file is produced;

storing the trust anchor in association with the replacement trust anchor, an identifier of the binary file, and an identifier of the host computer, wherein the storing is at a storage location that is communicatively accessible by the packet processing computer; and

passing, by the packet processing computer, the altered binary file to the host computer, wherein the altered binary file is received by the host computer instead of the binary file, and wherein the replacement trust anchor is usable by the host computer to authenticate information in a communication sent by the remote server computer.

12. The system of claim 11 , wherein the binary file comprises malware, and wherein the binary file is requested from the resource server by the host computer after the host computer is compromised.

13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the packet processing computer is on a network path between the host computer and the resource server.

14. The system of claim 11 , wherein the trust anchor is at one end of a cryptographic trust chain, wherein another end of the cryptographic trust chain comprises a public key of the remote server computer in an asymmetric cryptographic scheme.

15. The system of claim 11 , wherein the identifying comprises identifying based on a prior analysis of an instance of the binary file.

16. The system of claim 11 , wherein the identifying comprises identifying a container data structure for the trust anchor.

17. The system of claim 11 , wherein the operations further comprise:

intercepting, by a second packet processing computer, a communication from the remote server computer to the host computer, wherein the communication comprises a digital signature that is configured to be authenticated using the trust anchor;

replacing, by the second packet processing computer, the digital signature by a replacement digital signature, whereby an altered communication is produced, wherein the replacement digital signature is configured to be authenticated by the replacement trust anchor; and

passing, by the second packet processing computer, the altered communication to the host computer, wherein the altered communication is received by the host computer instead of the communication, and wherein the replacement trust anchor is usable by the host computer to authenticate the replacement digital signature.

18. The system of claim 11 , wherein the operations further comprise:

establishing, by a second packet processing computer, a first encrypted communication channel with the remote server computer using the trust anchor;

establishing, by the second packet processing computer, a second encrypted communication channel with the host computer using the replacement trust anchor; and

transferring, by the second packet processing computer, a communication between the remote server computer and the host computer through the first encrypted communication channel and through the second encrypted communication channel.

19. The system of claim 18 , wherein the communication comprises encrypted information, wherein the operations further comprise decrypting, by the second packet processing computer, the encrypted information.

20. The system of claim 18 ,

wherein the establishing the first encrypted communication channel comprises establishing a first cryptographic symmetric key, wherein the first cryptographic symmetric key is shared between the second packet processing computer and the remote server computer using the trust anchor, and

wherein the establishing the second encrypted communication channel comprises establishing a second cryptographic symmetric key, wherein the second cryptographic symmetric key is shared between the second packet processing computer and the host computer using the replacement trust anchor.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 28, 2025
From: MACLEOD, IAN; MCCARTHY, DONALD; OPPLEMAN, VICTOR
To: PACKET FORENSICS, LLC
Reel/Frame 070962/0844 →
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