IP Library Granted Patent US 12,468,822
Granted Patent B2
US 12,468,822 · App. 18/129,918 · Granted Nov 11, 2025

Zero trust accessory management

Inventors: Siavash James Joorabchian Hawkins (Canterbury, GB); Krishna Shanbhag B (Bangalore, IN)
Assignee: Omnissa, LLC
G06F21/602G06F21/31G06F21/72
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,468,822
App. No.
18/129,918
Granted
Nov 11, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

The present disclosure relates to zero trust accessory management. A cryptographic interface application can set a provisioning passcode for the hardware security module. The cryptographic interface application can further set a usage passcode for the hardware security module. The cryptographic interface application can remove an unblock passcode for the hardware security module. The cryptographic interface application can install at least one credential to the hardware security module using the accessory provisioning passcode.

Claims (60)

1 . A system comprising:

a client device comprising a processor and a memory; and

a cryptographic interface application stored in the memory that, when executed by the processor, causes the client device to at least:

detect a hardware security module associated with the client device;

receive, from a management service over a network, a policy containing a set of rules for operating the hardware security module;

set a provisioning passcode for the hardware security module that complies with the set of rules of the policy received from the management service;

set a usage passcode for the hardware security module;

remove an unblock passcode for the hardware security module;

install at least one credential on the hardware security module using the provisioning passcode;

receive, from a client application installed on the client device, a request for the at least one credential installed on the hardware security module;

determine that the client application is permitted to access the at least one credential installed on the hardware security module based on the set of rules of the policy received from the management service; and

provide the client application access to the at least one credential.

2 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the hardware security module comprises a trusted platform module (TPM) chip installed in the client device or an external portable hardware authentication device that is connectable to the client device.

3 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the provisioning passcode is used to modify a credential store of the hardware security module.

4 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the usage passcode causes the hardware security module to process cryptographic operations with stored credentials.

5 . The system of claim 4 , wherein the unblock passcode clears a blocked state of the hardware security module, the blocked state comprising a state in which the usage passcode will not cause the hardware security module to process the cryptographic operations.

6 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the cryptographic interface application, when executed by the processor, further causes the client device to at least:

receive an updated policy from the management service;

determine that the client device fails to comply with the updated policy; and

reject a second request for the at least one credential from the client application.

7 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the cryptographic interface application, when executed by the processor, further causes the client device to at least, in response to receiving a factory reset command:

delete the at least one credential; and

reset the provisioning passcode, the usage passcode, and the unblock passcode.

8 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the cryptographic interface application, when executed by the processor, further causes the client device to at least:

receive a public key and a key pair locator that enables locating a passcode recovery service;

generate a passcode recovery file comprising the key pair locator and the usage passcode, the passcode recovery file being encrypted using the public key; and

provide the passcode recovery file to a remote data store.

9 . A method, comprising:

detecting a hardware security module associated with a client device;

receiving, by the client device from a management service over a network, a policy including a set of rules for operating the hardware security module;

setting a provisioning passcode for the hardware security module that complies with the set of rules of the policy received from the management service;

setting a usage passcode for the hardware security module;

removing an unblock passcode for the hardware security module; and

installing at least one credential on the hardware security module using the provisioning passcode;

receiving, from a client application installed on the client device, a request for the at least one credential installed on the hardware security module;

determining that the client application is permitted to access the at least one credential installed on the hardware security module based on the set of rules of the policy received from the management service; and

providing the client application access to the at least one credential.

10 . The method of claim 9 , wherein the provisioning passcode is used to modify a credential store.

11 . The method of claim 9 , wherein the usage passcode is used to process cryptographic operations with stored credentials.

12 . The method of claim 9 , wherein the unblock passcode clears a blocked state of the hardware security module.

13 . The method of claim 9 , further comprising:

receiving an updated policy from the management service;

determining that the client device fails to comply with the updated policy; and

rejecting a second request for the at least one credential from the client application.

14 . A non-transitory, computer-readable medium comprising machine-readable instructions that, when executed by a processor of a client device, cause the processor to at least:

detect a hardware security module connected to the client device;

receive, by the client device from a management service over a network, a policy including a set of rules for operating the hardware security module;

set a provisioning passcode for the hardware security module that complies with the set of rules of the policy received from the management service;

set a usage passcode for the hardware security module;

remove an unblock passcode for the hardware security module; and

install at least one credential on the hardware security module using the provisioning passcode;

receive, from a client application installed on the client device, a request for the at least one credential installed on the hardware security module;

determine that the client application is permitted to access the at least one credential installed on the hardware security module based on the set of rules of the policy received from the management service; and

provide the client application access to the at least one credential.

15 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 14 , wherein the hardware security module comprises a trusted platform module (TPM) chip installed in the client device or an external portable hardware authentication device that is connectable to the client device.

16 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 14 , wherein the provisioning passcode is used to modify a credential store, the usage passcode is used to process cryptographic operations with stored credentials, and the unblock passcode clears a blocked state of the hardware security module.

17 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 14 , further comprising machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the processor, further causes the processor to at least:

receive an updated policy from the management service;

determine that the client device fails to comply with the updated policy; and

reject a second request for the at least one credential from the client application.

Assignments (4)
PATENT ASSIGNMENT Recorded Aug 5, 2024
From: VMWARE LLC
To: OMNISSA, LLC
Reel/Frame 068327/0365 →
SECURITY INTEREST Recorded Jul 3, 2024
From: OMNISSA, LLC
To: UBS AG, STAMFORD BRANCH
Reel/Frame 068118/0004 →
CHANGE OF NAME Recorded Apr 25, 2024
From: VMWARE, INC.
To: VMWARE LLC
Reel/Frame 067239/0402 →
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Apr 3, 2023
From: HAWKINS, SIAVASH JAMES JOORABCHIAN; SHANBHAG B, KRISHNA
To: VMWARE, INC.
Reel/Frame 063200/0120 →
Priority Claims (1)
IN 202341004012 · Jan 20, 2023 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240248998A1 · Jul 25, 2024
References Cited (12)
US 11228421B1 · Mesh · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20120131354A1 · French · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 20120204245A1 · Ting · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 20140101454A1 · Thom · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20160078434A1 · Huxham · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20160344560A1 · Caceres · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20180018663A1 · Van · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20190245848A1 · Divoux · 2019 [cited by examiner]
US 20190258781A1 · Qureshi · 2019 [cited by examiner]
US 20220191693A1 · Sullivan · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20230269066A1 · Chan · 2023 [cited by examiner]
Yubico, YubiKey 5 Series Technical Manual, Seo. 21, 2021, Yubico, 66 Pages (Year: 2021). [cited by examiner]