IP Library Granted Patent US 12,499,220
Granted Patent B2
US 12,499,220 · App. 17/694,725 · Granted Dec 16, 2025

Secure remote reset

Inventor: Yuval Itkin (Zoran, IL)
Assignee: Mellanox Technologies, Ltd
G06F21/554G06F21/564G06F21/602G06F21/64G06F21/107
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,499,220
App. No.
17/694,725
Granted
Dec 16, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

In one embodiment, a system includes data communication device including a network interface to receive a nonce supply request from a remote machine, processing core(s), processing circuitry to generate a nonce, sign the nonce with a private key of the data communication device yielding a first digital signature, provide the nonce and first digital signature to the remote machine, receive, from the remote machine, a secure reset request including a second digital signature of the nonce signed with a private key of the remote machine, verify the second digital signature with a public key of the remote machine to verify that the remote machine provided the secure reset request and that the nonce signed by the second digital signature is the same nonce provided to the remote machine, and issue a reset command to the processing core(s) to reboot responsively to the verification of the second digital signature.

Claims (78)

1 . A method of securing remote selective reset of at least one processing core of a data processing unit (DPU) in a network while preventing illicit reset of the at least one processing core of the DPU, the method comprising:

in a remote selective reset set up phase:

sending a verifiable message supply request to the DPU by a trusted network entity;

receiving, by the DPU, the verifiable message supply request from the trusted network entity over the network;

generating and storing, by the DPU, a verifiable message;

sending, by the DPU, the verifiable message to the trusted network entity over the network; and

receiving, by the trusted network entity, the verifiable message; and

in a remote selective reset initiation phase:

using the verifiable message to prevent a replay attack;

signing, by the trusted network entity, the verifiable message with a private key of the trusted network entity to create a digital signature;

sending, by the trusted network entity, a remote selective reset request including the digital signature to the DPU;

receiving, by the DPU, from the trusted network entity over the network the remote selective reset request including the digital signature;

verifying, by the DPU, the digital signature with a public key of the trusted network entity and the verifiable message previously stored by the DPU to verify that the trusted network entity is authorized to request remote selective reset of the at least one processing core and that the stored verifiable message matches the verifiable message used by the trusted network entity to generate the signature; and

issuing, by the DPU, a reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset while a central processing unit of a host device connected to the DPU remains operational and unaffected by the reset command.

2 . The method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

signing, by the DPU, the verifiable message with a private key of the DPU yielding another digital signature of the verifiable message;

providing, by the DPU the other digital signature to the trusted network entity over the network;

receiving, by the trusted network entity from the DPU over the network the other digital signature; and

verifying, by the trusted network entity, the other digital signature with a public key of the DPU.

3 . The method according to claim 1 , further comprising deleting, by the DPU, the verifiable message responsively to the verification of the digital signature to prevent a replay attack based on the verifiable message.

4 . The method according to claim 1 , further comprising detecting, by a Wake-on-LAN (WoL) detector of the DPU, receipt of the secure reset request from the trusted network entity.

5 . The method according to claim 1 , wherein the issuing includes issuing, by the DPU, the reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset without rebooting the central processing unit of the host device connected to the DPU.

6 . A method of securing remote selective reset of at least one processing core of a data processing unit (DPU) in a network while preventing illicit reset of the at least one processing core of the DPU, the method comprising:

in a remote selective reset set up phase:

receiving, by the DPU, a verifiable message supply request from a trusted network entity over the network;

generating and storing, by the DPU, a verifiable message; and

sending, by the DPU, the verifiable message to the trusted network entity over the network; and

in a remote selective reset initiation phase:

using the verifiable message to prevent a replay attack;

receiving, by the DPU, from the trusted network entity over the network a remote selective reset request including a digital signature of the verifiable message signed by the trusted network entity using a private key of the trusted network entity;

verifying, by the DPU, the digital signature with a public key of the trusted network entity and the verifiable message previously stored by the DPU to verify that the trusted network entity is authorized to request remote selective reset of the at least one processing core and that the previously stored verifiable message matches the verifiable message used by the trusted network entity to generate the signature; and

issuing, by the DPU, a reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset while a central processing unit of a host device connected to the DPU remains operational and unaffected by the reset command.

7 . The method according to claim 6 , further comprising:

signing, by the DPU, the verifiable message with a private key of the DPU yielding another digital signature of the verifiable message; and

providing, by the DPU the other digital signature to the trusted network entity over the network.

8 . The method according to claim 6 , further comprising deleting, by the DPU, the verifiable message responsively to the verification of the digital signature to prevent a replay attack based on the verifiable message.

9 . The method according to claim 6 , further comprising detecting, by a Wake-on-LAN (WoL) detector of the DPU, receipt of the secure reset request from the trusted network entity.

10 . The method according to claim 6 , wherein the issuing includes issuing, by the DPU, the reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset without rebooting the central processing unit of the host device connected to the DPU.

11 . A system for securing remote selective reset of at least one processing core of a data processing unit (DPU) in a network while preventing illicit reset of the at least one processing core of the DPU, the system comprising: the DPU and a trusted network entity, wherein:

in a remote selective reset set up phase:

the trusted network entity is to send a verifiable message supply request to the DPU;

the DPU is to receive the verifiable message supply request from the trusted network entity over the network;

the DPU is to generate and store a verifiable message;

the DPU is to send the verifiable message to the trusted network entity over the network; and

the trusted network entity is to receive the verifiable message; and

in a remote selective reset initiation phase:

the trusted network entity and the DPU are to use the verifiable message to prevent a replay attack;

the trusted network entity is to sign the verifiable message with a private key of the trusted network entity to create a digital signature;

the trusted network entity is to send a remote selective reset request including the digital signature to the DPU;

the DPU is to receive from the trusted network entity over the network the remote selective reset request including the digital signature;

the DPU is to verify the digital signature with a public key of the trusted network entity and the verifiable message previously stored by the DPU to verify that the trusted network entity is authorized to request remote selective reset of the at least one processing core and that the stored verifiable message matches the verifiable message used by the trusted network entity to generate the signature; and

the DPU is to issue a reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset while a central processing unit of a host device connected to the DPU remains operational and unaffected by the reset command.

12 . The system according to claim 11 , wherein:

the DPU is to sign the verifiable message with a private key of the DPU yielding another digital signature of the verifiable message;

the DPU is to provide the other digital signature to the trusted network entity over the network;

the trusted network entity is to receive from the DPU over the network the other digital signature; and

the trusted network entity is to verify the other digital signature with a public key of the DPU.

13 . The system according to claim 11 , wherein the DPU is to delete the verifiable message responsively to the verification of the digital signature to prevent a replay attack based on the verifiable message.

14 . The system according to claim 11 , wherein the DPU includes a Wake-on-LAN (WoL) detector to detect receipt of the secure reset request from the trusted network entity.

15 . The system according to claim 11 , further comprising the host device including the central processing unit, wherein the DPU is to issue the reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset without rebooting the central processing unit of the host device connected to the DPU.

16 . A data processing unit (DPU) device for securing remote selective reset of at least one processing core of the DPU while preventing illicit reset of the at least one processing core of the DPU, the DPU comprising:

a network interface controller;

the at least one processing core;

processing circuitry to, in a remote selective reset set up phase:

receive a verifiable message supply request from a trusted network entity over a network;

generate and store a verifiable message; and

send the verifiable message to the trusted network entity over the network; and

wherein in a remote selective reset initiation phase, the processing circuitry is to:

use the verifiable message to prevent a replay attack;

receive from the trusted network entity over the network a remote selective reset request including a digital signature of the verifiable message signed by the trusted network entity using a private key of the trusted network entity;

verify the digital signature with a public key of the trusted network entity and the previously stored verifiable message to verify that the trusted network entity is authorized to request remote selective reset of the at least one processing core and that the previously stored verifiable message matches the verifiable message used by the trusted network entity to generate the signature; and

issue a reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset while a central processing unit of a host device connected to the DPU remains operational and unaffected by the reset command.

17 . The device according to claim 16 , wherein the processing circuitry is to:

sign the verifiable message with a private key of the DPU yielding another digital signature of the verifiable message; and

provide the other digital signature to the trusted network entity over the network.

18 . The device according to claim 16 , wherein the processing circuitry is to delete the verifiable message responsively to the verification of the digital signature to prevent a replay attack based on the verifiable message.

19 . The device according to claim 16 , wherein the processing circuitry includes a Wake-on-LAN (WoL) detector to detect receipt of the secure reset request from the trusted network entity.

20 . The device according to claim 16 , wherein the processing circuitry is to issue the reset command to selectively reset the at least one processing core of the DPU to self reset without rebooting the central processing unit of the host device connected to the DPU.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 15, 2022
From: ITKIN, YUVAL
To: MELLANOX TECHNOLOGIES, LTD.
Reel/Frame 059263/0086 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20230297669A1 · Sep 21, 2023
References Cited (24)
US 11256644B2 · Mekad et al. · 2022 [cited by applicant]
US 20050257041A1 · Wallenstein · 2005 [cited by examiner]
US 20090205028A1 · Smeets · 2009 [cited by examiner]
US 20090217043A1 · Metke · 2009 [cited by examiner]
US 20090234986A1 · Yuhara · 2009 [cited by examiner]
US 20110307694A1 · Broustis et al. · 2011 [cited by applicant]
US 20160259667A1 · Bailey · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20170177457A1 · Swanson · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 20180081698A1 · Byon · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20180165480A1 · Raju · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20190361073A1 · Trantham · 2019 [cited by applicant]
US 20210099292A1 · Gilton · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 20220052849A1 · Kasso · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220113915A1 · Ki · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20220400124A1 · Chasdai · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20240012673A1 · Garbett · 2024 [cited by examiner]
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., “Magic Packet Technology”, White Paper, pp. 1-6, year 1998. [cited by applicant]
Nvidia Corporation, “Nvidia Bluefield-3 DPU, Programmable Data Center Infrastructure On-A-Chip”, Product Information, pp. 1-2, year 2021. [cited by applicant]
ARM, “Microprocessor Cores and Processor Technology—Processor IP for the Widest Range of Devices,” p. 1-5, ARM Limited, years 1995-2022, as downloaded from https://www.arm.com/products/silicon-ip-cpu. [cited by applicant]
“Common Management Interface Specification (CMIS)”, Rev. 5.0, pp. 1-300, May 8, 2021. [cited by applicant]
STMicroelectronics, “STSAFE-A110 Authentication, State-Of-The-Art Security for Peripherals on IoT Devices” Datasheet, pp. 1-36, Dec. 2019. [cited by applicant]
STMicroelectronics, “M2646, Getting Started with the X-CUBE-SAFEA1 Software Package”, User Manual, pp. 1-23, year 2022. [cited by applicant]
Itkin et al., U.S. Appl. No. 17/745,906, filed May 17, 2022. [cited by applicant]
U.S. Appl. No. 17/745,906 Office Action dated May 28, 2024. [cited by applicant]