IP Library Granted Patent US 12,519,621
Granted Patent B2
US 12,519,621 · App. 18/029,030 · Granted Jan 6, 2026

Redistribution of secret sharings

Inventors: Jan Camenisch (Thalwil, CH); Andrea Cerulli (Zürich, CH); Manu Drijvers (Zürich, CH); Jens Groth (Zürich, CH)
Assignee: DFINITY STIFTUNG
H04L9/085H04L9/0618H04L9/3218
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,519,621
App. No.
18/029,030
Granted
Jan 6, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Method for redistribution of a (n,t)-secret sharing of a secrets from a set of dealers to a set of receivers. The method comprises performing by each of at least the threshold number t of dealers, —creating a (n′,t′)-secret sharing of its respective secret share, —creating a set of ciphertexts comprising for each receiver one encrypted sub-share of the n1 secret sub-shares of its respective secret share and being encrypted with respect to a public encryption key of the respective receiver. The public encryption key is a key of a public-key encryption scheme. —generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the set of ciphertexts jointly contain a redistribution of its secret share—broadcasting a dealing to the set of receivers, the dealing comprising the set of ciphertexts for the set of receivers and the corresponding non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.

Claims (66)

1 . A computer-implemented method for redistribution of a (n,t)-secret sharing of a secret from a set of dealers to a set of receivers, the (n,t)-secret sharing comprising n secret shares, wherein a threshold number t≤n of the secret shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret, the method comprising:

performing, by each of at least the threshold number t of dealers, the steps of:

creating a (n′,t′)-secret sharing of its respective secret share, the (n′,t′)-secret sharing comprising n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, wherein a threshold number t′≤n′ of the secret sub-shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret share;

creating a set of ciphertexts, the set of ciphertexts comprising for each receiver of the set of receivers one encrypted sub-share of the n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, the encrypted secret sub-share being encrypted with respect to a public encryption key of a public-key encryption scheme of the respective receiver;

generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the set of ciphertexts jointly contain a redistribution of its secret share;

broadcasting a dealing to the set of receivers, the dealing comprising the set of ciphertexts for the set of receivers and the corresponding non-interactive zero-knowledge proof;

using a public-key encryption scheme with forward secrecy for encrypting the secret sub-shares for the receivers,

wherein the encryption scheme is configured to perform a chunked encryption of the sub-shares, wherein each sub-share is split into a plurality of plaintexts each representing a chunk; and

generating, by the set of dealers, a further non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, the further zero-knowledge proof being configured to prove that the chunked encryption is correct.

2 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

checking, by a predefined set of parties, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of the dealings; and

once a sufficient number t of proofs have been successfully checked,

decrypting, by each of the receivers, its encrypted sub-shares across the dealings; and

combining, by each of the receivers, the decrypted sub-shares to a new secret share of the secret.

3 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 2 , further comprising:

creating, by any party, from the associated public key material created by the set of dealers new associated public key material associated to the new secret sharing and the new secret shares of the set of receivers.

4 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 2 , further comprising performing the decrypting of the encrypted sub-shares in a separate process, on a virtual hardware security module, or on a hardware security module.

5 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the zero-knowledge proofs are publicly verifiable zero-knowledge proofs such that any party can verify them.

6 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the secret sharing is a linear secret sharing.

7 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

creating, by each dealer, associated public key material associated to its secret share and its secret sharing of said secret share; and

adding the associated public key material to the dealing.

8 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 7 , wherein the associated public key material comprises:

a public group element related to the secret share of each dealer; and/or

public group elements which are related to the secret sharing created by each dealer.

9 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 7 , wherein the creating of the new associated public key material comprises:

deriving the new associated public key material from the associated public key material created by the set of dealers, the new associated public key material comprising

public share verification keys which are associated to the new secret shares of the receivers;

a public verification key related to the secret key; and/or

elements from which the public share verification keys of the receivers and/or the public verification key may be derived.

10 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the secret is a secret key corresponding to a public verification key of a public key signature scheme.

11 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the public-key encryption scheme uses chosen ciphertext attack security for the encrypting the secret sub-shares for the set of receivers.

12 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 ,

wherein the encryption scheme with forward secrecy is a binary tree encryption scheme.

13 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 ,

wherein the public-key encryption scheme is a multi-receiver encryption scheme, the multi-receiver encryption scheme being configured to encrypt the sub-shares of a dealer to the public encryption keys of the set of receivers.

14 . The computer-implemented method according to claim 13 ,

wherein the multi-receiver encryption scheme uses shared randomness to encrypt the sub-shares of the set of dealers to the public encryption keys of the set of receivers.

15 . A distributed network comprising a plurality of nodes, wherein the network is configured to perform a computer-implemented method for redistribution of a (n,t)-secret sharing of a secret from a set of dealers to a set of receivers, the (n,t)-secret sharing comprising n secret shares, wherein a threshold number t≤n of the secret shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret s, the method comprising:

performing, by each of at least the threshold number t of dealers, the steps of:

creating a (n′,t′)-secret sharing of its respective secret share, the (n′,t′)-secret sharing comprising n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, wherein a threshold number t′≤n′ of the secret sub-shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret share;

creating a set of ciphertexts, the set of ciphertexts comprising for each receiver of the set of receivers one encrypted sub-share of the n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, the encrypted secret sub-share being encrypted with respect to a public encryption key of a public-key encryption scheme of the respective receiver;

generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the set of ciphertexts jointly contain a redistribution of its secret share; and

broadcasting a dealing to the set of receivers, the dealing comprising the set of ciphertexts for the set of receivers and the corresponding non-interactive zero-knowledge proof;

using a public-key encryption scheme with forward secrecy for encrypting the secret sub-shares for the receivers,

wherein the encryption scheme is configured to perform a chunked encryption of the sub-shares, wherein each sub-share is split into a plurality of plaintexts each representing a chunk; and

generating, by the set of dealers, a further non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, the further zero-knowledge proof being configured to prove that the chunked encryption is correct.

16 . A node for a distributed network, the node comprising:

a hardware processor; and a memory, wherein the network comprises a plurality of nodes including the node, and the network is configured to perform a computer-implemented method for redistribution of a (n,t)-secret sharing of a secret from a set of dealers to a set of receivers, the (n,t)-secret sharing comprising n secret shares, wherein a threshold number t≤n of the secret shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret s, the method comprising:

performing, by each of at least the threshold number t of dealers, the steps of:

creating a (n′,t′)-secret sharing of its respective secret share, the (n′,t′)-secret sharing comprising n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, wherein a threshold number t′≤n′ of the secret sub-shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret share;

creating a set of ciphertexts, the set of ciphertexts comprising for each receiver of the set of receivers one encrypted sub-share of the n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, the encrypted secret sub-share being encrypted with respect to a public encryption key of a public-key encryption scheme of the respective receiver;

generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the set of ciphertexts jointly contain a redistribution of its secret share; and

broadcasting a dealing to the set of receivers, the dealing comprising the set of ciphertexts for the set of receivers and the corresponding non-interactive zero-knowledge proof;

using a public-key encryption scheme with forward secrecy for encrypting the secret sub-shares for the receivers,

wherein the encryption scheme is configured to perform a chunked encryption of the sub-shares, wherein each sub-share is split into a plurality of plaintexts each representing a chunk; and

generating, by the set of dealers, a further non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, the further zero-knowledge proof being configured to prove that the chunked encryption is correct.

17 . A non-transitory computer readable medium storing a computer program product for redistribution of a (n,t)-secret sharing of a secret from a set of dealers to a set of receivers, the (n,t)-secret sharing comprising n secret shares, wherein a threshold number t≤n of the secret shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret, the computer program product comprising program instructions executable by one or more nodes of a distributed network to cause the one or more nodes to perform a method comprising:

performing, by each of at least the threshold number t of dealers, the steps of:

creating a (n′,t′)-secret sharing of its respective secret share, the (n′,t′)-secret sharing comprising n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, wherein a threshold number t′≤n′ of the secret sub-shares is sufficient to reconstruct the secret share;

creating a set of ciphertexts, the set of ciphertexts comprising for each receiver of the set of receivers one encrypted sub-share of the n′secret sub-shares of its respective secret share, the encrypted secret sub-share being encrypted with respect to a public encryption key of a public-key encryption scheme of the respective receiver;

generating a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that the set of ciphertexts jointly contain a redistribution of its secret share;

broadcasting a dealing to the set of receivers, the dealing comprising the set of ciphertexts for the set of receivers and the corresponding non-interactive zero-knowledge proof;

using a public-key encryption scheme with forward secrecy for encrypting the secret sub-shares for the receivers,

wherein the encryption scheme is configured to perform a chunked encryption of the sub-shares, wherein each sub-share is split into a plurality of plaintexts each representing a chunk; and

generating, by the set of dealers, a further non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, the further zero-knowledge proof being configured to prove that the chunked encryption is correct.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 27, 2023
From: CAMENISCH, JAN; CERULLI, ANDREA; DRIJVERS, MANU; GROTH, JENS
To: DFINITY STIFTUNG
Reel/Frame 064088/0745 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20230361993A1 · Nov 9, 2023
References Cited (25)
US 9641325B1 · Camenisch · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 10795766B2 · Dhuse · 2020 [cited by examiner]
US 11082215B2 · Irazabal · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 11184169B1 · Sokolov · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 20060026423A1 · Bangerter · 2006 [cited by examiner]
US 20100158254A1 · Schaad · 2010 [cited by examiner]
US 20100185863A1 · Rabin · 2010 [cited by examiner]
US 20150341335A1 · Camenisch · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 20160094540A1 · Camenisch · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20170104588A1 · Camenisch · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 20180227278A1 · Camenisch · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 20200082399A1 · Deshpande et al. · 2020 [cited by applicant]
JP 2004341152A · 2004 [cited by applicant]
WO 2019145790A1 · 2019 [cited by applicant]
Dai Ikarashi et al., “Short Secret Sharing Applicable to Multi-Party Computation against Cheating”, The 30th Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, Kyoto, Japan, Jan. 22-25, 2013, 9 pages. (Machine English … [cited by applicant]
Machine English translation of “Notice of Reasons for Refusal for Japanese Application No. 2023-519886”, dated Sep. 11, 2024, 7 pages. [cited by applicant]
Mariko Uchida et al., “Easy Key Management in Multiple Association by Using (2,2)-threshold Secret Sharing for A Group File Sharing System”, The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers, IEICE T… [cited by applicant]
Ogata et al., “Secret Sharing Scheme and its Application”, Journal of the Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers, Japan, Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers, Dec.… [cited by applicant]
Takuya Makino et al., “A Multiple Times Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme”, A code and the information security symposium proceedings [online], Japan, Jan. 21, 2020, 2C2-5, and pp. 1-5 (Machine English translation includ… [cited by applicant]
“International Search Report and Written Opinion for PCT Application No. PCT/EP2020/077414”, mailed Jun. 22, 2021, 9 pages. [cited by applicant]
Fabrice Benhamouda, et al., “Can a Blockchain Keep a Secret?”, Apr. 24, 2020, 35 pages. [cited by applicant]
Ran Canetti, et al., “A Forward-Secure Public-Key Encryption Scheme”, Feb. 6, 2007, 30 pages. [cited by applicant]
Mihir Bellare, et al., “Multirecipient Encryption Schemes: How to Save on Bandwidth and Computation Without Sacrificing Security”, Nov. 1, 2007, 17 pages. [cited by applicant]
Alfredo De Santis, et al., “Robust Non-interactive Zero Knowledge”, 2001, 32 pages. [cited by applicant]
Jens Groth, et al., “Snarky Signatures: Minimal Signatures of Knowledge from Simulation-Extractable SNARKs”, 2017, 36 pages. [cited by applicant]