Method for the application of implicit signature schemes

1. A method of a certifying a correspondent in a data communication system by a certifying authority, said certifying authority including a cryptographic unit, said method comprising:

said certifying authority generating a random number c A using said cryptographic unit;

said certifying authority generating implicit certificate components based on said random number c A using said cryptographic unit, said implicit certificate components having a first component γ A and a second component s A ;

said certifying authority providing said implicit certificate components for use in said data communication system; and

said certifying authority providing a public key of said certifying authority for use in derivation of a public key of said correspondent from said first component γ A ; wherein said certifying authority recertifies said correspondent by providing implicit certificate components using a changed value for said random number.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein said second component s A is generated using said first component γ A and a private key of said certifying authority.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =h(γ A ∥ID A ∥cP)c+c A (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =h(γ A ∥ID A ∥cP)c A +c (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =c A ±ch(ID A ∥γ A ) (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

6. The method of claim 1 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =c A h(ID A ∥γ A )±c (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

7. The method of claim 1 further comprising recertifying one or more correspondents whose certificates have not been revoked.

8. The method of claim 7 , wherein said recertifying utilizes information previously received from said correspondent.

9. The method of claim 1 , wherein said recertifying occurs with a certification period.

10. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon computer-executable instructions for certifying a correspondent in a data communication system by a certifying authority, said computer-executable instructions comprising instructions for:

generating a random number c A ;

generating implicit certificate components based on said random number c A , said implicit certificate components having a first component γ A and a second component s A ;

providing said implicit certificate components for use in said data communication system; and

providing a public key of said certifying authority for use in derivation of a public key of said correspondent from said first component γ A ;

wherein said computer-executable instructions further comprise instructions for recertifying said correspondent by providing implicit certificate components using a changed value for said random number.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein said second component s A is generated using said first component γ A and a private key of said certifying authority.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =h(γ A ∥ID A ∥cP)c+C A (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =h(γ A ∥ID A ∥cP)c A +c (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =c A ±ch(ID A ∥γ A ) (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein

said first component γ A =aP+c A P, wherein aP is provided to said certifying authority by said correspondent and P is a point on a curve; and

said second component s A =c A h(ID A ∥γ A )±c (mod n), wherein c is a private key of said certifying authority, n is a large prime number, ID A is an identifier of said correspondent and includes at least one distinguishing feature of said correspondent; and h indicates a secure hash function.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , said computer-executable instructions further comprising instructions for recertifying one or more correspondents whose certificates have not been revoked.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein said recertifying utilizes information previously received from said correspondent.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 10 , wherein said recertifying occurs with a certification period.

19. A certifying authority for certifying a correspondent in a data communication system, said certifying authority including a cryptographic unit for:

generating a random number c A ;

generating implicit certificate components based on said random number c A , said implicit certificate components having a first component γ A and a second component s A ;

providing said implicit certificate components for use in said data communication system;

providing a public key of said certifying authority for use in derivation of a public key of said correspondent from said first component γ A ;

wherein said certifying authority further includes said cryptographic unit for recertifying said correspondent by providing implicit certificate components using a changed value for said random number.

20. The certifying authority of claim 19 , wherein said second component s A is generated using said first component γ A and a private key of said certifying authority.