Trusted and privacy-preserving mechanism for electricity usage data disclosure using verifiable noise

1. A method of energy usage data privacy preservation, the method comprising:

downloading energy usage data and a signature from a repository;

receiving input effective to select a noise bound;

determining whether the signature is that of a utility;

rejecting the energy usage data when the signature is not that of the utility; and

when the signature is that of the utility:

generating noisy data by adding random noise to the energy usage data, the random noise being configured to vary the energy usage data by an amount less than the noise bound;

encrypting a message-signature pair that includes the energy usage data and a verified signature;

constructing a proof configured to establish that the encrypted message-signature pair and the noisy data are members of a corresponding proof language; and

communicating the noisy data, the encrypted message-signature pair, and the proof to a third party.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the noise bound is quantified as a portion of the energy usage data; and

the random noise has no or an unrelated meaning to the energy usage data itself and is randomly sampled with respect to the energy usage data.

3. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the noise bound is defined according to a noise bound equation:



(

m

′

-

m

)

m



≤

ɛ

;

 and wherein:

m represents the energy usage data;

m′ represents the noisy data;

| . . . | represents an absolute value operator; and

ε represents the noise bound.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

receiving an offer from the third party that includes an incentive to reduce the noise bound; and

re-generating the noisy data based on a second noise bound in exchange for the incentive.

5. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the proof includes a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof; and

the corresponding proof language includes a specifically-configured language that belongs to a class of non-deterministic polynomial time (NP) languages (designed NP language).

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein:

the designed NP language is defined according to a designed NP language expression:

L

ɛ

,

pk

,

vk

U

=

{

(

m

′

,

e

)

|

∃

m

,

σ

,

r

:



(

m

′

-

m

)

m



≤

ɛ

⋀

Ver

⁡

(

vk

U

,

σ

,

m

)

=

1

⋀

e

=

Enc

⁡

(

pk

,

(

m

,

σ

)

,

r

)

}

;

the NIZK proof is defined according to an NIZK proof expression π:=P(ψ, (m′, e), (m, σ, r)); and

the encrypted message-signature pair is defined according to an encrypted message-signature pair expression e:=Enc(pk, (m, σ), r), and wherein:

L ε,pk,vkU represents the designed NP language;

m represents the energy usage data;

m′ represents the noisy data;

ε represents the noise bound;

σ represents the signature, which is output from a sign algorithm;

vk U represents a verification key;

Ver ( ) represents a verification algorithm;

pk represents a public key;

Enc( ) represents an encryption algorithm;

^ represents a logical conjunction operator;

| represents a conditional event operator;

| . . . | represents an absolute value operator;

: represents a “such that” operator;

∃ represents an existential quantification operator;

π represents the NIZK proof;

:= represents a definitional operator;

P represents an NIZK prover;

Ψ represents an NIZK common reference string (CRS);

e represents the encrypted message-signature pair; and

r represents a random number.

7. The method of claim 1 , wherein:

the signature is generated using an existentially unforgeable signature scheme; and

the encrypting is performed using a secure encryption scheme that satisfies one or more provable security properties.

8. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having encoded therein programming code executable by a processor to perform operations comprising:

downloading energy usage data and a signature from a repository;

receiving input effective to select a noise bound;

determining whether the signature is that of a utility;

rejecting the energy usage data when the signature is not that of the utility; and

when the signature is that of the utility:

generating noisy data by adding random noise to the energy usage data, the random noise being configured to vary the energy usage data by an amount less than the noise bound;

encrypting a message-signature pair that includes the energy usage data and a verified signature;

constructing a proof configured to establish that the encrypted message-signature pair and the noisy data are members of a corresponding proof language; and

communicating the noisy data, the encrypted message-signature pair, and the proof to a third party.

9. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein:

the noise bound is quantified as a portion of the energy usage data; and

the random noise has no or an unrelated meaning to the energy usage data itself and is randomly sampled with respect to the energy usage data.

10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein:

the noise bound is defined according to a noise bound equation:



(

m

′

-

m

)

m



≤

ɛ

;

 and wherein:

m represents the energy usage data;

m′ represents the noisy data;

| . . . | represents an absolute value operator; and

ε represents the noise bound.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving an offer from the third party that includes an incentive to reduce the noise bound; and

re-generating the noisy data based on a second noise bound in exchange for the incentive.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein:

the proof includes a non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof; and

the corresponding proof language includes a specifically-configured language that belongs to a class of non-deterministic polynomial time (NP) languages (designed NP language).

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 12 , wherein:

the designed NP language is defined according to a designed NP language expression:

L

ɛ

,

pk

,

vk

U

=

{

(

m

′

,

e

)

|

∃

m

,

σ

,

r

:



(

m

′

-

m

)

m



≤

ɛ

⋀

Ver

⁡

(

vk

U

,

σ

,

m

)

=

1

⋀

e

=

Enc

⁡

(

pk

,

(

m

,

σ

)

,

r

)

}

;

the NIZK proof is defined according to an NIZK proof expression π:=P(ψ, (m′, e), (m, σ, r)); and

the encrypted message-signature pair is defined according to an encrypted message-signature pair expression e:=Enc(pk, (m, σ), r), and wherein:

L ε,pk,vkU represents the designed NP language;

m represents the energy usage data;

m′ represents the noisy data;

ε represents the noise bound;

σ represents the signature, which is output from a sign algorithm;

vk U represents a verification key;

Ver ( ) represents a verification algorithm;

pk represents a public key;

Enc( ) represents an encryption algorithm;

^ represents a logical conjunction operator;

| represents a conditional event operator;

| . . . | represents an absolute value operator;

: represents a “such that” operator;

∃ represents an existential quantification operator;

π represents the NIZK proof;

:= represents a definitional operator;

P represents an NIZK prover;

Ψ represents an NIZK common reference string (CRS);

e represents the encrypted message-signature pair; and

r represents a random number.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein:

the signature is generated using an existentially unforgeable signature scheme; and

the encrypting is performed using a secure encryption scheme that satisfies one or more provable security properties.