IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,541,591
Granted Patent B2
US 12,541,591 · App. 17/853,768 · Granted Feb 3, 2026

Malware detection for documents using knowledge distillation assisted learning

Inventors: Min Du (Santa Clara, CA); Curtis Leland Carmony (Albuquerque, NM); Wenjun Hu (Santa Clara, CA)
Assignee: Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
G06F21/56G06F2221/034
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,541,591
App. No.
17/853,768
Granted
Feb 3, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

The detection of malicious documents using knowledge distillation assisted learning is disclosed. A document is received for maliciousness determination. A likelihood that the received document represents a threat is determined. The determination is made, at least in part, using a raw bytes model that was trained, at least in part, using image model prediction probabilities. A verdict for the document is provided as output based at least in part on the determined likelihood.

Claims (34)

1 . A system, comprising:

a processor configured to:

receive a document for a maliciousness determination;

determine a likelihood that the document received for the maliciousness determination represents a threat, at least in part using a raw bytes model, wherein the raw bytes model was trained, at least in part, using image model prediction probabilities obtained from an image model trained, at least in part, using a plurality of images generated in a pipeline that converts a plurality of documents labeled as malicious into a corresponding plurality of rendered images of those documents, wherein at least some of the corresponding plurality of rendered images are rendered, collectively, from a multi-page document labeled as a malicious document; and

provide as output a verdict for the document based at least in part on the determined likelihood, wherein the verdict is that the received document is benign; and

a memory coupled to the processor and configured to provide the processor with instructions.

2 . The system of claim 1 , wherein determining the likelihood does not require converting a portion of the received document into an image.

3 . The system of claim 1 , wherein, prior to training the image model, an image hash-based filtering operation is performed on at least some of the plurality of images labeled as malicious documents.

4 . The system of claim 3 , wherein filtered images are stored using a TFRecord data format.

5 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to generate the image model.

6 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the image model is a convolutional neural network model.

7 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the raw bytes model is a convolutional neural network model.

8 . The system of claim 1 , wherein, at least in part in response to receiving an indication of a false positive result, the image model is retrained using a benign data set that includes the false positive result.

9 . The system of claim 1 , wherein the document is a Microsoft Office document.

10 . The system of claim 1 , wherein training the raw bytes model includes using knowledge distillation.

11 . The system of claim 1 , wherein a loss function used in training the raw bytes model comprises both self loss and imitation loss.

12 . A method, comprising:

receiving a document for a maliciousness determination;

determining a likelihood that the document received for the maliciousness determination represents a threat, at least in part by using a raw bytes model, wherein the raw bytes model was trained, at least in part, using image model prediction probabilities obtained from an image model trained, at least in part, using a plurality of images generated in a pipeline that converts a plurality of documents labeled as malicious into a corresponding plurality of rendered images of those documents, wherein at least some of the corresponding plurality of rendered images are rendered, collectively, from a multi-page document labeled as a malicious document; and

providing as output a verdict for the document based at least in part on the determined likelihood, wherein the verdict is that the received document is benign.

13 . A computer program product embodied in a non-transitory computer readable medium and comprising computer instructions for:

receiving a document for a maliciousness determination;

determining a likelihood that the document received for the maliciousness determination represents a threat, at least in part by using a raw bytes model, wherein the raw bytes model was trained, at least in part, using image model prediction probabilities obtained from an image model trained, at least in part, using a plurality of images generated in a pipeline that converts a plurality of documents labeled as malicious into a corresponding plurality of rendered images of those documents, wherein at least some of the corresponding plurality of rendered images are rendered, collectively, from a multi-page document labeled as a malicious document; and

providing as output a verdict for the document based at least in part on the determined likelihood, wherein the verdict is that the received document is benign.

14 . The method of claim 12 , wherein determining the likelihood does not require converting a portion of the received document into an image.

15 . The method of claim 12 , wherein, prior to training the image model, an image hash-based filtering operation is performed on at least some of the plurality of images labeled as malicious documents.

16 . The method of claim 15 , wherein filtered images are stored using a TFRecord data format.

17 . The method of claim 12 , further comprising generating the image model.

18 . The method of claim 12 , wherein the image model is a convolutional neural network model.

19 . The method of claim 12 , wherein the raw bytes model is a convolutional neural network model.

20 . The method of claim 12 , wherein, at least in part in response to receiving an indication of a false positive result, the image model is retrained using a benign data set that includes the false positive result.

21 . The method of claim 12 , wherein the document is a Microsoft Office document.

22 . The method of claim 12 , wherein training the raw bytes model includes using knowledge distillation.

23 . The method of claim 12 , wherein a loss function used in training the raw bytes model comprises both self loss and imitation loss.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Sep 27, 2022
From: DU, MIN; CARMONY, CURTIS LELAND; HU, WENJUN
To: PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC.
Reel/Frame 061231/0340 →
Continuity (3)
Provisional Application 63350296 · Jun 8, 2022
Provisional Application 63334574 · Apr 25, 2022
Related Publication 20230342461A1 · Oct 26, 2023
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