IP Library Granted Patent US 12,361,107
Granted Patent B2
US 12,361,107 · App. 17/918,124 · Granted Jul 15, 2025

Method for managing a biometric smart card

Inventors: Guillaume Cammas (Aubagne, FR); Jean-Luc Salles (La Bouilladisse, FR); Pierre Souchon (La Ciotat, FR); Nicolas Boulanger (Meyreuil, FR)
Assignee: THALES DIS FRANCE SAS
G06F21/32G06F21/88G06K19/0718G06K19/07705G06F2221/2143
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,361,107
App. No.
17/918,124
Granted
Jul 15, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

Provided is a method for managing a biometric sensor configured to collect a captured biometric data and a secure element able to communicate with the biometric sensor through a communication channel. The method comprises receiving a specific data by the biometric smart card, and checking the specific data by using a control data pre-stored in the biometric smart card. Only if said checking is successful, it then executes an erasing command for removing said reference biometric data from the biometric smart card and a disabling command for permanently deactivating the communication channel.

Claims (23)

1. A method for managing a biometric smart card associated to a user, said biometric smart card comprising a reference biometric data previously enrolled by said user, a biometric sensor configured to collect a captured biometric data from a person and a secure element able to communicate with the biometric sensor through a communication channel, characterized in that the method comprises the steps:

providing a server computer with information reflecting that said biometric smart card has been lost or stolen,

coupling said biometric smart card to a hardware machine and establishing a communication session between the server computer and the hardware machine by starting an online financial transaction,

receiving, by the biometric smart card and through both said hardware machine and communication session, a specific data generated by the server computer in accordance with the fact that said biometric smart card has been lost or stolen, wherein the specific data is a cryptographic data,

checking, by the biometric smart card, the specific data by using a control data prestored in the biometric smart card, wherein the control data is a key,

only if said checking is successful, executing by the biometric smart card both an erasing command for removing said reference biometric data from the biometric smart card and a disabling command for permanently deactivating said communication channel, and

rejecting the online financial transaction.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the biometric smart card receives a script generated by the server computer, said script comprising said erasing command, said disabling command and said specific data.

3. The method according to claim 1 wherein said erasing command and disabling command are pre-stored in the biometric smart card.

4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the disabling command permanently deactivates said communication channel by updating a digital value or by physically destroying a hardware component into the biometric smart card.

5. A system comprising:

a hardware server computer and a biometric smart card allocated to a user, said biometric smart comprising a reference biometric data previously enrolled by said user,

a biometric sensor configured to collect a captured biometric data from a person, and

a secure element able to:

communicate with the biometric sensor through a communication channel, characterized in that said hardware server computer is adapted to be provided with information reflecting that said biometric smart card has been lost or stolen,

generate a specific data in accordance with the fact that said biometric smart card has been, lost or stolen, wherein the specific data is a cryptographic data, and

send accordingly the specific data to the biometric smart card when both said biometric smart card has been coupled to a hardware machine and said communication session has been established between the hardware server computer and the hardware machine by starting an online financial transaction and in that said biometric smart card comprises at least a processing unit and instructions which cause said biometric smart card to:

receive the specific data,

check the specific data by using a control data pre-stored in the biometric smart card, wherein the control data is a key,

only if said checking is successful, execute both an erasing command for removing said reference biometric data from the biometric smart card and a disabling command for permanently deactivating said communication channel, and

reject the online financial transaction.

6. The system according to claim 5 , wherein the biometric smart card is configured to receive said erasing command, said disabling command and said specific data from the hardware machine.

7. The system according to claim 5 , wherein the disabling command permanently deactivates said communication channel by updating a digital value or by physically destroying a hardware component into the biometric smart card.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 27, 2022
From: CAMMAS, GUILLAUME; BOULANGER, NICOLAS; SOUCHON, PIERRE; SALLES, JEAN-LUC
To: THALES DIS FRANCE SAS
Reel/Frame 062207/0056 →
Priority Claims (1)
EP 20315226 · Apr 28, 2020 · regional
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20230137390A1 · May 4, 2023
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