IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,405,303
Granted Patent B2
US 12,405,303 · App. 18/395,745 · Granted Sep 2, 2025

Scan chain security circuit and driving method thereof

Inventors: Sungho Kang (Seoul, KR); Seokjun Jang (Paju-si, KR)
Assignee: UIF (University Industry Foundation), Yonsei University
G01R31/31719G01R31/318536G01R31/318572
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,405,303
App. No.
18/395,745
Granted
Sep 2, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A scan chain security circuit includes a scan chain including at least one flip-flop, a scan path obfuscator to obfuscate a path of a pattern sequence input to at least one first flip-flop grouped at an input side of the scan chain, in response to a first control signal, a scan path normalizer to normalize the path of the pattern sequence input to at least one second flip-flop grouped at an outside of the scan chain, in response to a second control signal, at least one dummy flip-flop interposed between the at least one first flip-flop and the at least one second flip-flop to receive a test key included in the pattern sequence, and a scan data obfuscator to damage and obfuscate an output pattern sequence output from the at least one second flip-flop, depending on whether a security key stored in a memory of a chip to be inspected is matched with the test key.

Claims (25)

1. A scan chain security circuit comprising:

a scan chain including at least one flip-flop;

a scan path obfuscator configured to obfuscate a path of a pattern sequence input to at least one first flip-flop grouped at an input side of the scan chain, in response to a first control signal;

a scan path normalizer configured to normalize the path of the pattern sequence input to at least one second flip-flop grouped at an outside of the scan chain, in response to a second control signal;

at least one dummy flip-flop interposed between the at least one first flip-flop and the at least one second flip-flop to receive a test key included in the pattern sequence; and

a scan data obfuscator configured to damage and obfuscate an output pattern sequence output from the at least one second flip-flop, depending on whether a security key stored in a memory of a chip to be inspected is matched with the test key.

2. The scan chain security circuit of claim 1 , wherein the at least one first flip-flop receives only a first pattern, which includes only a test pattern, in the pattern sequence, and sequentially receives a second pattern to an N-th pattern including the test key and the test pattern after the first pattern, in which “N” is a natural number.

3. The scan chain security circuit of claim 1 , wherein the scan path obfuscator groups “M” columns of the scan chain, and sets at least one flip-flop grouped and placed at the input side of the scan chain to the at least one first flip-flop, and

wherein the scan path normalizer groups the “M” columns of the scan chain, sets at least one flip-flop grouped and placed at the output side of the scan chain to the at least one second flip-flop, in which “M” is a natural number.

4. The scan chain security circuit of claim 2 , wherein the at least one first flip-flop includes:

a path selector and a scan flip-flop to convert a path in a column unit within the grouped scan chains, in response to the first control signal, and,

wherein the at least one second flip-flop includes:

a path selector and a scan flip-flop to convert the path in a column unit within the grouped scan chains, in response to the second control signal.

5. The scan chain security circuit of claim 4 , wherein the first control signal and the second control signal are generated from a linear feedback shift register using an eigenvalue, which is stored in a chip to be inspected, as an initial seed, and allow a path of the first pattern to be converted in the column unit such that the path is obfuscated or normalized.

6. The scan chain security circuit of claim 5 , further comprising:

at least one seed flip-flop interposed between the at least one first flip-flop and the at least one second flip-flop to receive the test pattern included in a K-th pattern and provide the test pattern as a seed of the linear feedback shift register, in which “K” is a natural number greater than or equal to 1 and less than “N”.

7. The scan chain security circuit of claim 6 , wherein the first and second control signals are generated from the linear feedback shift register using the test pattern included in the K-th pattern as the seed to obfuscate or normalize a path of the second pattern to the N-th pattern by converting the path in the column unit.

8. The scan chain security circuit of claim 1 , wherein the scan data obfuscator is disposed in a last column of an output stage of the scan chain, to set at least one flip-flop, which is connected to the at least second flip-flop, as at least one third flip-flop to damage and obfuscate the output pattern sequence.

9. The scan chain security circuit of claim 8 , wherein the at least one third flip-flop includes a multiplexer and a scan flip-flop to damage and obfuscate the output test pattern in response to the second control signal.

10. A method for driving a scan chain security circuit, the method comprising:

receiving a first control signal by a scan path obfuscator to obfuscate a path of a pattern sequence input to at least one first flip-flop grouped at an input side of at least one scan chain;

receiving a second control signal by a scan path normalizer to normalize the path of the pattern sequence input to at least one second flip-flop grouped at an outside of the scan chain;

receiving a test key included in the pattern sequence by at least one dummy flip-flop interposed between the at least one first flip-flop and the at least one second flip-flop; and

damaging and obfuscating, by a scan data obfuscator, an output test pattern which is output from the at least one second flip-flop, depending on whether a security key stored in a memory of a chip to be inspected is matched with the test key.

11. A computer-readable non-transitory recording medium having a program for executing the method for driving the scan chain security circuit of claim 10 .

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 26, 2023
From: KANG, SUNGHO; JANG, SEOKJUN
To: UIF (UNIVERSITY INDUSTRY FOUNDATION), YONSEI UNIVERSITY
Reel/Frame 065949/0991 →
Priority Claims (1)
KR 10-2023-0023654 · Feb 22, 2023 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240280633A1 · Aug 22, 2024
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