Method and apparatus for encrypting short data in a wireless communication system

1. A method for encrypting short data at a terminal in a wireless communication system, the method comprising:

generating a short data burst in idle mode;

generating a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) using a Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)-TEK prekey derived from an Authorization Key (AK) related to Security Association (SA) between the terminal and a Base Station (BS), the AK being acquired in an authentication procedure during initial network entry;

constructing, by the terminal, a nonce using a Packet Number (PN) identical to an uplink CMAC PN (CMAC-PN_U) transmitted together with a Ranging Request (RNG-REQ) message carrying the short data burst;

encrypting the short data burst using the TEK and the nonce;

generating a Medium Access Control (MAC) Protocol Data Unit (PDU) by attaching a MAC header and the CMAC-PN_U for integrity protection to the RNG-REQ message carrying the encrypted short data burst; and

transmitting the MAC PDU in a radio signal to the BS.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes a ranging purpose indication field indicating that the RNG-REQ message is transmitted for idle-mode location update, a CMAC indicator indicating whether the RNG-REQ message is protected by a CMAC, and the encrypted short data burst.

3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes an encryption indicator indicating whether the short data burst included in the RNG-REQ message is encrypted.

4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the nonce includes a length of the short data burst, a Station Identifier (STID), a Flow ID (FID), a predetermined number of 0s, and the CMAC-PN_U.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

generating a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by truncating a Master Session Key (MSK) acquired during the initial network entry;

generating the AK for the SA between the terminal and the BS using the PMK, an address of the terminal, and an ID of the BS; and

generating the CMAC-TEK prekey using the AK,

wherein the TEK generation comprises generating the TEK using the CMAC-TEK prekey, an SA Identification (SAID) of the SA between the terminal and the BS, and a TEK counter value for the TEK, and

wherein the SAID and the TEK counter value are preset.

6. A method for decrypting short data at a Base Station (BS) in a wireless communication system, the method comprising:

receiving a Medium Access Control (MAC) Protocol Data Unit (PDU) that includes a Ranging Request (RNG-REQ) message carrying an encrypted short data burst, a MAC header, and an Uplink Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Packet Number (PN) (CMAC-PN _U) for integrity protection from a terminal in idle mode;

generating a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) using a CMAC-TEK prekey derived from an Authorization Key (AK) related to Security Association (SA) between the terminal and the BS;

constructing a nonce using a Packet Number (PN) identical to the CMAC-PN_U transmitted with the RNG-REQ message; and

decrypting the encrypted short data burst using the TEK and the nonce.

7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes a ranging purpose indication field indicating that the RNG-REQ message is transmitted for idle-mode location update, and a CMAC indicator indicating whether the RNG-REQ message is protected by a CMAC, and the encrypted short data burst.

8. The method of claim 6 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes an encryption indicator indicating whether the short data burst included in the RNG-REQ message is encrypted.

9. The method of claim 6 , wherein the nonce includes a length of the short data burst, a Station Identifier (STID), a Flow ID (FID), a predetermined number of 0s, and the CMAC-PN_U.

10. The method of claim 6 , further comprising:

generating a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by truncating a Master Session Key (MSK) acquired in relation to the SA;

generating the AK for the SA between the terminal and the BS using the PMK, an address of the terminal, and an ID of the BS; and

generating the CMAC-TEK prekey using the AK,

wherein the TEK generation comprises generating the TEK using the CMAC-TEK prekey, an SA Identification (SAID) of the SA between the terminal and the BS, and a TEK counter value for the TEK, and

wherein the SAID and the TEK counter value are preset.

11. A terminal apparatus for encrypting short data in a wireless communication system, the terminal apparatus comprising:

a generator configured to generate a short data burst in idle mode;

an encryptor configured to generate a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) using a Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)-TEK prekey derived from an Authorization Key (AK) related to Security Association (SA) between the terminal and a Base Station (BS), the AK being acquired in an authentication procedure during initial network entry, construct a nonce with a Packet Number (PN) identical to an uplink CMAC PN (CMAC-PN_U) transmitted together with a Ranging Request (RNG-REQ) message carrying the short data burst, and encrypt the short data burst using the TEK and the nonce; and

a transmitter configured to generate a Medium Access Control (MAC) Protocol Data Unit (PDU) by attaching a MAC header and the CMAC-PN_U for integrity protection to the RNG-REQ message carrying the encrypted short data burst, and transmit the MAC PDU in a radio signal to the BS.

12. The terminal apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes a ranging purpose indication field configured to indicate that the RNG-REQ message is transmitted for idle-mode location update, a CMAC indicator configured to indicate whether the RNG-REQ message is protected by a CMAC, and the encrypted short data burst.

13. The terminal apparatus of claim 12 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes an encryption indicator configured to indicate whether the short data burst included in the RNG-REQ message is encrypted.

14. The terminal apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the nonce includes a length of the short data burst, a Station Identifier (STID), a Flow ID (FID), a predetermined number of 0s, and the CMAC-PN_U.

15. The terminal apparatus of claim 11 , further comprising a controller configured to generate a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by truncating a Master Session Key (MSK) acquired during the initial network entry, generating the AK for the SA between the terminal and the BS using the PMK, an address of the terminal, and an ID of the BS, and generating the CMAC-TEK prekey using the AK,

wherein the TEK is generated by using the CMAC TEK prekey, an SA Identification (SAID) of the SA between the terminal and the BS, and a TEK counter value for the TEK, and

wherein the SAID and the TEK counter value are preset.

16. A Base Station (BS) apparatus for decrypting short data in a wireless communication system, the BS apparatus comprising:

a receiver configured to receive a Medium Access Control (MAC) Protocol Data Unit (PDU) that includes a Ranging Request (RNG-REQ) message carrying an encrypted short data burst, a MAC header, and an Uplink Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Packet Number (PN) (CMAC-PN_U) for integrity protection from a terminal in idle mode; and

a decryptor configured to generate a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) using a CMAC-TEK prekey derived from an Authorization Key (AK) related to Security Association (SA) between the terminal and the BS, construct a nonce with a Packet Number (PN) identical to the CMAC-PN_U transmitted with the RNG-REQ message, and decrypt the encrypted short data burst using the TEK and the nonce,

wherein the CMAC-PN_U is included in the CMAC digest.

17. The BS apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes a ranging purpose indication field configured to indicate that the RNG-REQ message is transmitted for idle-mode location update, a CMAC indicator configured to indicate whether the RNG-REQ message is protected by a CMAC, and the encrypted short data burst.

18. The BS apparatus of claim 17 , wherein the RNG-REQ message includes an encryption indicator configured to indicate whether the short data burst included in the RNG-REQ message is encrypted.

19. The BS apparatus of claim 16 , wherein the nonce includes a length of the short data burst, a Station Identifier (STID), a Flow ID (FID), a predetermined number of 0s, and the CMAC-PN_U.

20. The BS apparatus of claim 16 , further comprising a controller configured to generate a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by truncating a Master Session Key (MSK) acquired in relation to the SA, generating the AK for the SA between the terminal and the BS using the PMK, an address of the terminal, and an ID of the BS, and generating the CMAC-TEK prekey using the AK, wherein the TEK is generated by using the CMAC-TEK prekey, an SA Identification (SAID) of the SA between the terminal and the BS, and a TEK counter value for the TEK, and

wherein the SAID and the TEK counter value are preset.