Methods and devices for trusted protocols for a non-secured, distributed environment with applications to virtualization and cloud-computing security and management
The present invention discloses methods for trusted protocols for a non-secure computing-environment. Methods include the steps of: upon request for determining that an untrusted computing resource is trustworthy, vouching for the untrusted resource as trustworthy by a trusted computing resource upon satisfying at least one criterion of: the trusted resource was directly involved in setting up and/or activating the untrusted resource; and/or has access to a database of identifying credentials and/or information which allow the trusted resource to verify that the untrusted resource is trustworthy; and concealing at least one secret that needs to be present on any computing resource, wherein at least one secret is concealed differently on each computing resource; and transmitting at least one secret from any computing resource to any other computing resource in a way that changes the step of concealing at least one secret without any computing resource knowing at least one secret.
1. A method for trusted protocols for a non-secure computing-environment, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) upon request for determining that an untrusted computing resource is trustworthy, vouching for said untrusted computing resource as trustworthy by a trusted computing resource, wherein said untrusted computing resource and said trusted computing resource are different, server-side computing resources in the computing-environment, upon satisfying at least one criterion selected from the group consisting of:
(i) said trusted computing resource was directly involved in setting up and/or activating said untrusted computing resource; and
(ii) said trusted computing resource has access to a database of identifying credentials and/or identifying information which allow said trusted computing resource to verify that said untrusted computing resource is trustworthy; and
(b) concealing, during and as part of said step of vouching, at least one key that needs to be present at least on said trusted computing resource and said untrusted computing resource in establishing said untrusted computing resource as trustworthy, wherein said at least one key is concealed differently, using a different key-encryption key, on each said computing resource, wherein said step of concealing is implemented by performing at least one operation selected from the group consisting of: a partially-homomorphic encryption operation, a fully-homomorphic encryption operation, and a homomorphic blinding-encryption operation; and
(c) transmitting said at least one key from any of said computing resources to any other said computing resource in accordance with said step of concealing which changes said key-encryption key without any of said computing resources knowing said at least one key:
(i) during and as part of said step of vouching; and
(ii) during and as part of said step of concealing;
wherein said trusted computing resource initially received said at least one key in concealed form from at least one entity selected from the group consisting of: a user device that initially encrypted, either homomorphically or through blinding, a clear form of said at least one key, and a different trusted entity when said trusted computing resource was previously untrusted.
2. A device for trusted protocols for a non-secure computing-environment, the device comprising:
(a) a server including:
(i) a CPU for performing computational operations;
(ii) a memory module for storing data; and
(iii) a network connection for communicating across a network; and
(b) a vouching module, residing on said server, configured for:
(i) upon request for determining that an untrusted computing resource is trustworthy, vouching for said untrusted computing resource as trustworthy by a trusted computing resource, wherein said untrusted computing resource and said trusted computing resource are different, server-side computing resources in the computing-environment, upon satisfying at least one criterion selected from the group consisting of:
(A) said trusted computing resource was directly involved in setting up and/or activating said untrusted computing resource; and
(B) said trusted computing resource has access to a database of identifying credentials and/or identifying information which allow said trusted computing resource to verify that said untrusted computing resource is trustworthy; and
(ii) concealing, during and as part of said vouching, at least one key that needs to be present at least on said trusted computing resource and said untrusted computing resource in establishing said untrusted computing resource as trustworthy, wherein said at least one key is concealed differently, using a different key-encryption key, on each said computing resource, wherein said concealing is implemented by performing at least one operation selected from the group consisting of: a partially-homomorphic encryption operation, a fully-homomorphic encryption operation, and a homomorphic blinding-encryption operation; and
(iii) transmitting said at least one key from any of said computing resources to any other said computing resource in accordance with said concealing which changes said key-encryption key without any of said computing resources knowing said at least one key:
(A) during and as part of said vouching; and
(B) during and as part of said concealing;
wherein said trusted computing resource initially received said at least one key in concealed form from at least one entity selected from the group consisting of: a user device that initially encrypted, either homomorphically or through blinding, a clear form of said at least one key, and a different trusted entity when said trusted computing resource was previously untrusted.
3. A non-transitory computer-readable medium, having computer-readable code embodied on the non-transitory computer-readable medium, the computer-readable code comprising:
(a) program code for, upon request for determining that an untrusted computing resource is trustworthy, vouching for said untrusted computing resource as trustworthy by a trusted computing resource, wherein said untrusted computing resource and said trusted computing resource are different, server-side computing resources in the computing-environment, upon satisfying at least one criterion selected from the group consisting of:
(i) said trusted computing resource was directly involved in setting up and/or activating said untrusted computing resource; and
(ii) said trusted computing resource has access to a database of identifying credentials and/or identifying information which allow said trusted computing resource to verify that said untrusted computing resource is trustworthy; and
(b) program code for concealing, during and as part of said vouching, at least one key that needs to be present at least on said trusted computing resource and said untrusted computing resource in establishing said untrusted computing resource as trustworthy, wherein said at least one key is concealed differently, using a different key-encryption key, on each said computing resource, wherein said concealing is implemented by performing at least one operation selected from the group consisting of: a partially-homomorphic encryption operation, a fully-homomorphic encryption operation, and a homomorphic blinding-encryption operation; and
(c) program code for transmitting said at least one key from any of said computing resources to any other said computing resource in accordance with said concealing which changes said key-encryption key without any of said computing resources knowing said at least one key:
(i) during and as part of said vouching; and
(ii) during and as part of said concealing;
wherein said trusted computing resource initially received said at least one key in concealed form from at least one entity selected from the group consisting of: a user device that initially encrypted, either homomorphically or through blinding, a clear form of said at least one key, and a different trusted entity when said trusted computing resource was previously untrusted.