IP Library › Granted Patent US 9,495,570
Granted Patent B2
US 9,495,570 · App. 14/324,918 · Granted Nov 15, 2016

Method for authenticating an RFID tag

Inventor: Robert Povolny (Vienna, AT)
Assignee: Kapsch TrafficCom AG
G06K7/10366G06F21/43G06F21/44G06F21/445G06F21/45G06F21/46
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 9,495,570
App. No.
14/324,918
Granted
Nov 15, 2016
Kind
B2
Abstract

A method for authenticating an RFID tag with the aid of an RFID reader via a radio interface, wherein a user-specific key is stored in the RFID reader and a tag-specific identifier and a password generated from the identifier and the key in accordance with a known derivative function are stored in the RFID tag, comprising the following steps performed in the RFID reader: receiving via the radio interface the identifier of an RFID tag to be authenticated, generating the correct password from the received identifier and the stored key according to the known derivative function, and generating at least one incorrect password differing from the correct password, sending a series of at least two passwords, at least one being correct and at least one being incorrect, via the radio interface to the RFID tag, and authenticating the RFID tag if no confirmation response is received to any incorrect password.

Claims (14)

1. A method for authenticating an RFID tag by means of an RFID reader via a Radio interface therebetween, wherein a user-specific key is stored in the RFID reader and a tag-specific identifier and a password generated from said tag-specific identifier and said user-specific key in accordance with a known derivative function are stored in the RFID tag, and wherein an authentic RFID tag sends back a confirmation response via the radio interface only upon receipt of a correct password, by contrast a non-authentic RFID tag sends back a confirmation response via the radio interface upon receipt of any password, comprising following steps performed in the RFID reader:

receiving via the radio interface the tag-specific identifier of an RFID tag to be authenticated;

generating the correct password from the received tag-specific identifier and the stored user-specific key in accordance with the known derivative function, and generating at least one incorrect password differing from the correct password;

sending a series of at least two passwords, of which at least one is correct and at least one is incorrect, via the radio interface to the RFID tag; and

authenticating the RFID tag if no confirmation response is received to any incorrect password.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein an order of correct and incorrect passwords in said series is selected randomly.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the transmission of the series is aborted as soon as a confirmation response is received in response to an incorrect password.

4. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the transmission of the series is aborted as soon as no confirmation response is received in response to a correct password, and the RFID tag is then not authenticated.

5. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the last password of the series is a correct password.

6. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the transmission of the series is continued as long as the RFID tag is within the range of the radio interface.

7. The method according to claim 6 , wherein the range is measured by radio interrogations of the RFID tag output by the RFID reader.

8. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the tag-specific identifier of an RFID tag that has transmitted a confirmation response in response to an incorrect password is stored in a blacklist.

9. The method according to claim 8 , wherein, following the receipt of the tag-specific identifier of an RFID tag to be authenticated, it is checked whether the received tag-specific identifier is stored in the blacklist, and, if so, the RFID tag is not authenticated and the method is aborted.

10. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the RFID tag and the RFID reader operate in accordance with standard ISO 18000-6C, ISO 18000-63, or a standard compatible therewith.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jul 7, 2014
From: POVOLNY, ROBERT
To: KAPSCH TRAFFICCOM AG
Reel/Frame 033253/0840 →
Priority Claims (1)
EP 13176875 · Jul 17, 2013 · regional
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20150022314A1 · Jan 22, 2015