Rollback resistant security
Methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on a computer storage medium, for rollback resistant security are disclosed. In one aspect, a method, during a boot process of a computing device, includes the actions of obtaining a secret key derived from device-specific information for the computing device. The method further includes verifying that a signature for a software module is valid. The method further includes obtaining information indicating a current version of the software module. The method further includes using the secret key to generate a first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module and a second encryption key corresponding to a prior version of the software module. The method further includes preventing future access to the secret key until the computing device is rebooted. The method further includes providing the software module access to the first encryption key and the second encryption key.
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
during a boot process of a computing device:
obtaining, by the computing device, a secret key derived from device-specific information for the computing device;
verifying that a signature for a software module is valid;
obtaining information indicating a current version of the software module;
based on verifying that the signature for the software module is valid, using the secret key to generate (i) a first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module and (ii) a second encryption key corresponding to a prior version of the software module;
after using the secret key to generate the first encryption key and the second encryption key, preventing future access to the secret key until the computing device is rebooted; and
providing the software module access to the first encryption key and the second encryption key.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the device-specific information for the computing device is stored in hardware, is immutable, and is not accessible to the software module.
3. The method of claim 1 , comprising:
based on verifying that the signature for the software module is valid, using the secret key to generate an encryption key for each prior version of the software module.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the software module is an operating system or a kernel.
5. The method of claim 4 , comprising:
after providing the operating system or the kernel access to the first encryption key and the second encryption key, providing control of the computing device to the operating system or the kernel.
6. The method of claim 1 , wherein preventing future access to the secret key until the device is rebooted comprises overwriting the secret key.
7. The method of claim 1 , wherein preventing future access to the secret key until the device is rebooted comprises preventing a system on a chip that stores the secret key from allowing access to the secret key.
8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the information indicating a current version of the software module is an integer.
9. The method of claim 1 , wherein the information indicating a current version of the software module is a version number of the software module.
10. The method of claim 1 , comprising:
based on the information indicating a current version of the software, determining information indicating the prior version of the software module.
11. The method of claim 1 , comprising:
obtaining a public key of the software module,
wherein the first encryption key and the second encryption key are based on the public key.
12. The method of claim 1 , wherein verifying that a signature of the software module is valid comprises:
obtaining a public key of the software module; and
verifying the signature of the software module using the public key of the software module.
13. The method of claim 12 , wherein the public key is used to generate (i) the first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module and (ii) the second encryption key corresponding to the prior version of the software module based on verifying the signature of the software module using the public key of the software module.
14. The method of claim 1 , wherein the information indicating the current version of the software module is obtained from the signature of the software module.
15. The method of claim 1 , wherein the information indicating the current version of the software module is part of data signed to generate the signature for the software module.
16. The method of claim 1 , comprising:
determining that the software module is upgraded to the current version; and
in response to determining that the software module is upgraded to the current version:
decrypting user information using the second encryption key corresponding to the prior version of the software module; and
encrypting the decrypted user information using the first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module.
17. A system comprising:
one or more computers and one or more storage devices storing instructions that are operable, when executed by the one or more computers, to cause the one or more computers to perform operations comprising:
during a boot process of a computing device:
obtaining, by the computing device, a secret key derived from device-specific information for the computing device;
verifying that a signature for a software module is valid;
obtaining information indicating a current version of the software module;
based on verifying that the signature for the software module is valid, using the secret key to generate (i) a first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module and (ii) a second encryption key corresponding to a prior version of the software module;
after using the secret key to generate the first encryption key and the second encryption key, preventing future access to the secret key until the computing device is rebooted; and
providing the software module access to the first encryption key and the second encryption key.
18. The system of claim 17 , wherein the information indicating the current version of the software module is part of data signed to generate the signature for the software module.
19. The system of claim 18 , wherein the operations further comprise:
determining that the software module is upgraded to the current version; and
in response to determining that the software module is upgraded to the current version:
decrypting user information using the second encryption key corresponding to the prior version of the software module; and
encrypting the decrypted user information using the first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module.
20. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing software comprising instructions executable by one or more computers which, upon such execution, cause the one or more computers to perform operations comprising:
during a boot process of a computing device:
obtaining, by the computing device, a secret key derived from device-specific information for the computing device;
verifying that a signature for a software module is valid;
obtaining information indicating a current version of the software module;
based on verifying that the signature for the software module is valid, using the secret key to generate (i) a first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module and (ii) a second encryption key corresponding to a prior version of the software module;
after using the secret key to generate the first encryption key and the second encryption key, preventing future access to the secret key until the computing device is rebooted; and
providing the software module access to the first encryption key and the second encryption key.