Techniques to protect fuses against non-destructive attacks

1. An apparatus, comprising:

a first fuse block array comprising:

an encryption key comprising a plurality of segments of bits, the encryption key to encrypt data for a second fuse block array;

an inverse encryption key comprising a second plurality of segments of bits, each segment of the inverse encryption key to correspond with a particular segment of the encryption key; and

a random pattern having equally distributed bit values, the random pattern to enable detection of voltage attacks on the first fuse block array.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , the first fuse block array comprising a plurality of hash values to validate data stored in the second fuse block array.

3. The apparatus of claim 1 , the first fuse block array comprising an encryption protection enable segment and an integrity protection enable segment, the encryption protection enable segment to enable encryption for the second fuse block array and the integrity protection enable segment to enable hash value validation.

4. The apparatus of claim 1 , comprising fuse controller logic, at least a portion of which is implemented in circuitry, the fuse controller logic to encrypt and decrypt data in the second fuse block array using the encryption key of the first fuse block array.

5. The apparatus of claim 4 , the fuse controller logic to:

generate a hash value for decrypted data of the second fuse array; and

compare the hash value of the decrypted data with a second hash value stored in the first fuse block array to validate the decrypted data.

6. The apparatus of claim 5 , the fuse controller logic to:

validate the decrypted data when the hash value matches the second hash value; and

invalidate the decrypted data when the hash value does not match the second hash value.

7. The apparatus of claim 4 , the fuse controller logic to:

compare the random pattern with a random pattern value of a fuse controller,

in response to determining the random pattern and the random pattern value match, determine a voltage attack is not occurring; and

in response to determining the random pattern and the random pattern value do not match, determine the voltage attack is occurring.

8. The apparatus of claim 1 , the first fuse block array comprising a duplicate encryption key having duplicate bits of the encryption key, and a duplicate inverse encryption key having duplicate bits of the inverse encryption key.

9. The apparatus of claim 1 , the first fuse block array and the second fuse block array comprising programmable read-only memory (PROM).

10. The apparatus of claim 1 , comprising a processor unit having the first fuse block array, the second fuse block array, and fuse controller logic.

11. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium comprising a plurality of instructions that, when executed by circuitry, enable circuitry to:

encrypt and decrypt data in a first fuse block array using an encryption key of a second fuse block array, the second fuse block array comprising:

the encryption key comprising a plurality of segments of bits;

an inverse encryption key comprising a second plurality of segments of bits, each segment of the inverse encryption key to correspond with a particular segment of the encryption key; and

a random pattern having equally distributed bit values, the random pattern to enable detection of voltage attacks on the second fuse block array.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11 , comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enable circuitry to:

generate a hash value for decrypted data of the first fuse block array; and

compare the hash value of the decrypted data with a second hash value stored in the second fuse block array to validate the decrypted data.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 12 , comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enable circuitry to:

validate the decrypted data when the hash value matches the second hash value; and

invalidate the decrypted data when the hash value does not match the second hash value.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11 , comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enable circuitry to:

compare the random pattern with a random pattern value of a fuse controller,

determine a voltage attack is not occurring in response to determining the random pattern and the random pattern value match; and

determine the voltage attack is occurring in response to determining the random pattern and the random pattern value do not match.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11 , the second fuse block array comprising a plurality of hash values to validate data stored in the second fuse block array.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11 , the second fuse block array comprising an encryption protection enable segment and an integrity protection enable segment, the encryption protection enable segment to enable encryption for the second fuse block array and the integrity protection enable segment to enable hash value validation.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 16 , comprising a plurality of instructions, that when executed, enable circuitry to:

perform encryption and decryption of the data when the encryption protection enable segment is enabled; and

validate the data when the integrity protection enable segment is enabled.

18. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

encrypting data in a first fuse block array using an encryption key of a second fuse block array, the second fuse block array comprising:

the encryption key comprising a plurality of segments of bits;

an inverse encryption key comprising a second plurality of segments of bits, each segment of the inverse encryption key to correspond with a particular segment of the encryption key; and

a random pattern having equally distributed bit values, the random pattern to enable detection of voltage attacks on the second fuse block array.

19. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , comprising decrypting data in a second fuse block array using the encryption key of the first fuse block array.

20. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , comprising:

generating a hash value for decrypted data of the first fuse block array; and

comparing the hash value of the decrypted data with a second hash value stored in the second fuse block array to validate the decrypted data.

21. The computer-implemented method of claim 20 , comprising:

validating the decrypted data when the hash value matches the second hash value; and

invalidating the decrypted data when the hash value does not match the second hash value.

22. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , comprising:

comparing the random pattern with a random pattern value of a fuse controller,

determining a voltage attack is not occurring in response to determining the random pattern and the random pattern value match; and

determining the voltage attack is occurring in response to determining the random pattern and the random pattern value do not match.

23. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , the second fuse block array comprising a plurality of hash values to validate data stored in the second fuse block array.

24. The computer-implemented method of claim 18 , the second fuse block array comprising an encryption protection enable segment and a integrity protection enable segment, the encryption protection enable segment to enable encryption for the second fuse block array and the integrity protection enable segment to enable hash value validation.

25. The computer-implemented method of claim 24 , comprising:

performing encryption and decryption of the data when the encryption protection enable segment is enabled; and

validating the data when the integrity protection enable segment is enabled.