Detecting tampering of memory contents in an information handling system

1. A computer implemented method for detecting tampering of memory contents of a system component within an information handling system (IHS), the method comprising:

retrieving, via a board management controller (BMC), from a first memory device of the system component, a first hash associated with current first data within the first memory device;

retrieving, from a secure, second memory device, a previously stored second hash associated with initial first data, the previously stored second hash being a hash received from a register within the first memory device of the system component during a provisioning process of the IHS;

determining if the first hash and the second hash match; and

in response to the first hash and the second hash not matching:

generating an error message which indicates that the current first data of the first memory device within the system component has been tampered with; and

storing the error message to an error log.

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

identifying within the current first data, a first firmware image associated with the system component of the IHS; and

sending a notice to a system administrator that the current first data is not the corresponding initial first data and that the first firmware image has been altered.

3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising receiving a second hash during an initialization process of the IHS and storing the received second hash to the second memory device as the previously stored second hash.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

during operation of the IHS:

periodically starting a timer;

determining if the timer has expired; and

in response to the timer expiring: initiating retrieving of the first hash from the first memory device; and resetting and restarting the timer.

5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

retrieving, from the first memory device by logic of the first memory device, current first data;

generating, by the logic of the first memory device, the first hash from the current first data;

associating the first hash with the current first data; and

storing the first hash to the register of the first memory device.

6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the current first data is retrieved from at least one sector of the first memory device.

7. The method of claim 5 , wherein the current first data is retrieved from a plurality of sectors of the first memory device.

8. An information handling system (IHS) comprising:

a first IHS component having a first memory device;

a board management controller (BMC) communicatively coupled to the first IHS component, the first memory device and a second memory device, the BMC having firmware executing thereon for detecting tampering of memory contents, wherein the firmware configures the BMC to:

retrieve from a register of the first memory device, a first hash associated with current first data within the first memory device;

retrieve from a secure, second memory device, a previously stored second hash associated with initial first data of the first memory device, the previously stored second hash being a hash received from a register within the first memory device of the first IHS component during a provisioning process of the IHS;

determine if the first hash and the second hash match; and

in response to the first hash and the second hash not matching:

generate an error message which indicates that the current first data of the first memory device within the first IHS component has been tampered with; and

store the error message to an error log.

9. The information handling system of claim 8 , wherein the firmware further configures the BMC to:

identify within the current first data, a first firmware image associated with the IHS system component; and

send a notice to a system administrator that the current first data is not the corresponding initial first data and that the first firmware image has been altered.

10. The information handling system of claim 8 , further comprising receiving the second hash during an initialization process of the IHS and storing the received second hash to the second memory device as the previously stored second hash.

11. The information handling system of claim 8 , wherein the firmware further configures the BMC to:

during operation of the IHS:

periodically start a timer;

determine if the timer has expired; and

in response to the timer expiring: initiate retrieving of the first hash from the first memory device; and resetting and restarting the timer.

12. The information handling system of claim 8 , wherein the firmware further configures the BMC to:

retrieve, by logic of the first memory device, current first data;

generate, by logic of the first memory device, the first hash from the current first data;

associate the first hash with the current first data; and

store the first hash to a register of the first memory device.

13. The information handling system of claim 12 , wherein the current first data is retrieved from at least one sector of the first memory device.

14. The information handling system of claim 12 , wherein the current first data is retrieved from a plurality of sectors of the first memory device.

15. A detection system for detecting tampering of memory contents in an information handling system (IHS), the detection system comprising:

a first IHS component having a first memory device;

a board management controller (BMC) communicatively coupled to the first IHS component, the first memory device and a second memory device, the BMC having firmware executing thereon for detecting tampering of memory contents, wherein the firmware configures the BMC to:

retrieve from a register of the first memory device, a first hash associated with current first data within the first memory device;

retrieve from a secure, second memory device, a previously stored second hash associated with initial first data of the first memory device, the previously stored second hash being a hash received from a register within the first memory device of the system component during a provisioning process of the IHS;

determine if the first hash and the second hash match; and

in response to the first hash and the second hash not matching:

generate an error message which indicates that the current first data of the first memory device within the first IHS component has been tampered with; and

store the error message to an error log.

16. The detection system of claim 15 , wherein the firmware further configures the BMC to:

identify within the current first data, a first firmware image associated with the first IHS component of the IHS; and

send a notice to a system administrator that the current first data is not the corresponding initial first data and that the first firmware image has been altered.

17. The detection system of claim 15 , further comprising receiving a second hash during an initialization process of the IHS and storing the received second hash to the second memory device as the previously stored second hash.

18. The detection system of claim 15 , wherein the firmware further configures the BMC to:

during operation of the IHS:

periodically start a timer;

determine if the timer has expired; and

in response to the timer expiring: initiate retrieving of the first hash from the first memory device; and resetting and restarting the timer.

19. The detection system of claim 15 , wherein the firmware further configures the BMC to:

retrieve, by logic of the first memory device, from the first memory device, current first data;

generate, by logic of the first memory device, the first hash from the current first data;

associate the first hash with the current first data; and

store the first hash to a register of the first memory device.

20. The detection system of claim 19 , wherein the current first data is retrieved from at least one sector of the first memory device.