Communication system
A communication system is described in which user plane communication and control plane communication for a particular mobile communication device can be split between a base station that operates a small cell and a macro base station. Appropriate security for the user plane and control plane communications is safeguarded by ensuring that each base station is able to obtain or derive the correct security parameters for protecting the user plane or control plane communication for which it is responsible.
1. A base station (eNB) comprising:
a processor; and
a transceiver;
wherein the processor is configured to provide user plane communication to a user equipment (UE);
wherein the transceiver is configured:
to receive, from another base station, a security key, wherein the received security key is a key that is derived by the another eNB using a further security key, and wherein the further security key is key that is derived by a mobility management entity (MME) using an intermediate key;
wherein the processor is further configured to derive a user plane security key, for use in protection of user plane traffic, using the security key derived by the another eNB; and
wherein the another eNB provides control plane signalling to the mobile communication device.
2. A method in a base station (eNB) comprising:
providing user plane communication to a user equipment (UE);
receiving, from another eNB, a security key, wherein the received security key is a key that is derived by the another eNB using a further security key, and wherein the further security key is key that is derived by a mobility management entity (MME) based on an intermediate key; and
deriving a user plane security key, for use in protection of user plane traffic, using the security key derived by the another base eNB;
wherein the another eNB provides control plane signalling to the eNB.
3. User equipment comprising:
a processor; and
a transceiver;
wherein the transceiver is configured:
to receive control plane signalling from a first base station (eNB); and
to receive user plane signalling from a second eNB;
wherein the processor is configured:
to derive a security key of the first eNB, wherein the security key of the first eNB is a key that is derived by the UE based on an intermediate key;
to derive, using the derived security key of the eNB, a security key of the second eNB; and
to derive, using the security key of the second eNB, a user plane security key for use in protection of user plane traffic.
4. A method performed by user equipment, the method comprising:
receiving control plane signalling from a first base station (eNB) and user plane signalling from a second eNB;
deriving a security key of the first eNB, wherein the security key of the first eNB is a key that is derived by the UE based on an intermediate key;
deriving, using the derived security key of the first eNB, a security key of the second eNB; and
deriving, using the security key of the second eNB, a user plane security key for use in protection of user plane traffic.
5. A base station (eNB) according to claim 1 , wherein the user plane security key is a KUPenc security key.
6. A base station (eNB) according to claim 1 , wherein the security key derived by the another eNB is a KeNB security key of the eNB and wherein the further security key from which the KeNB security key of the eNB is derived is a KeNB of the another eNB that is derived by the MME using the intermediate key as an input to an appropriate key derivation function (KDF).
7. A base station (eNB) according to claim 1 , wherein the intermediate key is a KASME key.
8. A base station (eNB) according to claim 7 , wherein KASME key is a key that is derived using a cipher key (CK), an integrity key (IK) and a serving network identity (SN id).
9. A user equipment according to claim 3 , wherein the user plane security key is a KUPenc security key.
10. A user equipment according to claim 3 , wherein the security key of the first eNB is a first KeNB security key and the security key of the second eNB is a second KeNB that is derived using the first KeNB as an input to an appropriate key derivation function (KDF).
11. A user equipment according to claim 10 , wherein the KeNB security key of the first eNB is derived using the intermediate key as an input to an appropriate key derivation function (KDF).
12. A user equipment according to claim 3 , wherein the intermediate key is a KASME key.
13. A user equipment according to claim 11 , wherein KASME key is a key that is derived from a cipher key (CK), an integrity key (IK) and a serving network identity (SN id).