Binding a trusted virtual machine to a trusted host computer
An example method of authenticating software executing in a computer system includes verifying first software executing on the computer system, the software including a hypervisor, verifying second software executing in a virtual machine (VM) managed by the hypervisor, generating a binding key having public and private portions, signing an object to identifies the VM using the private portion of the binding key, and verifying a signature of the object using a public portion of the binding key.
1. A method of authenticating software executing in a computer system, comprising:
verifying first software executing on the computer system, the first software including a hypervisor;
verifying second software executing in a virtual machine (VM) managed by the hypervisor,
generating a binding key having a public portion and a private portion;
signing an object that identifies the VM using the private portion of the binding key, wherein the object is a checksum of indicia associated with the VM; and
verifying a signature of the object using the public portion of the binding key.
2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the step of verifying the first software is performed at a first attestation server remote to the computer system.
3. The method of claim 2 , wherein the step of verifying the second software is performed at the first attestation server or a second attestation server remote to the computer system.
4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the step of verifying the signature of the object is performed at the first attestation server or the second attestation server.
5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the binding key is generated by the hypervisor.
6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the indicia is a configuration file or a MAC address of a virtual network interface card associated with the VM.
7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the step of verifying the first software is performed by the computer system, and wherein the method further comprises:
sealing the binding key using a trusted platform module (TPM) of the computer system.
8. A non-transitory computer readable medium having instructions stored thereon that when executed by a processor cause the processor to perform a method of authenticating software executing in a computer system, comprising:
verifying first software executing on the computer system, the first software including a hypervisor;
verifying second software executing in a virtual machine (VM) managed by the hypervisor;
generating a binding key having a public portion and a private portion;
signing an object that identifies the VM using the private portion of the binding key, wherein the object is a checksum of indicia associated with the VM; and
verifying a signature of the object using the public portion of the binding key.
9. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the step of verifying the first software is performed at a first attestation server remote to the computer system.
10. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 9 , wherein the step of verifying the second software is performed at the first attestation server or a second attestation server remote to the computer system.
11. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 10 , wherein the step of verifying the signature of the object is performed at the first attestation server or the second attestation server.
12. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the binding key is generated by the hypervisor.
13. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the indicia is a configuration file or a MAC address of a virtual network interface card associated with the VM.
14. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the step of verifying the first software is performed by the computer system, and wherein the method further comprises:
sealing the binding key using a trusted platform module (TPM) of the computer system.
15. A computer system, comprising:
a hardware platform including a processor and memory; and
a software platform executing on the hardware platform, the software platform configured to perform authentication of software executing in a computer system by:
verifying first software executing on the computer system, the first software including a hypervisor;
verifying second software executing in a virtual machine (VM) managed by the hypervisor;
generating a binding key having a public portion and a private portion;
signing an object that identifies the VM using the private portion of the binding key, wherein the object is a checksum of indicia associated with the VM; and
verifying a signature of the object using the public portion of the binding key.
16. The computing system of claim 15 , wherein the software platform is configured to verify the first software is performed at a first attestation server remote to the computer system.
17. The computing system of claim 16 , wherein the software platform is configured to verify the second software is performed at the first attestation server or a second attestation server remote to the computer system.
18. The computing system of claim 17 , wherein the software platform is configured to verify the signature of the object is performed at the first attestation server or the second attestation server.
19. The computing system of claim 15 , wherein the binding key is generated by the hypervisor.
20. The computing system of claim 15 , wherein the indicia is a configuration file or a MAC address of a virtual network interface card associated with the VM.