Integrated circuit data protection

1. A method for providing data protection in an integrated circuit, the method comprising:

detecting a change to software or firmware;

determining whether a user is authentic in response to detecting the change to the software or the firmware;

generating a false cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) value that is not based on a Hardware Unique Key (HUK) associated with the integrated circuit in response to the user not being authentic;

determining that the change to the software or the firmware was unauthorized based at least in part on the false CMAC value not matching an expected CMAC value; and

corrupting an anti-replay counter (ARC) value, maintained in a one-time programmable memory of the integrated circuit and used by the integrated circuit to protect contents of a non-volatile memory, responsive to determining that the change to the software or the firmware was unauthorized.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein corrupting the ARC value comprises:

updating an ARC value stored in the one-time programmable memory with a current ARC value maintained in volatile memory.

3. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:

determining a first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory storing the ARC value to be set;

determining locations of a first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory comprising the first number of bits; and

updating the ARC value stored in the one-time programmable memory by setting the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory.

4. The method of claim 3 , wherein determining the first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory to set comprises:

determining the first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory to set based on a second number of bits already set in the one-time programmable memory.

5. The method of claim 3 , wherein determining the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory to be set comprises:

randomly selecting the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory from a second set of bits that have not been set in the one-time programmable memory.

6. The method of claim 1 wherein the Hardware Unique Key (HUK) comprises a bit string stored in a secure memory location of a computing device.

7. The method of claim 1 wherein the Hardware Unique Key (HUK) comprises a bit string stored in a one-time programmable memory of a computing device.

8. An integrated circuit providing data protection, the integrated circuit comprising:

a one-time programmable memory;

a processor communicably coupled to the one-time programmable memory, the processor configured to:

detect a change to software or firmware;

determine whether a user is authentic in response to detecting the change to the software or the firmware;

generate a false cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) value that is not based on a Hardware Unique Key (HUK) associated with the integrated circuit in response to the user not being authentic;

determine that the change to the software or the firmware was unauthorized based at least in part on the false CMAC value not matching an expected CMAC value; and

corrupt an anti-replay counter (ARC) value, maintained in the one-time programmable memory of the integrated circuit and used by the integrated circuit to protect contents of a non-volatile memory, responsive to determining that the change to the software or the firmware was unauthorized.

9. The integrated circuit of claim 8 , wherein the processor being configured to corrupt the ARC value is further configured to:

update a first ARC value stored in the one-time programmable memory with a second ARC value maintained in volatile memory of the integrated circuit.

10. The integrated circuit of claim 9 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

determine a first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory storing the ARC value to be set;

determine locations of a first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory comprising the first number of bits; and

update the ARC value stored in the one-time programmable memory by setting the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory.

11. The integrated circuit of claim 10 , wherein the processor being configured to determine the first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory to set is further configured to:

determine the first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory to set based on a second number of bits already set in the one-time programmable memory.

12. The integrated circuit of claim 10 , wherein the processor being configured to determine which bits of the one-time programmable memory to set is further configured to:

randomly select the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory from a second set of bits that have not been set in the one-time programmable memory.

13. A non-transitory, computer-readable medium, having stored thereon computer-readable instructions for providing data protection in an integrated circuit, comprising instructions configured to cause a computer to:

detect a change to software or firmware;

determine whether a user is authentic in response to detecting the change to the software or the firmware;

generate a false cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) value that is not based on a Hardware Unique Key (HUK) associated with the integrated circuit in response to the user not being authentic;

determine that the change to the software or the firmware was unauthorized based at least in art on the false CMAC value not matching an expected CMAC value; and

corrupt an anti-replay counter (ARC) value, maintained in a one-time programmable memory of the integrated circuit and used by the integrated circuit to protect contents of a non-volatile memory, responsive to determining that the change to the software or the firmware was unauthorized.

14. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 13 , wherein the instructions configured to cause the computer to corrupt the ARC value further comprise instructions configured to cause the computer to:

update a first ARC value stored in the one-time programmable memory with a second ARC value maintained in volatile memory of the integrated circuit.

15. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 14 , further comprising instructions configured to cause the computer to:

determine a first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory storing the ARC value to be set;

determine locations of a first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory comprising the first number of bits; and

update the ARC value stored in the one-time programmable memory by setting the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory.

16. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 15 , wherein the instructions configured to cause the computer to determine the first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory to set further comprise instructions configured to cause the computer to:

determine the first number of bits of the one-time programmable memory to set based on a second number of bits already set in the one-time programmable memory.

17. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the instructions configured to cause the computer to determine which bits of the one-time programmable memory to set further comprise instructions configured to cause the computer to:

randomly select the first set of bits of the one-time programmable memory from a second set of bits that have not been set in the one-time programmable memory.