Split security solutions for video/audio using SpaceFlip class ciphers

1. A method to limit the security damage from a successful cryptanalysis of a ciphertext, of a plaintext P, by applying a Split Security Solution (S 3 ) protocol, in which highly sensitive parts of the plaintext, are encrypted to a ciphertext that can be decrypted to plausible plaintexts other than the one plaintext that was encrypted into that ciphertext (equivocation encryption) comprising:

by a computing device:

(i) identifying plaintext parts, P*, of the plaintext P, that when compromised create higher security risk;

(ii) encrypting these higher security risk plaintext parts P* with an equivocation generating cipher, E*, using a shared key, K*, while encrypting the remaining lower security risk plaintext parts, P{circumflex over ( )}=P−P*, of the plaintext P with a zero-equivocation cipher, E{circumflex over ( )}, using an additional shared key, K{circumflex over ( )}; and

(iii) communicating the two ciphertexts C*=E*(P*, K*) and C{circumflex over ( )}=E{circumflex over ( )}(P{circumflex over ( )}, K{circumflex over ( )}) to the intended recipient, along with re-assembly instructions enabling the recipient to build back the plaintext P after decrypting C* to P* using key K* and a corresponding decryption algorithm D* (P*=D*(C*,K*)), and decrypting C{circumflex over ( )} to P{circumflex over ( )} using key K{circumflex over ( )} and a corresponding decryption algorithm D{circumflex over ( )}(P{circumflex over ( )}=D{circumflex over ( )}(C{circumflex over ( )}, K{circumflex over ( )});

the method further comprising:

(x) by an Encryption Station, comprising:

(x)a: a Plaintext Splitter P→P*+P{circumflex over ( )}+splitting information, μ;

(x)b: an Equivocation Generating Encryption (C*=E*(P*, K*);

(x)c: a Zero-Equivocation Generating Encryption (C{circumflex over ( )}=E{circumflex over ( )}(P{circumflex over ( )}, K{circumflex over ( )})); and

(x)d: a Ciphertext Assembler module (C*+C{circumflex over ( )}→C);

with the following steps executed by the Encryption Station:

(x)1. an external source submits a plaintext P to be Split Security Solution (S 3 ) processed;

(x)2. the plaintext splitter (PS) splits P to P* and P{circumflex over ( )};

(x)3. P* is encrypted with E* to C* using K*;

(x)4. P{circumflex over ( )} is encrypted with E{circumflex over ( )} to C{circumflex over ( )} using K{circumflex over ( )}; and

(x)5. the ciphertext assembler module assembles C from C* and C{circumflex over ( )} and μ;

(y) by a Decryption Station comprising:

(y)a: a Ciphertext Disassembly Module;

(y)b: an Equivocation resolving Decryption Module (D*);

(y)c: a Zero Equivocation Decryption Module (D{circumflex over ( )}); and

(y)d: a Plaintext Reassembly Module;

with the following steps executed by the Decryption Station:

(y)1. Ciphertext Disassembly (C→μ, C*, C{circumflex over ( )});

(y)2. Equivocation resolving Decryption, P*=D*(C*, K*);

(y)3. Zero Equivocation Decryption, P{circumflex over ( )}=D{circumflex over ( )}(C{circumflex over ( )}, K{circumflex over ( )}); and

(y)4. Plaintext Reassembly (P*, P{circumflex over ( )}, μ→P).

2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

implementing image security where P* comprises any one or more of the following:

(I) listed sensitive items: comprising machinery, gadgets, and/or constructions that are listed in a reference ledger as being of a special high priority security risk, and

(II) human identifying features: comprising faces, birth marks, and/or tattoos.

3. The method of claim 2 , further comprising:

scanning an image with facial recognition software before generating encrypted image data, identifying rectangles depicting human faces, marking the identified rectangles depicting human faces for higher security risk E* encryption, and marking the remainder of the image for lower security risk E{circumflex over ( )} encryption; and further:

identifying by item recognition software listed sensitive items on the pre-encrypted image, and slating the pixels depicting these items for higher security, E* encryption.

4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

securing audio files with P* determined by (I) voice recognition for a target speaker, where spoken words that the target speaker speaks are regarded as P* and the balance of spoken words as P{circumflex over ( )}, and by (II) voice transcription, where the transcribed words are checked against a list of words that require higher security protection.

5. A method of secret transposition encryption, E{circumflex over ( )}, of a plaintext P to a ciphertext Cp (Cp=E{circumflex over ( )}(P, K), where a transposition key, K, is encrypted with a cipher E* using a key, K*, which is shared between a sender and a recipient, to a ciphertext Ck that can be decrypted to different transposition keys, other than K, with each of these other transposition keys leading to a plausible plaintext, thereby ensuring equivocation as to the identity of the pre-transposition message, plaintext P, comprising:

sharing randomness between a sender's computing device and a recipient's computing device by only sharing a random key, K*, between the sender's computing device and the recipient's computing device;

by the sender's computing device:

encrypting K, to Ck, with an equivocation generating cipher, E*, utilizing the previously shared random key, K*, Ck=E*(K, K*) where K* is shared between both the sender's computing device and the recipient's computing device, with the cipher E* operating with larger quantities of ad hoc randomness not preshared between the sender and the recipient, and smaller quantities of pre-shared randomness, (bilateral randomness), K*, providing additional security protection by creating an equivocation challenge in the encrypted bit stream Ck to prevent any unauthorized third party's attempt to decrypt the encrypted bit stream Ck from succeeding;

transmitting the encrypted bit stream Ck to the recipient's computing device;

by the recipient's computing device:

receiving the encrypted bit stream Ck from the sender's computing device; and

decrypting the encrypted bit stream, Ck, to K, with a corresponding equivocation resolving cipher, D*, K=D*(Ck, K*) utilizing the previously shared random key, K*;

the sender's computing device transposing P to C using K, sending C to the recipient's computing device;

then the recipient's computing device reverse transposes C to P using K.

6. The method of claim 5 , further comprising:

mapping, by the sender's computing device, P into an N-dimensional space, Ω, using a mapping algorithm FNΩ, with each bit of P occupying an N-dimensional address in Ω;

dividing, by the sender's computing device, Ω into n N-dimensional cubes, ω i , for i=1, 2, . . . n, with the address and size of each of the n N-dimensional cubes recorded in a cube-address file, Q;

mapping, by the sender's computing device, the content of each N-dimensional cube onto a linear string, c i for i=1, 2, . . . n using a mapping algorithm, FNω, which is different from mapping algorithm FNω; and

concatenating, by the sender's computing device, the n c i strings in an order O, to form a string C, with O added to file Q;

wherein Q and O constitute the transposition key K with which P is encrypted to C, where K is encrypted by the sender to Ck, using the shared key, K*.