Generating hypervisor protected key for cryptography

1. A computer-implemented method for cryptography, the computer-implemented method comprising:

registering a guest virtual server with a trusted hypervisor by using guest credentials;

computing via the trusted hypervisor a hash value of the guest credentials;

generating a guest wrapping key and associating the hash value of the guest credentials with the guest wrapping key;

storing the hash value of the guest credentials and the guest wrapping key in a memory;

generating a satellite virtual server instance configured with virtual server specific data from the guest virtual server;

passing a copy of the guest wrapping key to the satellite virtual server instance;

wrapping, via the satellite virtual server instance, a random guest key with the guest wrapping key, thereby producing a wrapped random guest key;

passing the wrapped random guest key to the guest virtual server;

in response to a request from the guest virtual server, unwrapping, via the satellite virtual server instance and the guest wrapping key, the wrapped random guest key to form an unwrapped key;

rewrapping the unwrapped key with a master key to form a protected guest key; and

passing a copy of the protected guest key to the guest virtual server.

2. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising sending a conversion request from the guest virtual server, the conversion request comprising the guest credentials as a conversion argument, the rewrapping being performed in response to reception of the conversion request.

3. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the trusted hypervisor maintains the memory.

4. The computer-implemented method according to claim 3 , further comprising protecting the memory with a passphrase.

5. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the computing the hash value comprises using a cryptographic one-way function.

6. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising protecting the guest wrapping key via a hardware security module.

7. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

storing the virtual server specific data in a crypto control block of a virtual machine.

8. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , wherein the satellite virtual server instance has a sole interface, and

wherein the sole interface connects to the trusted hypervisor.

9. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

generating the random guest key via the trusted hypervisor using a service from the satellite virtual server instance,

wherein the wrapping of the random guest key occurs via the trusted hypervisor using the service from the satellite virtual server instance.

10. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising authorizing, by the trusted hypervisor, each request following the registering,

wherein the authorizing comprises using additional guest credentials provided with a respective request following the registering.

11. The computer-implemented method according to claim 1 , further comprising authorizing, by the trusted hypervisor, a further request of the guest virtual server following the registering, wherein the authorizing comprises using guest specific data.

12. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the satellite virtual server instance shares the master key with the guest virtual server.

13. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 , wherein the satellite virtual server instance and the guest virtual server are disposed within a same computer.

14. A computer system for cryptography, the computer system comprising:

one or more processors, one or more computer-readable memories, and program instructions stored on at least one of the one or more computer-readable memories for execution by at least one of the one or more processors to cause the computer system to:

register a guest virtual server with a trusted hypervisor by using guest credentials;

compute via the trusted hypervisor a hash value of the guest credentials;

generate a guest wrapping key and associate the hash value of the guest credentials with the guest wrapping key;

store the hash value of the guest credentials and the guest wrapping key in a memory;

generate a satellite virtual server instance configured with virtual server specific data from the guest virtual server;

pass a copy of the guest wrapping key to the satellite virtual server instance;

wrap, via the satellite virtual server instance, a random guest key with the guest wrapping key, thereby producing a wrapped random guest key;

pass the wrapped random guest key to the guest virtual server;

in response to a request from the guest virtual server, unwrap, via the satellite virtual server instance and the guest wrapping key, the wrapped random guest key to form an unwrapped key;

rewrap the unwrapped key with a master key to form a protected guest key; and

pass a copy of the protected guest key to the guest virtual server.

15. The computer system according to claim 14 , wherein the program instructions are further for execution by the at least one of the one or more processors to cause the computer system to send a conversion request from the guest virtual server, the conversion request comprising the guest credentials as a conversion argument, the rewrapping being performed in response to reception of the conversion request.

16. The computer system according to claim 14 , wherein the trusted hypervisor maintains the memory.

17. The computer system according to claim 16 , wherein the program instructions are further for execution by the at least one of the one or more processors to cause the computer system to protect the memory with a passphrase.

18. The computer system according to claim 14 , wherein the computing the hash value comprises using a cryptographic one-way function.

19. The computer system according to claim 14 , wherein the program instructions are further for execution by the at least one of the one or more processors to cause the computer system to protect the guest wrapping key via a hardware security module.

20. A computer program product for cryptography, the computer program product comprising a computer readable storage medium having program instructions embodied therewith, the program instructions being executable by a processor to cause the processor to:

register a guest virtual server with a trusted hypervisor by using guest credentials;

compute via the trusted hypervisor a hash value of the guest credentials;

generate a guest wrapping key and associate the hash value of the guest credentials with the guest wrapping key;

store the hash value of the guest credentials and the guest wrapping key in a memory;

generate a satellite virtual server instance configured with virtual server specific data from the guest virtual server;

pass a copy of the guest wrapping key to the satellite virtual server instance;

wrap, via the satellite virtual server instance, a random guest key with the guest wrapping key, thereby producing a wrapped random guest key;

pass the wrapped random guest key to the guest virtual server;

in response to a request from the guest virtual server, unwrap, via the satellite virtual server instance and the guest wrapping key, the wrapped random guest key to form an unwrapped key;

rewrap the wrapped guest key with the master key to form a protected guest key; and

pass a copy of the protected guest key to the guest virtual server.