Securing node groups
A method for securing a plurality of compute nodes includes authenticating a hardware architecture of each of a plurality of components of the compute nodes. The method also includes authenticating a firmware of each of the plurality of components. Further, the method includes generating an authentication database comprising a plurality of authentication descriptions that are based on the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware. Additionally, a policy for securing a specified subset of the plurality of compute nodes is implemented by using the authentication database.
1. A method for securing a plurality of compute nodes, comprising:
authenticating a hardware architecture of each of a plurality of components of the compute nodes;
authenticating a firmware of each of the plurality of components; and
generating an authentication database comprising a plurality of authentication descriptions that are based on the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware, wherein a policy for securing a specified subset of the plurality of compute nodes is implemented by using the authentication database.
2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising implementing the policy by using (i) an operation of an application program interface for authenticating compute node groups, and (ii) operating the authentication database.
3. The method of claim 1 , wherein one of the compute nodes comprises a controller that is connected to the plurality of components, and wherein the controller authenticates the hardware architecture of the plurality of components and authenticates the firmware of the plurality of components, wherein the controller compares the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware with one or more previous authentications to detect changes to the hardware architecture and the firmware.
4. The method of claim 1 , wherein one of the plurality of compute nodes comprises a baseboard management controller and a computer processor, and wherein the baseboard management controller authenticates the hardware architecture of the computer processor and authenticates the firmware of the computer processor.
5. The method of claim 1 , comprising generating a firmware measurement certificate for each layer of firmware of the plurality of components, wherein:
a core root of trust generates the firmware measurement certificate for a first layer of the firmware;
the firmware measurement certificate for the first layer of firmware specifies a trusted certification authority; and
authenticating the firmware is based on the firmware measurement certificate.
6. The method of claim 5 , wherein:
the firmware of the plurality of components operates the plurality of components;
the firmware measurement certificate comprises an attribute certificate; and
the firmware measurement certificate comprises:
a cumulative hash of the layer of firmware, wherein the cumulative hash comprises a concatenation of:
a hash of the layer of firmware; and
a hash of each one or more lower layers of the firmware; and
a nonce.
7. The method of claim 6 , wherein the firmware is authenticated using a trusted data store comprising a binary image of the firmware, and a certificate chain comprising a hardware digital certificate and the firmware measurement certificate.
8. The method of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of compute nodes is associated with a node hierarchy level, and wherein an authentication and verification manager for the node hierarchy level performs the authentication of the hardware architecture and the authentication of the firmware.
9. A system, comprising:
a processor; and
a memory component that stores instructions that cause the processor to:
authenticate a hardware architecture of each of a plurality of components of the compute nodes;
authenticate a firmware of each of the plurality of components; and
generate an authentication database comprising a plurality of authentication descriptions that are based on the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware, wherein a policy for securing a specified subset of the compute nodes is implemented by using the authentication database.
10. The system of claim 9 , wherein the instructions cause the processor to implement the policy by (i) using an operation of an application program interface for authenticating compute node groups, and (ii) operating the authentication database.
11. The system of claim 9 , wherein one of the compute nodes comprises a controller that is connected to the plurality of components, and wherein the controller authenticates the hardware architecture of the plurality of components and authenticates the firmware of the plurality of components, wherein the controller compares the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware with one or more previous authentications to detect changes to the hardware architecture and the firmware.
12. The system of claim 9 , wherein one of the compute nodes comprises a baseboard management controller and a computer processor, and wherein the baseboard management controller authenticates the hardware architecture of the computer processor and authenticates the firmware of the computer processor.
13. The system of claim 9 , wherein the instructions cause the processor to generate a firmware measurement certificate for each layer of firmware of the plurality of components, wherein:
a core root of trust generates the firmware measurement certificate for a first layer of the firmware;
the firmware measurement certificate for the first layer of the firmware specifies a trusted certification authority; and
authenticating the firmware is based on the firmware measurement certificate.
14. The system of claim 13 , wherein:
the firmware of the plurality of components operates the plurality of components;
the firmware measurement certificate comprises an attribute certificate; and
the firmware measurement certificate comprises:
a cumulative hash of the layer of firmware, wherein the cumulative hash comprises
a concatenation of:
a hash of the layer of firmware; and
a hash of each one or more lower layers of the firmware; and
a nonce.
15. The system of claim 14 , wherein the firmware is authenticated using a trusted data store comprising a binary image of the firmware, and a certificate chain comprising a hardware digital certificate and the firmware measurement certificate.
16. A non-transitory, computer-readable medium storing computer-executable instructions, which when executed, cause a computer to:
authenticate a hardware architecture of each of a plurality of components of the compute nodes;
authenticate a firmware of each of the plurality of components; and
generate an authentication database comprising a plurality of authentication descriptions that are based on the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware, wherein a policy for securing a specified subset of the compute nodes is implemented by using the authentication database.
17. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the computer-executable instructions cause the computer to implement the policy by (i) using an operation of an application program interface for authenticating compute node groups, and (ii) operating the authentication database.
18. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein one of the compute nodes comprises a controller that is connected to the plurality of components, and wherein the controller authenticates the hardware architecture of the plurality of components and authenticates the firmware of the plurality of components, wherein the controller compares the authenticated hardware architecture and the authenticated firmware with one or more previous authentications to detect changes to the hardware architecture and the firmware.
19. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein one of the compute nodes comprises a baseboard management controller and a computer processor, and wherein the baseboard management controller authenticates the hardware architecture of the computer processor and authenticates the firmware of the computer processor.
20. The non-transitory, computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the computer-executable instructions cause the computer to generate a firmware measurement certificate for each layer of firmware of the plurality of components, wherein:
a core root of trust generates the firmware measurement certificate for a first layer of the firmware;
the firmware measurement certificate for the first layer of the firmware specifies a trusted certification authority; and
authenticating the firmware is based on the firmware measurement certificate.