IP Library › Granted Patent US 11,928,215
Granted Patent B2
US 11,928,215 · App. 17/852,814 · Granted Mar 12, 2024

Firmware verification mechanism

Inventors: Prashant Dewan (Portland, OR); Chao Zhang (Shanghai, CN); Nivedita Aggarwal (Portland, OR); Aditya Katragada (Austin, TX); Mohamed Haniffa (Tamilnadu, IN); Kenji Chen (Taiwan, CN)
Assignee: Intel Corporation
G06F21/572G06F8/65G06F21/64G06F2221/033
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 11,928,215
App. No.
17/852,814
Filed
Jun 29, 2022
Granted
Mar 12, 2024
Kind
B2
Art Unit
2435
USPC
726/25
Abstract

An apparatus to verify firmware in a computing system, comprising a non-volatile memory, including firmware memory to store agent firmware associated with each of a plurality of interconnect protocol (IP) agents and version memory to store security version numbers (SVNs) included in the agent firmware, a security controller comprising verifier logic to verify an integrity of the version memory by applying a hash algorithm to contents of the version memory to generate a SVN hash, and a trusted platform module (TPM) to store the SVN hash.

Claims (33)

1. An apparatus comprising:

a non-volatile memory, including:

firmware memory to store agent firmware associated with each of a plurality of interconnect protocol (IP) agents;

version memory to store security version numbers (SVNs) included in the agent firmware;

a security controller to generate a SVN hash to verify an integrity of the version memory, receive a token from an IP agent and perform a SVN rollback to store refurbished agent firmware in response to receiving the token; and

a trusted platform module (TPM) to store the SVN hash.

2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the security controller generates the SVN hash by applying a hash algorithm to contents of the version memory.

3. The apparatus of claim 2 , wherein the security controller verifies the token.

4. The apparatus of claim 3 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises updating an IP agent software version.

5. The apparatus of claim 4 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises updating the contents of the version memory.

6. The apparatus of claim 5 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises generating an updated SVN hash based on the updated contents of the version memory.

7. The apparatus of claim 6 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises storing the updated SVN in the TPM.

8. The apparatus of claim 7 , wherein the security controller verifies an integrity of the version memory upon receiving firmware associated with a IP agent by applying the hash algorithm to the contents of the version memory to generate a check hash and comparing the check hash to the updated SVN hash stored in the TPM.

9. The apparatus of claim 8 , wherein the security controller verifies the integrity of the agent firmware upon determining that the check hash matches the SVN hash.

10. At least one computer readable medium having instructions stored thereon, which when executed by one or more processors, cause the processors to:

store security version numbers (SVNs) associated with agent firmware into a version memory included in a non-volatile memory;

generate a SVN hash to verify an integrity of the version memory;

receive a token from an interconnect protocol (IP) agent; and

perform a SVN rollback to store refurbished agent firmware in response to receiving the token.

11. The computer readable medium of claim 10 , wherein generating the SVN hash comprises applying a hash algorithm to contents of the version memory.

12. The computer readable medium of claim 11 , wherein performing the rollback comprises verifying the token.

13. The computer readable medium of claim 12 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises updating a first agent software version and updating the contents of the version memory.

14. The computer readable medium of claim 13 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises generating an updated SVN hash based on the updated contents of the version memory and storing the updated SVN in in a trusted platform module (TPM).

15. A method comprising:

storing security version numbers (SVNs) associated with agent firmware into a version memory included in a non-volatile memory;

generating a SVN hash to verify an integrity of the version memory;

receiving a token from an interconnect protocol (IP) agent; and

perform a SVN rollback to store refurbished agent firmware in response to receiving the token.

16. The method of claim 15 , wherein generating the SVN hash comprises applying a hash algorithm to contents of the version memory.

17. The method of claim 16 , wherein performing the rollback comprises verifying the token.

18. The method of claim 17 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises updating a first agent software version and updating the contents of the version memory.

19. The method of claim 18 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises generating an updated SVN hash based on the updated contents of the version memory.

20. The method of claim 19 , wherein performing the rollback further comprises storing the updated SVN in in a trusted platform module (TPM).

Continuity (2)
Continuation 16832152 · Mar 27, 2020
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