IP Library Granted Patent US 12,013,935
Granted Patent B2
US 12,013,935 · App. 17/436,098 · Granted Jun 18, 2024

Return-oriented programming protection

Inventors: Yitzhack Davidovich (Jerusalem, IL); Yoav Fuchs (Har Gillo, IL); Nir Brakha (Tel Aviv-Jaffa, IL)
Assignee: C2A-SEC, Ltd.
G06F21/554G06F2221/034
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,013,935
App. No.
17/436,098
Granted
Jun 18, 2024
Kind
B2
Abstract

An ROP attack protection method for a plurality of ECUs, the method constituted of: receiving data destined for one of the plurality of ECUs; determining which of the plurality of ECUs the received data is destined for; responsive to a unique model associated with the determined ECU, analyzing the received data to identify control flow instructions addressed to one or more predetermined addresses; responsive to the analyzation, generate a statistical analysis of the identified control flow instructions; and responsive to the generated statistical analysis, outputting a signal indicating a possibility of an attack.

Claims (35)

1. A return-oriented programming (ROP) attack protection method for a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs), the method comprising:

receiving data destined for one of the plurality of ECUs;

determining which of the plurality of ECUs the received data is destined for;

responsive to said determination, selecting a respective one of a plurality of models, each of the plurality of models associated with a respective one of the plurality of ECUs, wherein the selected model is associated with said determined ECU;

responsive to the selected model, analyzing said received data to identify control flow instructions addressed to one or more predetermined addresses;

responsive to said analyzation, generating a statistical analysis of said identified control flow instructions;

responsive to said generated statistical analysis, detecting the presence of an ROP attack; and

outputting a signal indicating said detected presence of an ROP attack.

2. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein each of the plurality of models comprises information regarding acceptable chains of gadgets for the respective ECU.

3. The ROP attack protection method of claim 2 , wherein for each of the plurality of models, the acceptable chains of gadgets for the respective ECU are determined from the binary of the respective ECU.

4. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions within a predetermined window within said received data, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack being responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions within the predetermined window exceeding a predetermined window value.

5. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein said detecting the presence of an ROP attack is further responsive to said respective unique model.

6. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions within a chain of said identified control flow instructions, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions within the chain of said identified control flow instructions exceeding a predetermined chain value.

7. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein said output signal controls a domain control unit (DCU) to block further data from being transferred to the plurality of ECUs.

8. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within a predetermined window within said received data, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack being responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within the predetermined window exceeding a predetermined window value.

9. The ROP attack protection method of claim 1 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within a chain of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within the chain of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets exceeding a predetermined chain value.

10. A return-oriented programming (ROP) attack protection system comprising:

a processor; and

a memory, said memory having stored therein a plurality of a unique models, each unique model associated with a respective one of a plurality of electronic control units (ECUs),

wherein said processor is arranged to:

receive data destined for one of the plurality of ECUs;

determine which of the plurality of ECUs the received data is destined for;

responsive to said determination, select a respective one of the plurality of unique models, wherein the selected model is associated with said determined ECU;

responsive to said selected model, analyze said received data to identify control flow instructions addressed to one or more predetermined addresses;

responsive to said analyzation, generate a statistical analysis of said identified control flow instructions;

responsive to said generated statistical analysis, detect the presence of an ROP attack; and

output a signal indicating said detected presence of an ROP attack.

11. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein each of the plurality of models comprises information regarding acceptable chains of gadgets for the respective ECU.

12. The ROP attack protection system of claim 11 , wherein for each of the plurality of models, the acceptable chains of gadgets for the respective ECU are determined from the binary of the respective ECU.

13. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions within a predetermined window within said received data, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack being responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions within the predetermined window exceeding a predetermined window value.

14. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein said detection of the presence of an ROP attack is further responsive to said respective unique model.

15. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions within a chain of said identified control flow instructions, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions within the chain of said identified control flow instructions exceeding a predetermined chain value.

16. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein said output signal controls a domain control unit (DCU) to block further data from being transferred to the plurality of ECUs.

17. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within a predetermined window within said received data, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack being responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within the predetermined window exceeding a predetermined window value.

18. The ROP attack protection system of claim 10 , wherein said generated statistical analysis comprises the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within a chain of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets, said detection of the presence of an ROP attack responsive to the number of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets within the chain of said identified control flow instructions addressed to gadgets exceeding a predetermined chain value.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jul 31, 2026
From: DAVIDOVICH, YITZHACK; FUCHS, YOAV; BRAKHA, NIR
To: C2A-SEC, LTD.
Reel/Frame 075478/0702 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 62814009 · Mar 5, 2019
Related Publication 20220188414A1 · Jun 16, 2022
Cited By (1)
US 12,282,548