GNSS receiving device
A GNSS receiver includes a demodulation module, a position calculation module, a storage, and a determination module. The demodulation module receives the GNSS signal and acquires a navigation message. The position calculation module performs positioning calculation based on a propagation delay which is a time until a GNSS signal transmitted from a GNSS satellite reaches an antenna. The storage stores reception timing (reference timing) of a message of a predetermined type in the navigation message. The determination module determines that a GNSS signal including the navigation message is a spoofed GNSS signal when the difference between the reception timing of the next and subsequent messages of the same type predicted from the reference timing and the reception timing of the same type of message received after the reference timing is outside the scope of the time threshold.
1. A GNSS receiver comprising:
processing circuitry configured to:
receive a GNSS signal broadcast from a GNSS satellite and to acquire a navigation message;
perform positioning calculation on the basis of a propagation delay, which is a time required for the GNSS signal transmitted from the GNSS satellite, to reach an antenna;
store a reference timing that is a timing at which a navigation message of a predetermined type is received; and
determine that a GNSS signal including a subsequent navigation message is a spoofed GNSS signal when a timing difference, which is a difference between predicted reception timing of the next and subsequent navigation messages of same type predicted based on the stored reference timing and actual reception timing of navigation messages of same type after the reference timing, deviates from a predetermined time threshold range, until the timing difference falls within the predetermined time threshold range, wherein
when the GNSS signal is not determined to be the spoofed GNSS signal, the reference timing is updated based on the actual reception timing of the navigation messages, and
when the GNSS signal is determined to be the spoofed GNSS signal, the reference timing is not updated based on the actual reception timing of the navigation messages.
2. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , further comprising:
an output interface configured to output acquired information to an external device, wherein
the processing circuitry determines for each satellite whether the GNSS signal is the spoofed GNSS signal, and
the output interface outputs the acquired information on spoofed GNSS signals for each satellite to the external device.
3. The GNSS receiver according to claim 2 , wherein
the antenna configured to receive the GNSS signal is fixedly installed, and
the processing circuitry determines that at least one of a plurality of received GNSS signals is a spoofed GNSS signal when a current antenna position obtained by positioning calculation using the plurality of received GNSS signals, varies by a predetermined amount or more from a preset antenna position or an antenna position obtained by past positioning calculation.
4. The GNSS receiver according to claim 2 , wherein
the processing circuitry is further configured to select a GNSS signal of the plurality of received GNSS signals that is not determined to be a spoofed GNSS signal, and
the GNSS receiver performs positioning calculation by using the GNSS signal selected by the processing circuitry.
5. The GNSS receiver according to claim 2 , further comprising:
an assist GNSS input interface configured to acquire assist GNSS information, wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the received GNSS signal is a spoofed GNSS signal when there is a difference between information obtained by demodulating the received GNSS signal and information obtained from the assist GNSS information with respect to at least one of satellite orbit information, satellite health information, clock time correction information provided by the satellite, and leap second information.
6. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , wherein
the antenna configured to receive the GNSS signal is fixedly installed, and
the processing circuitry determines that at least one of a plurality of received GNSS signals is a spoofed GNSS signal when a current antenna position obtained by positioning calculation using the plurality of received GNSS signals, varies by a predetermined amount or more from a preset antenna position or an antenna position obtained by past positioning calculation.
7. The GNSS receiver according to claim 6 , wherein
the processing circuitry is further configured to select a GNSS signal of the plurality of received GNSS signals that is not determined to be a spoofed GNSS signal, and
the GNSS receiver performs positioning calculation by using the GNSS signal selected by the processing circuitry.
8. The GNSS receiver according to claim 6 , further comprising:
an assist GNSS input interface configured to acquire assist GNSS information, wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the received GNSS signal is a spoofed GNSS signal when there is a difference between information obtained by demodulating the received GNSS signal and information obtained from the assist GNSS information with respect to at least one of satellite orbit information, satellite health information, clock time correction information provided by the satellite, and leap second information.
9. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , wherein
the processing circuitry is further configured to select a GNSS signal of the plurality of received GNSS signals that is not determined to be a spoofed GNSS signal, and
the GNSS receiver performs positioning calculation by using the GNSS signal selected by the processing circuitry.
10. The GNSS receiver according to claim 9 , further comprising:
an assist GNSS input interface configured to acquire assist GNSS information, wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the received GNSS signal is a spoofed GNSS signal when there is a difference between information obtained by demodulating the received GNSS signal and information obtained from the assist GNSS information with respect to at least one of satellite orbit information, satellite health information, clock time correction information provided by the satellite, and leap second information.
11. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , further comprising:
an assist GNSS input interface configured to acquire assist GNSS information, wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the received GNSS signal is a spoofed GNSS signal when there is a difference between information obtained by demodulating the received GNSS signal and information obtained from the assist GNSS information with respect to at least one of satellite orbit information, satellite health information, clock time correction information provided by the satellite, and leap second information.
12. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the received GNSS signal is a spoofed GNSS signal when a signal strength of the received GNSS signal is equal to or greater than a corresponding threshold value.
13. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the GNSS signals of a plurality of PRN codes are spoofed GNSS signals when a difference in signal strengths of the GNSS signals relating to the plurality of PRN codes is within a corresponding threshold value.
14. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , wherein
when the GNSS signals of first and second PRN codes of the plurality of PRN codes, are respectively received,
an elevation angle obtained from orbit information for the satellite corresponding to the first PRN code is higher than an elevation angle obtained from orbit information for the satellite corresponding to the second PRN code, and
when the signal strength of the GNSS signal of the first PRN code is smaller than the signal strength of the GNSS signal of the second PRN code, the processing circuitry determines that at least one of the GNSS signal of the first PRN code or the GNSS signal of the second PRN code is a spoofed GNSS signal.
15. The GNSS receiver according to claim 1 , wherein
the processing circuitry determines that the GNSS signal is a spoofed GNSS signal when a change of the signal strength of the received GNSS signal within a predetermined time period is within a corresponding threshold value.
16. A GNSS receiving method, comprising:
receiving a GNSS signal broadcast from a GNSS satellite and acquiring a navigation message;
performing positioning calculation on the basis of a propagation delay, which is a time required for the GNSS signal transmitted from the GNSS satellite, to reach an antenna;
storing a reference timing which is a timing at which a navigation message of a predetermined type is received; and
determining that a GNSS signal including a subsequent navigation message is a spoofed GNSS signal when a timing difference, which is a difference between predicted reception timing of next and subsequent navigation messages of same type predicted based on the stored reference timing and actual reception timing of navigation messages of the same type after the reference timing, deviates from a predetermined time threshold range, until the timing difference falls within the predetermined time threshold range, wherein
when the GNSS signal is not determined to be the spoofed GNSS signal, the reference timing is updated based on the actual reception timing of the navigation messages, and
when the GNSS signal is determined to be the spoofed GNSS signal, the reference timing is not updated based on the actual reception timing of the navigation messages.