Secure semiconductor and system design
A secure system includes a data port, a network on chip (NoC) module, a processor communicatively coupled to the NoC module, a communication interface operatively coupled to the processor and to the data port, an electronic field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) configuration module operatively coupled to the NoC module, and a clock operatively coupled to the NoC module. In a first modality, the communication interface is at least partially disabled. In a second modality, the communication interface is at least partially disabled, boundary scan operations are disabled, a RESET signal is held in a constant state, and/or redacted code is rendered inoperable. In a third modality, the communication interface is at least partially enabled to send and receive commands and data via the data port, the boundary scan operations are enabled, the RESET signal is not held in the constant state, and/or the redacted code is operable.
1. A secure semiconductor device, comprising:
a data port;
a network on chip (NoC) module;
a processor communicatively coupled to the NoC module, the processor configured to generate an access key;
a communication interface operatively coupled to the processor and to the data port, the communication interface configured to
enable communication access to and from the NoC module via the data port in response to a presence of the access key, and
disable the communication access to and from the NoC module via the data port in response to an absence of the access key; and
an electronic field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) configuration module;
a programmable logic block configured to operate in a boundary scan mode; and
a clock configured to disable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block in response to an absence of FPGA configuration data stored in the eFPGA configuration module.
2. The device of claim 1 , further comprising:
an electronic field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) configuration module; and
a clock configured to assert a RESET signal in response to an absence of FPGA configuration data stored in the eFPGA configuration module, thereby disabling operation of the device.
3. The device of claim 1 , further comprising:
a programmable logic block configured to operate in a boundary scan mode;
an electronic field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) configuration module;
a non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) configured to store field-programmable gate array (FPGA) configuration data; and
a clock configured to
enable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block and/or to de-assert a reset signal to the programmable logic block in response to a presence of the FPGA configuration in the eFPGA configuration module, and
disable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block and/or to assert the reset signal to the programmable logic block in response to an absence of the FPGA configuration data in the eFPGA configuration module.
4. The device of claim 1 , wherein the communication interface includes a JTAG interface.
5. The device of claim 1 , further comprising an on-chip oscillator operatively coupled to the processor.
6. A secure semiconductor device, comprising:
a network on chip (NoC) module;
an electronic field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) configuration module;
a clock operatively coupled to the eFPGA configuration module via the NoC module, the clock configured to assert a RESET signal in response to an absence of FPGA configuration data stored in the eFPGA configuration module, thereby disabling operation of the device; and
a programmable logic block configured to operate in a boundary scan mode;
wherein the clock is configured to disable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block in response to an absence of FPGA configuration data stored in the eFPGA configuration module.
7. The device of claim 6 , further comprising:
a data port;
a processor communicatively coupled to the NoC module, the processor configured to generate an access key; and
a communication interface operatively coupled to the processor and to the data port, the communication interface configured to
enable communication access to and from the NoC module via the data port in response to a presence of the access key, and
disable the communication access to and from the NoC module via the data port in response to an absence of the access key.
8. The device of claim 7 , wherein the communication interface includes a JTAG interface.
9. The device of claim 6 , further comprising:
a programmable logic block configured to operate in a boundary scan mode; and
a non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) configured to store field-programmable gate array (FPGA) configuration data;
wherein the clock is configured to
enable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block and/or to de-assert a reset signal to the programmable logic block in response to a presence of the FPGA configuration in the eFPGA configuration module, and
disable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block and/or to assert the reset signal to the programmable logic block in response to an absence of the FPGA configuration data in the eFPGA configuration module.
10. The device of claim 6 , further comprising an on-chip oscillator operatively coupled to the clock.
11. A secure system, comprising:
a data port;
a network on chip (NoC) module;
a processor communicatively coupled to the NoC module;
a communication interface operatively coupled to the processor and to the data port;
an electronic field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) configuration module operatively coupled to the NoC module; and
a clock operatively coupled to the NoC module;
wherein in a first modality, the communication interface is at least partially disabled;
wherein in a second modality, the communication interface is at least partially disabled, boundary scan operations are disabled, a RESET signal is held in a constant state, and/or redacted code is rendered inoperable;
wherein in a third modality, the communication interface is at least partially enabled to send and receive commands and data via the data port, the boundary scan operations are enabled, the RESET signal is not held in the constant state, and/or the redacted code is operable; and
wherein, in the second modality, the clock is configured to disable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block in response to an absence of FPGA configuration data stored in the eFPGA configuration module.
12. The system of claim 11 , further comprising an on-chip oscillator operatively coupled to the clock.
13. The system of claim 11 , wherein the communication interface includes a JTAG interface.
14. The system of claim 11 , wherein in the first modality or the second modality, the communication interface is configured to:
enable communication access to and from the NoC module via the data port in response to a presence of an access key; and
disable the communication access to and from the NoC module via the data port in response to an absence of the access key.
15. The system of claim 11 , wherein, in the second modality, the clock is configured to assert a RESET signal in response to an absence of FPGA configuration data stored in the eFPGA configuration module.
16. The system of claim 11 , further comprising:
a programmable logic block configured to operate in a boundary scan mode; and
a non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) configured to store field-programmable gate array (FPGA) configuration data;
wherein, in the second modality, the clock is configured to disable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block and/or to assert the reset signal to the programmable logic block in response to an absence of the FPGA configuration data in the eFPGA configuration module.
17. The system of claim 16 , wherein, in the second modality, the clock is further configured to enable the boundary scan mode of the programmable logic block and/or to de-assert a reset signal to the programmable logic block in response to a presence of the FPGA configuration in the eFPGA configuration module.