IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,283,192
Granted Patent B2
US 12,283,192 · App. 18/084,228 · Granted Apr 22, 2025

Detection method of decoying of a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, and associated traffic alert and collision avoidance system

Inventors: Kevyn Ledieu (Merignac, FR); Denis Ricaud (Merignac, FR); Nathalie Véronique Feyt (Merignac, FR)
Assignee: THALES
G08G5/0078G08G5/0008G08G5/04G01S13/933
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,283,192
App. No.
18/084,228
Granted
Apr 22, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

Disclosed is a method of detecting spoofing of a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, known as a TCAS, the TCAS having a Mode A, a Mode C and a Mode S for communicating with surrounding aircraft. The method includes: querying a suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S of the TCAS and receiving a response to this query; deducing from the response at least some data, known as Mode S data, relating to the suspected spoofing aircraft; and validating Mode S data by querying the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode A or Mode C of the TCAS.

Claims (32)

1. A method for spoofing detection of a traffic alert and collision avoidance system, called TCAS;

the TCAS having a Mode A, a Mode C and a Mode S for communicating with surrounding aircrafts;

the method comprising the following steps:

querying a suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S of the TCAS and receiving a response to this query;

deducing from said response data, called Mode S data, relating to the suspected spoofing aircraft;

validating the Mode S data by querying the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode A or Mode C of the TCAS.

2. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , wherein the validation step is repeated N times, the suspected spoofing aircraft being recognised as false when the Mode S data traffic is not validated by any iteration.

3. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , wherein:

N is greater than or equal to 3;

at least one iteration of the validation step is implemented when the suspected spoofing aircraft becomes a threat in both altitude and distance;

at least one iteration of the validation step is implemented prior to the triggering of a traffic alert in relation to the suspected spoofing aircraft;

at least one iteration of the validation step is implemented prior to the triggering of a resolution advisory in relation to the suspected spoofing aircraft.

4. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , further comprising a step of retrieving a transponder code of the suspected spoofing aircraft via Mode S.

5. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 4 , wherein the step of retrieving the transponder code is implemented:

in passive mode when the suspected spoofing aircraft is not a threat in altitude or distance;

in querying mode when the suspected spoofing aircraft is a threat in altitude or distance.

6. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 4 , wherein said Mode S data validation step comprises:

querying via Mode A;

identifying a response to this querying of the suspected spoofing aircraft by comparing the received transponder code with that retrieved in the retrieval step;

designating Mode S data as validated when the response from the suspected spoofing aircraft has been received within a time window determined by that Mode S data;

the Mode S data comprising a relative distance to the suspected spoofing aircraft.

7. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , wherein said Mode S data validation step comprises:

querying via Mode C;

designating Mode S data as validated when there is a response to this query with carried/deducible data corresponding to Mode S data;

the Mode S data comprising a relative distance, bearing and altitude of the suspected spoofing aircraft.

8. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , further comprising a behavioural analysis step consisting of analysing the behaviour of the suspected spoofing aircraft in terms of the physical capabilities of an aircraft and/or a regulation.

9. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 8 , wherein the behavioural analysis comprises analysing at least one of the following:

speed of the suspected spoofing aircraft;

variation in the speed of the suspected spoofing aircraft;

detection of a fixed transmitter.

10. The method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 , further comprising a step of displaying in the TCAS a symbol representative of the suspected spoofing aircraft in the event of non-validation of Mode S data, said symbol being different from a symbol representative of any other aircraft whose Mode S data has been validated.

11. A traffic alert and collision avoidance system, called TCAS, comprising a query module, a reception module, a behavioural analysis module, a validation module and a display module configured to implement the method for spoofing detection according to claim 1 .

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Feb 9, 2023
From: LEDIEU, KEVYN; RICAUD, DENIS; FEYT, NATHALIE VÉRONIQUE
To: THALES
Reel/Frame 062639/0693 →
Priority Claims (1)
FR 21 13974 · Dec 20, 2021 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20230196927A1 · Jun 22, 2023
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