IP Library Granted Patent US 12,314,940
Granted Patent B2
US 12,314,940 · App. 18/481,686 · Granted May 27, 2025

Currency management system and electronic signature device

Inventors: Keita Takamatsu (Tokyo, JP); Koji Fusa (Tokyo, JP); Yu Kusakabe (Tokyo, JP)
Assignee: GVE Ltd.
G06Q20/3825
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,314,940
App. No.
18/481,686
Granted
May 27, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A currency management system that excels in security and includes legal tender as a management target. A transaction information management device (TIMD) receives first transaction (Tr) information from a user terminal, and an account information management device receives second Tr information from the TIMD. The (TIMD) receives third Tr information from the account information management device, and a currency information management device receives fourth Tr information from the TIMD. The TIMD receives fifth Tr information from the currency information management device, and the TIMD sends sixth Tr information to a user terminal. The TIMD stores in the transaction information management device the first to sixth Tr information; and the account information management device and the currency information management device receive the first to sixth Tr information from the TIMD, and store the information in the account information management device and currency information management device respectively.

Claims (24)

1. A secret key type electronic signature device, comprising:

at least one processor configured to:

store, in at least one storage, a cryptographic key and a first authority assigned to the cryptographic key;

share the cryptographic key with another electronic signature device;

wherein the other electronic signature device comprises at least one processor and at least one storage, wherein the at least one processor of the other electronic signature device is configured to store, in the at least one storage of the other electronic signature device, the shared cryptographic key and a second authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key that is different from the first authority stored in the secret key type electronic signature device,

wherein the second authority stored in the other electronic signature device is only for verification of an electronic signature, and the at least one processor of the other electronic signature device is configured to perform verification of the electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key, but cannot perform creation of the electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key, and

wherein the first authority that is stored in the secret key type electronic signature device is configured for creation and verification of the electronic signature;

wherein the at least one processor of the secret key type electronic signature device is further configured to:

perform creation of a first electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key stored in the secret key type electronic signature device according to the first authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key stored in the secret key type electronic signature device that authorizes the creation, and as a result, attach the created first electronic signature to a piece of information;

wherein the at least one processor of the other electronic signature device is further configured to:

perform verification of the first electronic signature attached to the piece of information using the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device according to the second authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device that authorizes the verification, and, as a result, determine whether the piece of information to which the first electronic signature is attached has been illegally changed based on the result of the verification; and

not perform creation of the first electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device according to the second authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device that does not authorize the creation, and, as a result, not attach the first electronic signature to the piece of information.

2. A secret key type electronic signature device, comprising:

at least one memory storing a cryptographic key in association with a first authority and a second authority which are assigned to the cryptographic key, wherein the first authority is different from the second authority and the second authority is only for verification of an electronic signature; and

at least one processor configured to:

share the cryptographic key with another electronic signature device;

wherein the other electronic signature device comprises at least one processor and at least one storage, and the at least one processor of the other electronic signature device is configured to store, in the at least one storage of the other electronic signature device, the shared cryptographic key and the second authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key,

wherein the at least one processor of the other electronic signature device is configured to perform verification of the electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key, but cannot perform creation of the electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key, and

wherein the first authority and the second authority both stored in the memory of the secret key type electronic signature device are configured for creation and verification of the electronic signature;

wherein the at least one processor of the secret key type electronic signature device is further configured to:

perform creation of a first electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key stored in the secret key type electronic signature device according to the first authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key stored in the secret key type electronic signature device that authorizes the creation, and as a result, attach the created first electronic signature to a piece of information;

wherein the at least one processor of the other electronic signature device is further configured to:

perform verification of the first electronic signature attached to the piece of information using the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device according to the second authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device that authorizes the verification, and, as a result, determine whether the piece of information to which the first electronic signature is attached has been illegally changed based on the result of the verification; and

not perform creation of the first electronic signature using the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device according to the second authority assigned to the shared cryptographic key stored in the other electronic signature device that does not authorize the creation, and, as a result, not attach the first electronic signature to the piece of information.

Continuity (2)
Continuation 17922480
Related Publication 20240029063A1 · Jan 25, 2024
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