IP Library Granted Patent US 12,335,732
Granted Patent B2
US 12,335,732 · App. 17/852,715 · Granted Jun 17, 2025

Detecting spoofed ethernet frames within an autosar communication stack

Inventors: Mohamed A. Layouni (Fraser, MI); Vinaya Rayapeta (Cedar Park, TX); Manohar Reddy Nanjundappa (Troy, MI); Thomas M. Forest (Macomb, MI); Karl Bernard Leboeuf (LaSalle, CA)
Assignee: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
H04W12/106G07C5/008H04W12/104
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,335,732
App. No.
17/852,715
Granted
Jun 17, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system comprises a computer including a processor and a memory. The memory includes instructions such that the processor is programmed to: receive, at a device driver, an Ethernet frame from an Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR) communication stack, determine, at the device driver, whether the Ethernet frame is a spoofed Ethernet frame, and transmit a cancelation command to at least one layer of the AUTOSAR communication stack when the device driver determines the Ethernet frame is spoofed.

Claims (28)

1. A system comprising a computer including a processor and a memory, the memory including instructions such that the processor is programmed to:

receive, at a device driver, an Ethernet frame from an Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR) communication stack;

determine, at the device driver, whether the Ethernet frame is a spoofed Ethernet frame by:

extracting, via the device driver, a source media access control (MAC) address from a source MAC address portion of the Ethernet frame;

extracting, via the device driver, the source MAC address from a datagram portion of the Ethernet frame; and

comparing the source MAC address extracted from the source MAC address portion with the source MAC address extracted from the datagram portion,

wherein the ethernet frame is spoofed when the source MAC address extracted from the source MAC address portion does not match the source MAC address extracted from the datagram portion; and

transmit a cancelation command to at least one layer of the AUTOSAR communication stack when the device driver determines the Ethernet frame is spoofed.

2. The system of claim 1 , wherein one or more authorized MAC addresses are stored in a data structure.

3. The system of claim 2 , wherein the data structure comprises an AUTOSAR Extensible Markup Language (XML) file.

4. The system of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further programmed to transmit the cancelation command to a protocol data unit (PDU) router module of the AUTOSAR communication stack.

5. The system of claim 4 , wherein the PDU router module is configured to propagate the cancelation command through the AUTOSAR communication stack.

6. The system of claim 1 , wherein the AUTOSAR communication stack includes an Ethernet interface module configured to receive the Ethernet frame.

7. The system of claim 6 , wherein the Ethernet interface module is configured to provide the Ethernet frame to the device driver.

8. A method comprising:

receiving, at a device driver, an Ethernet frame from an Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR) communication stack;

determining, at the device driver, whether the Ethernet frame is a spoofed Ethernet frame by:

extracting, via the device driver, a source media access control MAC) address from a source MAC address portion of the Ethernet frame;

extracting, via the device driver, the source MAC address from a datagram portion of the Ethernet frame; and

comparing the source MAC address extracted from the source MAC address portion with the source MAC address extracted from the datagram portion,

wherein the ethernet frame is spoofed when the source MAC address extracted from the source MAC address portion does not match the source MAC address extracted from the datagram portion; and

transmitting a cancelation command to at least one layer of the AUTOSAR communication stack when the device driver determines the Ethernet frame is spoofed.

9. The method of claim 8 , wherein one or more authorized MAC addresses are stored in a data structure.

10. The method of claim 9 , wherein the data structure comprises an AUTOSAR Extensible Markup Language (XML) file.

11. The method of claim 8 , the method further comprising: transmitting the cancelation command to a protocol data unit (PDU) router module of the AUTOSAR communication stack.

12. The method of claim 11 , wherein the PDU router module is configured to propagate the cancelation command through the AUTOSAR communication stack.

13. The method of claim 8 , wherein the AUTOSAR communication stack includes an Ethernet interface module configured to receive the Ethernet frame.

14. The method of claim 13 , wherein the Ethernet interface module is configured to provide the Ethernet frame to the device driver.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 29, 2022
From: LAYOUNI, MOHAMED A.; RAYAPETA, VINAYA; NANJUNDAPPA, MANOHAR REDDY; FOREST, THOMAS M.; LEBOEUF, KARL BERNARD
To: GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
Reel/Frame 060356/0739 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240007859A1 · Jan 4, 2024
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