IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,373,299
Granted Patent B2
US 12,373,299 · App. 18/159,394 · Granted Jul 29, 2025

Just-in-time filesystem-based ransomware backup

Inventors: Seth Jacob Rothschild (Littleton, MA); Farida Shafik (Cairo, EG)
Assignee: Dell Products L.P.
G06F11/1451G06F11/1458H04L63/1416
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,373,299
App. No.
18/159,394
Granted
Jul 29, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

One example method includes detecting a file access process, such as a write operation performed by a ransomware process, directed to a file, based on the detecting, incrementing a counter, checking to determine if the counter exceeds a defined threshold, and when the counter exceeds the defined threshold, creating a backup of the file. The backup file may be a read-only file, and may expire, and be deleted, at a particular time, or after the passage of a period of time.

Claims (34)

1. A method, comprising:

detecting a file access process directed to a file;

in a case where the file access process is detected, checking a name of the file to determine whether the file is a backup file;

in a case where it is determined that the file is the backup file, shutting down the file access process; and

in a case where it is determined that the file is not the backup file:

based on the detecting, incrementing a counter each time the file access process is detected;

checking to determine if the counter exceeds a defined threshold; and

when the counter exceeds the defined threshold, creating a backup of the file,

wherein, in a case where the file is determined to be the backup file, an administrator is notified of the file access, or a machine where the file access is occurring is shut down.

2. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the file access process comprises a write operation.

3. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein a possible ransomware attack is indicated by the counter exceeding the defined threshold.

4. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the file is only backed up when the counter exceeds the defined threshold.

5. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the backup automatically expires, and is deleted, at a particular time, or after a particular period of time has passed.

6. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the defined threshold comprises a rate at which the file access process and one or more additional file access processes, collectively, are performed.

7. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the backup is used to overwrite the file when part of the file is encrypted by a ransomware process.

8. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein when part of the file is encrypted by a ransomware process, the file is restored using the backup.

9. The method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the file access process corresponds to a process ID in a map, and the counter comprises the process ID.

10. A non-transitory storage medium having stored therein instructions that are executable by one or more hardware processors to perform operations comprising:

detecting a file access process directed to a file;

in a case where the file access process is detected, checking a name of the file to determine whether the file is a backup file;

in a case where it is determined that the file is the backup file, shutting down the file access process; and

in a case where it is determined that the file is not the backup file:

based on the detecting, incrementing a counter each time the file access process is detected;

checking to determine if the counter exceeds a defined threshold; and

when the counter exceeds the defined threshold, creating a backup of the file,

wherein, in a case where the file is determined to be the backup file, an administrator is notified of the one file access, or a machine where the one file access is occurring is shut down.

11. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein the file access process comprises a write operation.

12. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein a possible ransomware attack is indicated by the counter exceeding the defined threshold.

13. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein the file is only backed up when the counter exceeds the defined threshold.

14. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein the backup automatically expires, and is deleted, at a particular time, or after a particular period of time has passed.

15. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein after the backup of the file is created, both the file and the backup of the file are monitored for file access processes.

16. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein the backup is used to overwrite the file when part of the file is encrypted by a ransomware process.

17. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein when part of the file is encrypted by a ransomware process, the file is restored using the backup.

18. The non-transitory storage medium as recited in claim 10 , wherein the file access process corresponds to a process ID in a map, and the counter comprises the process ID.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jan 25, 2023
From: ROTHSCHILD, SETH JACOB; SHAFIK, FARIDA
To: DELL PRODUCTS L.P.
Reel/Frame 062487/0868 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240248803A1 · Jul 25, 2024
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