IP Library Granted Patent US 12,450,369
Granted Patent B2
US 12,450,369 · App. 18/318,746 · Granted Oct 21, 2025

System and method for remotely verifying physical security keys

Inventors: I-Te Chen (Taipei, TW); Chuang-Yi Chiu (Taipei, TW)
Assignee: INSYDE SOFTWARE CORP.
G06F21/604H04L9/3271H04L9/0827H04L9/321H04L9/3247
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,450,369
App. No.
18/318,746
Granted
Oct 21, 2025
Kind
B2
Abstract

A system for remotely verifying physical security keys and a method thereof are provided. The system includes a physical key, a control device, and a controlled platform. The control device is electrically connected to the physical key. The controlled platform is linked to the control device via digital transmission. The control device sends a verification application message to an application service program linked to the controlled platform through the digital transmission; according to the verification application message, the controlled platform responds to the control device via the digital transmission with a challenge value signing procedure to request a signature; according to the challenge value signature procedure, the control device performs a signature procedure on the physical key to complete verification. In this way, the physical key is remotely authenticated by the control device to achieve the purpose of improving information security.

Claims (18)

1. A method for remotely verifying physical security keys, adapted to a physical key, a control device and a controlled platform linked to the control device, the method comprising:

the control device sending a verification application message to an application service program linked to the controlled platform through digital transmission;

according to the verification application message, the controlled platform responding to the control device via the digital transmission with a challenge value signing procedure to request a signature; and

according to the challenge value signature procedure, the control device performing a signature procedure on the physical key to complete verification;

wherein the step that according to the verification application message the controlled platform responding to the control device via the digital transmission with a challenge value signing procedure to request a signature further comprises:

the controlled device requesting a challenge value signature request signal to the registration and authentication database according to the verification application message;

the registration and authentication database responding to the controlled device with a challenge value and a public key index response signal according to the challenge value signature request signal;

the controlled device responding to the challenge value and the public key index response signal to the control device according to the verification application message; and

the control device initiating a challenge value signature on the physical key according to the challenge value and the public key index response signal.

2. The method according to claim 1 , wherein after the step that the control device initiating a challenge value signature on the physical key according to the challenge value and the public key index response signal, the method further comprises the physical key performing the signature according to the challenge value and the public key index response signal.

3. The method according to claim 1 , wherein the step that the control device initiating a challenge value signature on the physical key according to the challenge value and the public key index response signal further comprises:

determining whether the physical key establishes an electrical connection with the control device; and

when the electrical connection establishes, the physical key transmits the challenge value signature to the controlled platform through the control device.

4. The method according to claim 3 , wherein the step that according to the challenge value signature procedure, the control device performing a signature procedure on the physical key to complete verification further comprises:

the physical key responding the signature to the control device according to the signature;

the control device responding the signature to the controlled device according to the signature;

the controlled device responding the signature to the registration and authentication database according to the signature; and

the application service program of the registration and authentication database completing the verification according to the signature.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded May 17, 2023
From: CHEN, I-TE; CHIU, CHUANG-YI
To: INSYDE SOFTWARE CORP.
Reel/Frame 063661/0619 →
Priority Claims (1)
CN 202310084156.1 · Jan 31, 2023 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240256682A1 · Aug 1, 2024
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