Granted Patent B2

US 12,461,734 · App. 17/952,478 · Granted Nov 4, 2025

Inventors: Kristin M. Schanche (Fairfield, OH); Matthew W. Wiseman (Fairfield, OH); Simone Drakes (Miramar, FL); Edward Gorman (Cutler Bay, FL); Jeroen Hoppenbrouwers (Miami, FL); Emmanuel Norde (Miami, FL); Dorian Uzun (Hollywood, FL); Henry Mederos (Miami, FL)

Assignee: General Electric Company

G06F8/65G06F8/61G06F8/70G06F21/64H04W12/033H04W12/068H04W12/106G06F21/31G06F21/57G06F21/572G06F21/575G06F21/725

Abstract

Claims (35)

1 . A method for remotely uploading certified software from a source to a data update logic on an asset via a wireless communications link, the method comprising:

encrypting the wireless communications link between the source and the data update logic to form a secure tunnel;

autonomously verifying a credential of the source at the asset when a software update file is transmitted based on an authorized credential preloaded onto a storage device in the asset;

performing a load assurance check on a portion of the transmitted software update file to confirm integrity of the transmitted software update file after the credential of the source is verified, wherein the load assurance check calculates a cryptographic hash function for comparison to a check value provided by the source; and

activating the transmitted software update file after the transmitted software update file integrity is verified, the activating occurring automatically in a data processing module and being devoid of human intervention, the asset being an aircraft.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the source is a ground unit.

3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the data update logic performs security checking for all asset critical function control modules or data processing units.

4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the data update logic and a data processing unit form a path to a corresponding aircraft critical function control module.

5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the load assurance check includes a check-sum.

6 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising sending a validation message from the asset notifying the source of a final disposition of the transmitted software update file.

7 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the uploading includes deactivating at least a portion of the transmitted software update file.

8 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon, computer executable instructions that, if executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform a method for remotely uploading certified software from a source to a data update logic on an asset via a wireless communications link comprising:

encrypting the wireless communications link between the source and the data update logic to form a secure tunnel;

autonomously verifying a credential of the source at the asset when a software update file is transmitted based on an authorized credential preloaded onto a storage device in the asset;

performing a load assurance check on a portion of the transmitted software update file to confirm integrity of the transmitted software update file after the credential of the source is verified, wherein the load assurance check calculates a cryptographic hash function for comparison to a check value provided by the source; and

activating the transmitted software update file after the transmitted software update file integrity is verified, the activating occurring automatically in a data processing module and being devoid of human intervention, the asset being an aircraft.

9 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 ,

wherein the source is a ground unit.

10 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the data update logic performs security checking for all asset critical function control modules or data processing units.

11 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the data update logic and a data processing unit form a path to a corresponding aircraft critical function control module.

12 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the load assurance check includes a check-sum.

13 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , further comprising sending a validation message from the asset notifying the source of a final disposition of the transmitted software update file.

14 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8 , wherein the uploading includes deactivating at least a portion of the transmitted software update file.

15 . A system for remotely updating software from a source to an aircraft comprising:

a processor;

a memory within the aircraft, the memory storing machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to:

receive a file transmitted from the source and representative of a software update;

a wireless communications link forming an encrypted tunnel between the source and the memory; and

the memory storing machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to:

autonomously verify a credential of the source when the software update file is transmitted based on an authorized credential preloaded onto a storage device in the asset;

perform a load assurance check on a portion of the transmitted software update file to confirm integrity of the transmitted software update file after the credential of the source is verified, wherein the load assurance check includes a comparison between a cryptographic hash function and a check value provided by the source; and

activate the transmitted software update file after the software update file integrity is verified, the activating occurring automatically in a data processing module and devoid of human intervention.

16 . The system of claim 15 , wherein the source is a ground unit.

17 . The system of claim 15 , wherein the verifying includes security/trusted source validation.

18 . The system of claim 15 , wherein the load assurance check includes a check-sum and a hash function.

Assignments (2)

Continuity (3)

References Cited (42)