Joint random subcarrier selection and channel-based artificial signal design aided pls
View Patent ↗In the area of Joint Random Subcarrier Selection and Channel-Based Artificial Signal Design Aided PLS, a method for providing physical layer security (PLS) depending on the randomness of wireless channel is proposed. Specifically, a channel-based joint random subcarrier selection and artificial signal design are introduced to protect the communication in the presence of a passive eavesdropper which can be even stronger than the legitimate receiver. Our analysis assumes a window-based subcarrier selection method in which the strongest subcarriers in each window are selected. Chosen subcarriers are considered for secret sequence extraction. The generated channel dependent secret sequence is used for both random subcarrier selection and artificial signal design. We evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method through some representative metrics, such as secret sequence disagreement rate (SSDR), throughput and bit error rate (BER), in both perfect and imperfect channel estimation cases. Simulation results are presented and insightful discussions are drawn.
1 . A process for joint random subcarrier selection and channel-based artificial signal design aided physical security system, the physical security system having a pair of random subcarrier selection schemes for window-based subcarrier selection using a strongest subcarrier selection scheme of the pair of random subcarrier selection schemes of each window to achieve a secret sequence extractions and a channel-based random selection of the pair of random subcarrier selection schemes to add an artificial signal to information data in order to protect confidential data of a transmitter, the process comprising:
finding the strongest subcarrier selection scheme into a single-antenna receiver channel;
quantizating the strongest subcarrier selection scheme and the secret sequence extractions;
choosing minimum required length bits of one of the secret sequence extractions when the one of the secret sequence extractions is larger than another of the secret sequence extractions;
choosing a first minimum required length bits when one, of the secret sequence extractions is less than the another of the secret sequence extractions;
forming small packets of the secret sequence extractions with a length of M bits after the steps of choosing;
dividing the length of the M bits to N for a subcarrier selection number;
adding an artificial signal to the information data to protect the confidential data of the transmitter, wherein the secret sequence extractions form the single-antenna receiver channel is modulated in a same order as a modulation of the information data;
sending a signal from the transmitter as X∈ 1×K to a single-antenna legitimate receiver after applying a cyclic prefix to time-domain encrypted signals so as to avoid intersymbol interference;
receiving the sent signal as y b =h b *x+n b by the single-antenna legitimate receiver;
applying serial-to-parallel conversion on the received signal after removing the cyclic prefix by using a fast Fourier transform to the received signal;
preforming a zero-forcing channel equalization process to the converted signal;
element-wise dividing the received signal and the channel associated therewith;
applying a parallel to serial conversion to the received signal;
extracting an information signal in accordance with
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capturing the information signal in accordance with y e =h e *x+n e from a single-antenna eavesdroppers channel;
receiving the captured information signal at a side of the single-antenna eavesdropper channel alter the zero-forcing channel equalization;
generating the single-antenna channel eavesdropper information signal by the single-channel eavesdropper channel in accordance with a same algorithm as the single-antenna legitimate receiver; and
extracting the information signal from the single-antenna eavesdropper channel in accordance with
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