IP Library Granted Patent US 12,526,142
Granted Patent B2
US 12,526,142 · App. 18/713,457 · Granted Jan 13, 2026

Cryptography

Inventors: Marco Macchetti (Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne, CH); Jerome Perrine (Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne, CH); Nicolas Fischer (Cheseaux-sur-Lausanne, CH)
Assignee: NAGRAVISION SARL
H04L9/3073H04L9/0866
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,526,142
App. No.
18/713,457
Granted
Jan 13, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

A pairing method between a user device ( 1 ) and an operator device ( 2 ), the user device ( 1 ) being intended to receive conditional access data from the operator device ( 2 ), the user device having a user device identifier (U ID ), the operator having an operator device identifier (O ID ). The method comprises receiving, by the user device, a user device key (KU ID ) derived from a first cryptographically secure function and receiving, by the operator device, an operator key (KO ID ) derived from a second cryptographically secure function. The user device comprises a user device bilinear mathematical function (e(KU ID , O ID )) and the operator device comprises an operator bilinear mathematical function (e(U ID , KO ID )) which each define a pairing over an elliptic curve. The method includes generating, by the operator device ( 2 ), a pairing key (KD=e(U ID , KO ID )) between the user device ( 1 ) and the operator device ( 2 ), using the operator key (KO ID ) and the device identifier (U ID ) as variables of the operator mathematical function (e(U ID , KO ID )). The user device ( 1 ) generates the same pairing key (KD=e(KU ID , O ID )) using the user device key (KU ID ) and the operator device identifier (U ID ) as variables of the user device mathematical function e(KU ID , O ID ).

Claims (66)

1 . A pairing method between a user device and an operator device, the user device being intended to receive conditional access data from the operator device, the user device having a user device identifier (UID), the operator device having an operator device identifier (OID), the method comprising:

receiving, by the user device, a user device key (KUID) derived from a first cryptographically secure function;

receiving, by the operator device, an operator device key (KOID) derived from a second cryptographically secure function, wherein the user device comprises a user device bilinear mathematical function (e (KUID, OID)) and the operator device comprises an operator bilinear mathematical function (e (UID, KOID)) which each define a pairing over an elliptic curve wherein the user device bilinear mathematical function and the operator bilinear mathematical function each define a bilinear mathematical function corresponding to the same cryptographic pairing over the same elliptic curve;

generating, by the operator device, a pairing key (KD=e (UID, KOID)) between the user device and the operator device, using the operator device key (KOID) and the user device identifier (UID) as variables of the operator bilinear mathematical function (e (UID, KOID));

generating, by the user device, the same pairing key (KD=e (KUID, OID)) using the user device key (KUID) and the operator device identifier (OID) as variables of the user device bilinear mathematical function e (KUID, OID) based on the user device and the operator device being paired; and

decrypting encrypted data to obtain the conditional access data.

2 . The pairing method of claim 1 , wherein the first cryptographically secure function and the second cryptographically secure function each comprise a scalar point multiplication operation over a respective group of points of the elliptic curve.

3 . The pairing method of claim 2 , wherein the user device identifier (UID) comprises an element of a first group of points on the elliptic curve, and the operator device identifier (OID) comprises an element of a second group of points on the elliptic curve.

4 . The pairing method of claim 3 , wherein the user device identifier (UID) is generated by applying hash-to-curve algorithm UID=H (device ID) to a device ID of the user device.

5 . The pairing method of claim 3 , wherein the operator device identifier (OID) is generated by applying hash-to-curve algorithm OID=H (operator ID) to an operator ID of the operator device.

6 . The pairing method of claim 2 , wherein the user device key (KUID) is derived from a first cryptographically secure function comprising the scalar point multiplication operation (KUID=N·UID) of a personalization key (N) which defines a point on the elliptic curve and the user device identifier (UID) which defines a point on the elliptic curve.

7 . The pairing method of claim 6 , wherein the personalization key (N) comprises an integer number.

8 . The pairing method of claim 2 , wherein the operator device key (KOID) is derived from a second cryptographically secure function comprising the scalar point multiplication operation (KOID=N·OID) of a personalization key (N) which defines a point on the elliptic curve and the operator device identifier (OID) which defines a point on the elliptic curve.

9 . The pairing method of claim 8 , wherein the personalization key (N) comprises an integer number.

10 . The pairing method of claim 1 , wherein a merged operator key, KO new , comprises a sum of respective operator keys KO i for a plurality of operators:

KO

new

=

i

=

1

n

KO

ID

(

i

)

where KO ID (i) =N·O ID (i) where O ID (i) , is the operator device identifier of an ith operator of n (i) ID operators.

11 . The pairing method of claim 1 , further comprising:

providing a personalization key, providing an identifier of the user device to be paired, providing an identifier of the operator device to be paired, providing the first cryptographically secure function and the second cryptographically secure function;

calculating a user device key by applying the first cryptographically secure function to the personalization key and to the user device identifier; and

calculating an operator device key by applying the second cryptographically secure function to the personalization key and to the operator device identifier.

12 . A system comprising:

an operator device comprising a memory and at least one processor, the operator device having an operator device identifier (OID); and

a user device comprising a memory and at least one processor, the user device having a user device identifier (UID), wherein the user device comprises a user device bilinear mathematical function (e (KUID, OID)) and the operator device comprises an operator bilinear mathematical function (e (UID, KOID)) which each define a pairing over an elliptic curve, wherein the user device bilinear mathematical function and the operator bilinear mathematical function each define a bilinear mathematical function corresponding to the same cryptographic pairing over the same elliptic curve;

the user device configured to:

receive conditional access data from an operator device; and

receive a user device key (KUID) derived from a first cryptographically secure function; and

the operator device configured to:

receive an operator device key (KOID) derived from a second cryptographically secure function; and

generate a pairing key (KD=e (UID, KOID)) between the user device and the operator device, using the operator device key (KOID) and the user device identifier (UID) as variables of the operator bilinear mathematical function (e (UID, KOID));

the user device further configured to generate the same pairing key (KD=e (KUID, OID)) using the user device key (KUID) and the operator device identifier (OID) as variables of the user device bilinear mathematical function e (KUID, OID) based on the user device and the operator device being paired; and

decrypt encrypted data to obtain the conditional access data.

13 . The system of claim 12 , wherein the first cryptographically secure function and the second cryptographically secure function each comprise a scalar point multiplication operation over a respective group of points of the elliptic curve.

14 . The system of claim 13 , wherein the user device identifier (UID) comprises an element of a first group of points on the elliptic curve, and the operator device identifier (OID) comprises an element of a second group of points on the elliptic curve.

15 . The system of claim 14 , wherein the user device identifier (UID) is generated by applying hash-to-curve algorithm UID=H (device ID) to a device ID of the user device.

16 . The system of claim 14 , wherein the operator device identifier (OID) is generated by applying hash-to-curve algorithm OID=H (operator ID) to an operator ID of the operator device.

17 . The system of claim 13 , wherein the user device key (KUID) is derived from a first cryptographically secure function comprising the scalar point multiplication operation (KUID=N·UID) of a personalization key (N) which defines a point on the elliptic curve and the user device identifier (UID) which defines a point on the elliptic curve.

18 . The system of claim 17 , wherein the personalization key (N) comprises an integer number.

19 . The system of claim 13 , wherein the operator device key (KOID) is derived from a second cryptographically secure function comprising the scalar point multiplication operation (KOID=N·OID) of a personalization key (N) which defines a point on the elliptic curve and the operator device identifier (OID) which defines a point on the elliptic curve.

20 . The system of claim 12 , wherein a merged operator key, KO new , comprises a sum of respective operator keys KO i for a plurality of operators:

KO

new

=

i

=

1

n

KO

ID

(

i

)

where KO ID (i) =N·O ID (i) ID where O ID (i) is the operator device identifier of an ith operator of n operators.

Priority Claims (1)
EP 21213270 · Dec 8, 2021 · regional
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20250023729A1 · Jan 16, 2025
References Cited (19)
US 7113594B2 · Boneh et al. · 2006 [cited by applicant]
US 12278817B1 · Raj · 2025 [cited by examiner]
US 20120045051A1 · Nogami · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 20160142206A1 · Canard · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20160241527A1 · Fischer et al. · 2016 [cited by applicant]
US 20170053566A1 · Takashima · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 20190281453A1 · Shi · 2019 [cited by examiner]
US 20200014534A1 · Garcia Morchon · 2020 [cited by applicant]
US 20200052905A1 · Mathias · 2020 [cited by examiner]
US 20220021529A1 · Chen · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 20240413984A1 · Rindal · 2024 [cited by examiner]
Y. Chen, J.-F. Martínez, P. Castillejo and L. López, “A Bilinear Map Pairing Based Authentication Scheme for Smart Grid Communications: PAuth,” in IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 22633-22643, 2019. (Year: 2019). [cited by examiner]
F. Guo, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, H. Hsing, D. S. Wong and V. Varadharajan, “Optimized Identity-Based Encryption from Bilinear Pairing for Lightweight Devices,” in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 14, … [cited by examiner]
Yu et al., “Hierarchical-CPK-Based Trusted Computing Cryptography Scheme” Sep. 2, 2011, Advances in Biometrics: International Conference ICB 2007; Proceedings (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 149-163 XP019162406,… [cited by applicant]
European Extended Search Report, EP Application No. 21213270.8 dated Jun. 1, 2022; 10 pages. [cited by applicant]
“Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing” SIAM J. of Computing, vol. 32, No. 3, 2003. [cited by applicant]
A. Faz-Hernandez et al. “Hashing to Elliptic Curves” Internet Draft, Mar. 9, 2020, 148 pages. [cited by applicant]
Y. Sakemi et al., “Pairing-Friendly Curves” Internet Draft, Mar. 19, 2020, 423 pages. [cited by applicant]
D. Boneh et al., “BLS Signatures” Internet Draft, Sep. 10, 2020, 30 pages. [cited by applicant]