IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,536,306
Granted Patent B2
US 12,536,306 · App. 17/511,387 · Granted Jan 27, 2026

System, devices and/or processes for system ownership change event

Inventors: Daniil Viktorovich Egranov (Houston, TX); Donald Edward Banks (San Jose, CA)
Assignee: Arm Limited
G06F21/604G06F21/57G06F21/602G06F21/78H04L9/0891G06F21/107G06F2221/2143
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,536,306
App. No.
17/511,387
Granted
Jan 27, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Briefly, example methods, apparatuses, and/or articles of manufacture are disclosed that may be implemented, in whole or in part, using one or more processing devices to facilitate and/or support system ownership change event for one or more computing devices.

Claims (38)

1 . A method, comprising:

cryptographically associating a particular computing device with a new system owner based at least in part on a new system owner public key of a new system owner public/private key pair and a current system owner private key of a current system owner public/private key pair, including:

prior to finalizing provision of the new system owner public key as a new system owner root of trust public key (ROTPK), initiating, via a processor of the particular computing device, execution of one or more operations to:

disable or erase specified computing device firmware or specified content, or a combination thereof, and

revoke a delegate's cryptographical control of firmware authorization management for the particular computing device, including revoking the delegate's permissions to authorize another party to modify the specified computing device firmware; and

responsive at least in part to successful execution of the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or specified content, or the combination thereof, and further responsive at least in part to the revocation of the delegate's cryptographical control of firmware authorization management for the particular computing device, finalizing the provision of the new system owner public key as the new system owner ROTPK at least in part via execution of an immutable firmware bootloader;

wherein cryptographically associating the particular computing device with the new system owner further comprises:

transmitting the new system owner ROTPK from the particular computing device to a current system owner computing device for signature of the new system owner ROTPK using the current system owner private key;

obtaining a signed new system owner ROTPK from the current system owner computing device;

verifying the signed new system owner ROTPK against a current platform ROTPK; and

storing the signed new system owner ROTPK in a secure non-volatile storage of the particular computing device.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the initiating the execution of the one or more operations to disable or erase specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof to occur following the obtaining the signed new system owner ROTPK.

3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the initiating the execution of the one or more operations to disable or erase specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof to occur responsive at least in part to the storing the signed new system owner ROTPK in the secure non-volatile storage.

4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the cryptographically associating the particular computing device with the new system owner further comprises:

detecting system ownership change pending state; and

responsive to detection of the system ownership change pending state, the processor to execute the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof.

5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof includes processing secure-world content.

6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof includes processing non-secure-world content.

7 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof includes disabling a trusted service.

8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof includes reconfiguring firmware services.

9 . An apparatus, comprising: at least one processor comprising at least one execution circuit to:

cryptographically associate a particular computing device with a new system owner based at least in part on a new system owner public key of a new system owner public/private key pair and a current system owner private key of a current system owner public/private key pair, wherein the at least one processor to:

prior to finalizing provision of the new system owner public key as a new system owner root of trust public key (ROTPK), initiate execution of one or more operations to:

disable or erase specified computing device firmware or specified content, or a combination thereof, and

revoke a delegate's cryptographical control of firmware authorization management for the particular computing device, including revoking the delegate's permissions to authorize another party to modify the specified computing device firmware; and

responsive at least in part to successful execution of the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or specified content, or the combination thereof, and further responsive at least in part to the revocation of the delegate's cryptographical control of firmware authorization management for the particular computing device, finalize the provision of the new system owner public key as the new system owner ROTPK at least in part via execution of an immutable firmware bootloader;

wherein, to cryptographically associate the particular computing device with the new system owner, the at least one processor is further to:

initiate transmission of the new system owner ROTPK from the particular computing device to a current system owner computing device for signature of the new system owner ROTPK using the current system owner private key;

obtain a signed new system owner ROTPK from the current system owner computing device;

verify the signed new system owner ROTPK against a current platform ROTPK; and

store the signed new system owner ROTPK in a secure non-volatile storage of the particular computing device.

10 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein the at least one processor to initiate the execution of the one or more operations to disable or erase specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof following the obtaining the signed new system owner ROTPK.

11 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein the at least one processor to initiate execution of the one or more operations to disable or erase specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof responsive at least in part to storage of the signed new system owner ROTPK in the secure non-volatile storage.

12 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein, to cryptographically associate the particular computing device with the new system owner, the at least one processor further to:

detect system ownership change pending state; and

responsive to detection of the system ownership change pending state, execute the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof.

13 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof to include operations to process secure-world content and/or non-secure-world content.

14 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein the one or more operations to disable or erase the specified computing device firmware or the specified content, or the combination thereof to include disabling a trusted service and/or reconfiguring firmware services.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Dec 17, 2021
From: EGRANOV, DANIIL VIKTOROVICH; BANKS, DONALD EDWARD
To: ARM LIMITED
Reel/Frame 058414/0660 →
Continuity (2)
Continuation In Part 17000148 · Aug 21, 2020
Related Publication 20220058275A1 · Feb 24, 2022
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