IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,591,066
Granted Patent B2
US 12,591,066 · App. 18/205,176 · Granted Mar 31, 2026

Signal processing method to avoid deception attack and apparatus for performing the same

Inventor: Tae Hee Kim (Daejeon, KR)
Assignee: ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
G01S19/015G01S19/254
View Patent ↗
Loading inventors, assignments & file history…
Monitor This Case
Get email alerts when status or documents change.
Order Certified Copies
Most orders are placed with the USPTO same day — all within 24 business hours.
Order via The Patent Place →
Pre-filled with this patent's details
Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,591,066
App. No.
18/205,176
Filed
Jun 2, 2023
Granted
Mar 31, 2026
Kind
B2
Art Unit
2632
USPC
375/150
Abstract

A signal processing method to avoid deception attack and apparatus for performing the same are provided. The signal processing method includes generating a synthesized signal by receiving a signal from a satellite, detecting a deception signal from the synthesized signal based on tracking information on a signal currently being tracked, separating a normal navigation signal from the synthesized signal in response to the detecting of the deception signal, and computing a normal navigation solution based on the normal navigation signal.

Claims (38)

1 . A signal processing method to avoid a deception attack, the method comprising:

generating a synthesized signal by receiving a signal from a satellite;

detecting a deception signal from the synthesized signal based on tracking information on a signal currently being tracked;

separating a normal navigation signal from the synthesized signal in response to the detecting of the deception signal; and

computing a normal navigation solution based on the normal navigation signal,

wherein the separating of the normal navigation signal comprises:

determining whether the normal navigation signal is separated from the synthesized signal; and

generating tracking information on the normal navigation signal when the normal navigation signal is determined to have been separated from the synthesized signal.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the tracking information comprises a code location and Doppler information of the signal currently being tracked.

3 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the detecting of the deception signal comprises:

calculating signal intensity correlation values of signals included in the synthesized signal; and

determining whether the deception signal is included in the synthesized signal based on the signal intensity correlation values.

4 . The method of claim 3 , wherein the calculating of the signal intensity correlation values comprises calculating the signal intensity correlation values of the signals included in the synthesized signal within a predetermined code location range, based on a code location of the signal currently being tracked.

5 . The method of claim 3 , wherein the determining of whether the deception signal is included in the synthesized signal comprises determining, as the deception signal, a signal which has a signal intensity correlation value greater than a signal intensity correlation value of the signal currently being tracked among the signals included in the synthesized signal.

6 . The method of claim 4 , wherein the determining of whether the deception signal is included in the synthesized signal further comprises:

setting a deception detect flag to a first state when the deception signal is included in the synthesized signal; and

setting the deception detect flag to a second state when there is no signal which has a signal intensity correlation value greater than a signal intensity correlation value of the signal currently being tracked among the signals included in the synthesized signal.

7 . The method of claim 6 , further comprising detecting the deception signal again in response to the deception detect flag being in the second state.

8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the determining of whether the normal navigation signal is separated comprises determining whether a distribution of signal intensity correlation values of the normal navigation signal maintains a predetermined shape and determining whether the normal navigation signal is separated.

9 . The method of claim 8 , wherein the distribution of the signal intensity correlation values of the normal navigation signal comprises a distribution of Early-Prompt-Late correlation values.

10 . An apparatus for signal processing to avoid a deception attack, the apparatus comprising:

a converter configured to generate a synthesized signal by receiving a signal from a satellite; and

a signal processor configured to detect a deception signal from the synthesized signal based on tracking information on a signal currently being tracked, separate a normal navigation signal from the synthesized signal, and generate a normal navigation solution based on the normal navigation signal,

wherein when separating the normal navigation signal, the signal processor is configured to:

determine whether the normal navigation signal is separated from the synthesized signal; and

generate tracking information on the normal navigation signal when the normal navigation signal is determined to have been separated from the synthesized signal.

11 . The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the tracking information comprises a code location and Doppler information of the signal currently being tracked.

12 . The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the signal processor is configured to:

calculate signal intensity correlation values of signals included in the synthesized signal; and

determine whether the deception signal is included in the synthesized signal based on the signal intensity correlation values.

13 . The apparatus of claim 12 , wherein the signal processor is configured to calculate the signal intensity correlation values of the signals included in the synthesized signal within a predetermined code location range, based on a code location of the signal currently being tracked.

14 . The apparatus of claim 12 , wherein the signal processor is configured to determine, as the deception signal, a signal which has a signal intensity correlation value greater than a signal intensity correlation value of the signal currently being tracked among the signals included in the synthesized signal.

15 . The apparatus of claim 13 , wherein the signal processor is configured to:

set a deception detect flag to a first state when the deception signal is included in the synthesized signal; and

set the deception detect flag to a second state when there is no signal which has a signal intensity correlation value greater than a signal intensity correlation value of the signal currently being tracked among the signals included in the synthesized signal.

16 . The apparatus of claim 15 , wherein the signal processor is configured to detect the deception signal again in response to the deception detect flag being in the second state.

17 . The apparatus of claim 10 , wherein the signal processor is configured to determine whether a distribution of signal intensity correlation values of the normal navigation signal maintains a predetermined shape and determine whether the normal navigation signal is separated.

18 . The apparatus of claim 17 , wherein the distribution of the signal intensity correlation values of the normal navigation signal comprises a distribution of Early-Prompt-Late correlation values.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 2, 2023
From: KIM, TAE HEE
To: ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Reel/Frame 063841/0061 →
Priority Claims (2)
KR 10-2022-0121857 · Sep 26, 2022 · national
KR 10-2023-0039814 · Mar 27, 2023 · national
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240103178A1 · Mar 28, 2024
References Cited (161)
US 6512803B2 · Heinzl · 2003 [cited by examiner]
US 6639541B1 · Quintana · 2003 [cited by examiner]
US 6642884B2 · Bryant · 2003 [cited by examiner]
US 6828935B1 · Dunn · 2004 [cited by examiner]
US 6842498B2 · Heinzl · 2005 [cited by examiner]
US 6931055B1 · Underbrink · 2005 [cited by examiner]
US 6952440B1 · Underbrink · 2005 [cited by examiner]
US 7372400B2 · Cohen · 2008 [cited by examiner]
US 7623068B2 · Powell · 2009 [cited by examiner]
US 7822105B2 · Underbrink · 2010 [cited by examiner]
US 7969354B2 · Levin · 2011 [cited by examiner]
US 8068054B2 · Levin · 2011 [cited by examiner]
US 8134911B2 · Yang · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 8138972B2 · Underbrink · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 8593345B2 · Underbrink · 2013 [cited by examiner]
US 8896479B2 · Wang · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 9020697B2 · Ricci · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 9123186B2 · Ricci · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 9235941B2 · Ricci · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 9290153B2 · Ricci · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 9366762B2 · Smith · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 9383449B2 · Kim · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 9658340B2 · Shin · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 9755730B2 · Ryu · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 9778367B2 · Wang · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 9883209B2 · Ricci · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 9958549B2 · Psiaki · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 10162061B2 · Kim · 2018 [cited by examiner]
US 10365376B2 · Lee · 2019 [cited by examiner]
US 10775510B2 · Agee · 2020 [cited by examiner]
US 10983221B2 · Agee · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 10996339B2 · Agee · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 11119221B2 · Cohen · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 11258625B2 · Decenzo · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 11391599B1 · Anvari · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 11500109B2 · Kaabouch · 2022 [cited by examiner]
US 11626971B2 · Curran · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 11662474B2 · Gick · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 12222426B2 · Di Grazia · 2025 [cited by examiner]
US 12292516B2 · Schmidt Diaz · 2025 [cited by examiner]
US 20090195354A1 · Levin · 2009 [cited by examiner]
US 20110006946A1 · Yu · 2011 [cited by examiner]
US 20110068973A1 · Humphreys · 2011 [cited by examiner]
US 20120086597A1 · Sin · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 20120092214A1 · Lee · 2012 [cited by examiner]
US 20140002303A1 · Sin · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20140049787A1 · Jacob · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20140085137A1 · Sin · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20140309886A1 · Ricci · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20140310594A1 · Ricci · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20140310610A1 · Ricci · 2014 [cited by examiner]
US 20150035702A1 · Joo · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 20150116148A1 · Kim · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 20150123846A1 · Jeong · 2015 [cited by examiner]
US 20160116597A1 · Jeong · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20160205419A1 · Ricci · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20160223678A1 · Kim · 2016 [cited by examiner]
US 20170075701A1 · Ricci · 2017 [cited by examiner]
US 20210286088A1 · Cheng · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 20210382179A1 · Cohen · 2021 [cited by examiner]
US 20230137969A1 · Kim · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 20230318849A1 · Jung · 2023 [cited by examiner]
US 20240103178A1 · Kim · 2024 [cited by examiner]
US 20240264315A1 · Joo · 2024 [cited by examiner]
AU 2006350107A1 · 2008 [cited by examiner]
AU 2021100964A4 · 2021 [cited by examiner]
CA 2628795A1 · 2008 [cited by examiner]
CA 2628795C · 2014 [cited by examiner]
CA 2940652A1 · 2015 [cited by examiner]
CA 2940652C · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 101379410B · 2013 [cited by examiner]
CN 104656104A · 2015 [cited by examiner]
CN 105717518A · 2016 [cited by examiner]
CN 104155663B · 2017 [cited by examiner]
CN 106470901A · 2017 [cited by examiner]
CN 104656104B · 2017 [cited by examiner]
CN 110244323A · 2019 [cited by examiner]
CN 110308464A · 2019 [cited by examiner]
CN 106470901B · 2019 [cited by examiner]
CN 111427070A · 2020 [cited by examiner]
CN 112147646A · 2020 [cited by examiner]
CN 110231633B · 2021 [cited by examiner]
CN 113031019A · 2021 [cited by examiner]
CN 113031020B · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 113031021B · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 114646981A · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 115291256A · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 115327579A · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 115407368A · 2022 [cited by examiner]
CN 111427070B · 2023 [cited by examiner]
CN 110308464B · 2023 [cited by examiner]
CN 116430414A · 2023 [cited by examiner]
CN 116430414B · 2023 [cited by examiner]
CN 114325769B · 2024 [cited by examiner]
CN 115088273B · 2025 [cited by examiner]
CN 114648047B · 2025 [cited by examiner]
CN 120050596A · 2025 [cited by examiner]
CN 120050597A · 2025 [cited by examiner]
EP 0921409B1 · 2005 [cited by examiner]
EP 1955090B1 · 2009 [cited by examiner]
EP 2455781A1 · 2012 [cited by examiner]
EP 2708917A1 · 2014 [cited by examiner]
EP 2796896B1 · 2016 [cited by examiner]
EP 3056925A1 · 2016 [cited by examiner]
EP 2455781B1 · 2017 [cited by examiner]
EP 3056925B1 · 2018 [cited by examiner]
EP 3671281A1 · 2020 [cited by examiner]
FR 2995700A1 · 2014 [cited by examiner]
FR 3032805A1 · 2016 [cited by examiner]
FR 3032805B1 · 2019 [cited by examiner]
JP 2008058320A · 2008 [cited by examiner]
JP 2010169683A · 2010 [cited by examiner]
JP 2019045150A · 2019 [cited by examiner]
KR 20050017564A · 2005 [cited by examiner]
KR 20070012308A · 2007 [cited by examiner]
KR 20130135739A · 2013 [cited by examiner]
KR 20140049787A · 2014 [cited by examiner]
KR 101484861B1 · 2015 [cited by examiner]
KR 101498613B1 · 2015 [cited by examiner]
KR 20150050114A · 2015 [cited by examiner]
KR 20150050617A · 2015 [cited by examiner]
KR 20180066666A · 2016 [cited by examiner]
KR 1020160094728A · 2016 [cited by applicant]
KR 20160094728A · 2016 [cited by examiner]
KR 20170057966A · 2017 [cited by examiner]
KR 101775516B1 · 2017 [cited by examiner]
KR 20170124224A · 2017 [cited by examiner]
KR 20180063398A · 2018 [cited by examiner]
KR 20180099191A · 2018 [cited by examiner]
KR 20190041208A · 2019 [cited by examiner]
KR 20190068861A · 2019 [cited by examiner]
KR 102042104B1 · 2019 [cited by examiner]
KR 20200107143A · 2020 [cited by examiner]
KR 102258696B1 · 2021 [cited by applicant]
KR 20220081697A · 2022 [cited by examiner]
KR 20220135584A · 2022 [cited by examiner]
KR 102465550B1 · 2022 [cited by examiner]
KR 20230002326A · 2023 [cited by examiner]
KR 20230063853A · 2023 [cited by examiner]
KR 20240043049A · 2024 [cited by examiner]
WO WO0177705A2 · 2001 [cited by examiner]
WO WO0186318A1 · 2001 [cited by examiner]
WO WO0204977A2 · 2002 [cited by examiner]
WO WO02059639A1 · 2002 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2005047923A2 · 2005 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2008024534A2 · 2008 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2008048283A2 · 2008 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2012105752A2 · 2012 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2014047378A1 · 2014 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2018014980A1 · 2018 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2020144679A1 · 2020 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2022165150A1 · 2022 [cited by examiner]
WO WO2025125183A1 · 2025 [cited by examiner]
GNSS Spoofing and Anti-Spoofing Technology, MDPI, Sep. 2022 (Year: 2022). [cited by examiner]
Jamming and Spoofing Detection in GNSS, Sensors, Jun. 28, 2024 (Year: 2024). [cited by examiner]
M. Psiaki et al. GPS Spoofing Detection via Dual-Receiver Correlation of Military Signals, IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2013 (Year: 2013). [cited by examiner]
Taro Suzuki, Signal Tracking, Aug. 2022, Retrieved from https-gnss-learning.org (Year: 2022). [cited by examiner]
E. Schmidt, N. Gatsis and D. Akopian, “A GPS Spoofing Detection and Classification Correlator-Based Technique Using the Lasso,” in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 4224-4237, De… [cited by examiner]
A. Cavaleri, B. Motella, M. Pini and M. Fantino, “Detection of spoofed GPS signals at code and carrier tracking level,” 2010 5th ESA Workshop on Satellite Navigation Technologies and European Workshop on GNSS Signals an… [cited by examiner]
M. L. Psiaki, B. W. O'Hanlon, J. A. Bhatti, D. P. Shepard and T. E. Humphreys, “GPS Spoofing Detection via Dual-Receiver Correlation of Military Signals,” in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol. 4… [cited by examiner]
Sherman Lo et al., “Signal Authentication : A Secure Civil GNSS for Today”, InsideGNSS, Sep.-Oct. 2009. [cited by applicant]
Cited By (1)
US 12,736,685