IP Library Granted Patent US 12,609,836
Granted Patent B2
US 12,609,836 · App. 18/828,919 · Granted Apr 21, 2026

Prevention of information leakage through signature

Inventors: Christian Rudolf Hoermann (Raleigh, NC); Dharma Ganesan (Columbia, MD); Thomas William Keetch (Blackburn with Darwen, GB); David Meibusch (Brisbane City, AU)
Assignee: Oracle International Corporation
H04L9/3247G06F21/6227G06F21/64H04L63/0428
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,609,836
App. No.
18/828,919
Granted
Apr 21, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Techniques for preventing leakage of sensitive information through a signature are disclosed. Data is received, and the data is transmitted to a signature and encryption (SE) service, along with an encryption key. Signed and encrypted data is received from the SE service, where the signed and encrypted data is (i) encrypted using the encryption key and (ii) signed by the SE service. A verification is performed to verify that that sensitive information (such as the encryption key) is not leaked through a side channel of a signature of the signed and encrypted data, such as by (i) determining a length of the side channel of the signature, and (ii) verifying that the length of the side channel of the signature does not exceed a threshold length. Responsive to verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the side channel of the signature, the signed and encrypted data is transmitted.

Claims (60)

1 . A method comprising:

receiving, by a transmission service, data;

transmitting the data to a signature and encryption (SE) service, along with an encryption key;

receiving, from the SE service, signed and encrypted data that is (i) encrypted using the encryption key and (ii) signed by the SE service;

verifying that sensitive information is not leaked through one or more side channels of a signature of the signed and encrypted data, wherein verifying that sensitive information is not leaked comprises performing one or both of (i) verifying that a length of the one or more side channels does not exceed a threshold length, and (ii) verifying that sensitive information is not posed as random numbers within the one or more side channels; and

responsive to verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data, transmitting the signed and encrypted data to a destination that is external to the transmission service and the SE service.

2 . The method of claim 1 , wherein verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature comprises:

determining the length of the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data;

verifying that the length of the one or more side channels of the signature does not exceed the threshold length; and

responsive to verifying that the length of the one or more side channels of the signature does not exceed the threshold length, verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature.

3 . The method of claim 2 , wherein the threshold length is less than a length of the sensitive information.

4 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the sensitive information comprises the encryption key.

5 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the one or more side channels of the signature supposedly include random numbers, and verifying that sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels comprises:

verifying that the sensitive information is not posed as the random numbers within the one or more side channels and leaked through the one or more side channels.

6 . The method of claim 1 , wherein:

a first encryption and signature operation and a second encryption and signature operation are two consecutive encryption and signature operations performed by the SE service; and

the SE service is ephemeral in nature, such that a state of the SE service from the first encryption and signature operation is not maintained during the second encryption and signature operation.

7 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

verifying that the SE service is ephemeral in nature.

8 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the SE service maintains a log of the data.

9 . The method of claim 1 , transmitting the signed and encrypted data comprises:

transmitting the signed and encrypted data to an intermediate zone, to facilitate the intermediate zone to verify a signature of the signed and encrypted data, and allow passage of the signed and encrypted data to a reception service.

10 . The method of claim 9 , wherein:

the transmission service and the SE service are within a first tenancy of a cloud environment; and

the reception service is within a second tenancy of the cloud environment that is different from the first tenancy.

11 . The method of claim 10 , wherein the intermediate zone is within one of (i) the first tenancy of the cloud environment, or (ii) a third tenancy of the cloud environment that is different from each of the first and second tenancies.

12 . The method of claim 9 , further comprising:

responsive at least in part to the intermediate zone verifying the signature of the signed and encrypted data, receiving, from the intermediate zone, the signed and encrypted data at the reception service.

13 . The method of claim 1 , further comprising:

subsequent to receiving the data, generating a cleartext form of the data,

wherein transmitting the data to the SE service comprises transmitting the cleartext form of the data to the SE service.

14 . The method of claim 1 , wherein the data includes a subset of a source code of a program that is deployable to a plurality of mobile devices.

15 . The method of claim 14 , wherein the SE service maintains a log of the data, and the log of the data includes the subset of the source code.

16 . A non-transitory computer-readable medium including instructions that when executed by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operations including:

receiving, by a transmission service, data;

transmitting the data to a signature and encryption (SE) service, along with an encryption key;

receiving, from the SE service, signed and encrypted data that is (i) encrypted using the encryption key and (ii) signed by the SE service;

determining an attribute of one or more side channels of a signature of the signed and encrypted data;

based at least in part on the attribute, verifying that sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data; and

responsive to verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data, transmitting the signed and encrypted data to a destination that is external to the transmission service and the SE service.

17 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the attribute of one or more side channels is a length of the one or more side channels, wherein verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature comprises:

verifying that the length of the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data does not exceed a threshold length; and

responsive to verifying that the length of the one or more side channels of the signature does not exceed the threshold length, verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature.

18 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17 , wherein the threshold length is less than a length of the sensitive information, and wherein the sensitive information comprises the encryption key.

19 . A system comprising:

one or more processors; and

one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing instructions, which, when executed by the system, cause the system to perform a set of actions including:

receiving, by a transmission service, data;

transmitting the data to a signature and encryption (SE) service, along with an encryption key;

receiving, from the SE service, signed and encrypted data that is (i) encrypted using the encryption key and (ii) signed by the SE service;

determining one or both of (i) a length of one or more side channels of a signature of the signed and encrypted data, and (ii) content of the one or more side channels;

based at least in part on one or both the length and the content, verifying that sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data; and

responsive to verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature of the signed and encrypted data, transmitting the signed and encrypted data to a destination that is external to the transmission service and the SE service.

20 . The system of claim 19 , wherein verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature comprises:

responsive to the length of the one or more side channels of the signature not exceeding a threshold length, verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature,

wherein the threshold length is less than a length of the sensitive information, and

wherein the sensitive information comprises the encryption key.

21 . The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 16 , wherein the attribute of one or more side channels comprise content of the one or more side channels, wherein verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature comprises:

verifying that the sensitive information is not included within the content of the one or more side channels; and

responsive to verifying that the sensitive information is not included within the content of the one or more side channels, verifying that the sensitive information is not leaked through the one or more side channels of the signature.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Oct 1, 2024
From: HOERMANN, CHRISTIAN RUDOLF; GANESAN, DHARMA; KEETCH, THOMAS WILLIAM; MEIBUSCH, DAVID
To: ORACLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 068759/0578 →
Continuity (3)
Provisional Application 63659241 · Jun 12, 2024
Provisional Application 63659243 · Jun 12, 2024
Related Publication 20250385799A1 · Dec 18, 2025
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Cited By (1)
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