IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,610,241
Granted Patent B2
US 12,610,241 · App. 18/183,777 · Granted Apr 21, 2026

System and method for detecting radio-frequency-based attacks in a predetermined area

Inventor: Shailendra Singh (Maharashtra, IN)
Assignee: Bank of America Corporation
H04W12/121H04W12/104
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,610,241
App. No.
18/183,777
Granted
Apr 21, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

An apparatus may be configured to detect radio-frequency (RF)-based attacks in a predetermined area. The server may include a memory and a processor. The memory may be configured to store a baseline RF signature corresponding to an electric component located in a predetermined area. The baseline RF signature may comprise an expected RF signature tracked from the electric component during a predetermined amount of time. The processor may be configured to monitor electronic operations of the electric component over the predetermined amount of time. The electric component may be located in the predetermined area. The processor may be configured to track an RF signature associated with the electric component. The processor may be configured to determine that the RF signature comprises an anomaly during the predetermined amount of time based at least in part upon the RF signature being different from the baseline RF signature corresponding to the electric component.

Claims (115)

1 . An apparatus, comprising:

a memory, configured to store:

a baseline radio-frequency (RF) signature corresponding to an electric component located in a predetermined area, the baseline RF signature comprising an expected RF signature tracked from the electric component during a predetermined amount of time; and

a processor communicatively coupled to the memory and configured to:

monitor a plurality of electronic operations of the electric component over the predetermined amount of time, the electric component being located in the predetermined area;

track an RF signature associated with the electric component, the RF signature corresponding to the plurality of electronic operations of the electric component over the predetermined amount of time;

determine that the RF signature comprises an anomaly during the predetermined amount of time based at least in part upon the RF signature being different from the baseline RF signature corresponding to the electric component;

determine that the anomaly is caused by an electronic attack in the predetermined area;

trigger broadcasting of a plurality of location signals from an ultra-wideband (UWB) tag coupled to the electric component, the plurality of location signals indicating that the electric component is part of the electronic attack;

triangulate a location of the electric component in the predetermined area, the location being triangulated based at least in part upon the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag; and

output the location of the electric component in the predetermined area to a secure component, the secure component being configured to display one or more simulated directions to the location of the electric component in the predetermined area.

2 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

in conjunction with tracking the RF signature associated with the electric component, compare the RF signature and the baseline RF signature; and

in response to the RF signature and the baseline RF signature being different to one another, determine that the RF signature comprises the anomaly during the predetermined amount of time.

3 . The apparatus of claim 2 , wherein the processor is further configured to

in conjunction with comparing the RF signature and the baseline RF signature, determine an anomaly score indicating differences between the RF signature and the baseline RF signature, wherein a higher anomaly score indicates fewer similarities between the RF signature and the baseline RF signature and a lower anomaly score indicates more similarities between the RF signature and the baseline RF signature.

4 . The apparatus of claim 1 ,

wherein the memory is further configured to store:

an asset name identifying the electric component located in the predetermined area; and

a UWB tag identifier (ID) assigned to the UWB tag coupled to the electric component; and

wherein the processor is further configured to:

receive the asset name assigned to the electric component from the memory;

relate the asset name assigned to the electric component to the UWB tag ID assigned to the UWB tag coupled to the electric component;

transmit triggering commands to the UWB tag for the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals; and

in response to determining that the anomaly is caused by the electronic attack, trigger the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component based at least in part upon the triggering commands.

5 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

receive the asset name assigned to the electric component from the memory;

relate the asset name assigned to the electric component to the UWB tag ID assigned to the UWB tag coupled to the electric component;

transmit triggering commands to the UWB tag for the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals; and

in response to determining that the anomaly is caused by the electronic attack, trigger the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component based at least in part upon the triggering commands, wherein:

a first information vector associated with the first location signal is determined by a first UWB component; and

the first information vector indicates a first possible location of the electric component in the predetermined area; and

triangulate the location of the electric component in the predetermined area based at least in part upon the first information vector.

6 . The apparatus of claim 5 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

receive a second information vector associated with a second location signal of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag, wherein:

the second information vector associated with the second location signal is determined by a second UWB component; and

the second information vector indicates a second possible location of the electric component in the predetermined area; and

triangulate the location of the electric component in the predetermined area based at least in part upon the first information vector and the second information vector.

7 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the secure component is a simulated reality device configured to:

display the simulated directions to the location of the electric component in the predetermined area in an augmented visibility field, the augmented visibility field comprising the simulated directions within a predetermined sensing range.

8 . A system, comprising:

a plurality of ultra-wideband (UWB) components located in a predetermined area; and

a server communicatively coupled to the plurality of UWB components, comprising:

a memory, configured to store a baseline radio-frequency (RF) signature corresponding to an electric component located in the predetermined area, the baseline RF signature comprising an expected RF signature tracked from the electric component during a predetermined amount of time; and

a processor communicatively coupled to the memory and configured to:

monitor a plurality of electronic operations of the electric component over the predetermined amount of time, the electric component being located in the predetermined area;

track an RF signature associated with the electric component, the RF signature corresponding to the plurality of electronic operations of the electric component over the predetermined amount of time;

determine that the RF signature comprises an anomaly during the predetermined amount of time based at least in part upon the RF signature being different from the baseline RF signature corresponding to the electric component;

determine that the anomaly is caused by an electronic attack in the predetermined area;

trigger broadcasting of a plurality of location signals from an ultra-wideband (UWB) tag coupled to the electric component, the plurality of location signals indicating that the electric component is part of the electronic attack;

triangulate a location of the electric component in the predetermined area, the location being triangulated based at least in part upon the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag; and

output the location of the electric component in the predetermined area to a secure component, the secure component being configured to display one or more simulated directions to the location of the electric component in the predetermined area.

9 . The system of claim 8 , wherein the processor is further configured to:

in conjunction with tracking the RF signature associated with the electric component, compare the RF signature and the baseline RF signature; and

in response to the RF signature and the baseline RF signature being different to one another, determine that the RF signature comprises the anomaly during the predetermined amount of time.

10 . The system of claim 8 ,

wherein the memory is further configured to store:

an asset name identifying the electric component located in the predetermined area; and

a UWB tag identifier (ID) assigned to the UWB tag coupled to the electric component; and

wherein the processor is further configured to:

receive the asset name assigned to the electric component from the memory;

relate the asset name assigned to the electric component to the UWB tag ID assigned to the UWB tag coupled to the electric component;

transmit triggering commands to the UWB tag for the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals; and

in response to determining that the anomaly is caused by the electronic attack, trigger the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component based at least in part upon the triggering commands.

11 . The system of claim 8 ,

wherein a first UWB component of the plurality of UWB components is configured to:

receive a first location signal of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag;

determine a first information vector associated with the first location signal, the first information vector indicating a first possible location of the electric component in the predetermined area;

transmit the first information vector to the server; and

wherein the processor is further configured to:

in conjunction with triggering the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component, receive the first information vector associated with the first location signal; and

triangulate the location of the electric component in the predetermined area based at least in part upon the first information vector.

12 . The system of claim 11 ,

wherein a second UWB component of the plurality of UWB components is configured to:

receive a second location signal of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag;

determine a second information vector associated with the second location signal, the second information vector indicating a second possible location of the electric component in the predetermined area;

transmit the second information vector to the server; and

wherein the processor is further configured to:

in conjunction with triggering the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component, receive the second information vector associated with the second location signal; and

triangulate the location of the electric component in the predetermined area based at least in part upon the second information vector.

13 . The system of claim 8 , wherein the secure component is a simulated reality device configured to:

display the simulated directions to the location of the electric component in the predetermined area in an augmented visibility field, the augmented visibility field comprising the simulated directions within a predetermined sensing range.

14 . A method to detect electronic attacks in a predetermined area, comprising:

monitoring, by a server, a plurality of electronic operations of an electric component over a predetermined amount of time, the electric component being located in the predetermined area;

tracking, by the server, a radio-frequency (RF) signature associated with the electric component, the RF signature corresponding to the plurality of electronic operations of the electric component over the predetermined amount of time;

determining, by the server, that the RF signature comprises an anomaly during the predetermined amount of time based at least in part upon the RF signature being different from a baseline RF signature corresponding to the electric component;

determining, by the server, that the anomaly is caused by an electronic attack in the predetermined area;

triggering, by the server, broadcasting of a plurality of location signals from an ultra-wideband (UWB) tag coupled to the electric component, the plurality of location signals indicating that the electric component is part of the electronic attack;

triangulating, by the server, a location of the electric component in the predetermined area, the location being triangulated based at least in part upon the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag; and

outputting, by the server, the location of the electric component in the predetermined area to a secure component, the secure component being configured to display one or more simulated directions to the location of the electric component in the predetermined area.

15 . The method of claim 14 , further comprising:

storing, by the server, the baseline RF signature corresponding to the electric component, the baseline RF signature comprising an expected RF signature tracked from the electric component during the predetermined amount of time;

in conjunction with tracking the RF signature associated with the electric component, comparing, by the server, the RF signature and the baseline RF signature; and

in response to the RF signature and the baseline RF signature being different to one another, determining that the RF signature comprises the anomaly during the predetermined amount of time.

16 . The method of claim 15 , further comprising:

in conjunction with comparing the RF signature and the baseline RF signature, determining an anomaly score indicating differences between the RF signature and the baseline RF signature, wherein a higher anomaly score indicates fewer similarities between the RF signature and the baseline RF signature and a lower anomaly score indicates more similarities between the RF signature and the baseline RF signature.

17 . The method of claim 14 , further comprising:

receiving an asset name assigned to the electric component;

relating, by the server, the asset name assigned to the electric component to a UWB tag identifier (ID) assigned to the UWB tag coupled to the electric component;

transmitting, by the server, triggering commands to the UWB tag for the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals; and

in response to determining that the anomaly is caused by the electronic attack, triggering, by the server, the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component based at least in part upon the triggering commands.

18 . The method of claim 14 , further comprising:

receiving, by a first UWB component, a first location signal of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag;

determining, by the first UWB component, a first information vector associated with the first location signal, the first information vector indicating a first possible location of the electric component in the predetermined area;

transmitting, by the first UWB component, the first information vector to the server;

in conjunction with triggering the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component, receiving, by the server, the first information vector associated with the first location signal; and

triangulating, by the server, the location of the electric component in the predetermined area based at least in part upon the first information vector.

19 . The method of claim 18 , further comprising:

receiving, by a second UWB component, a second location signal of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag;

determining, by the second UWB component, a second information vector associated with the second location signal, the second information vector indicating a second possible location of the electric component in the predetermined area;

transmitting, by the second UWB component, the second information vector to the server;

in conjunction with triggering the broadcasting of the plurality of location signals from the UWB tag coupled to the electric component, receiving, by the server, the second information vector associated with the second location signal; and

triangulating, by the server, the location of the electric component in the predetermined area based at least in part upon the first information vector and the second information vector.

20 . The method of claim 14 , wherein the secure component is a simulated reality device configured to:

display the simulated directions to the location of the electric component in the predetermined area in an augmented visibility field, the augmented visibility field comprising the simulated directions within a predetermined sensing range.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Mar 14, 2023
From: SINGH, SHAILENDRA
To: BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION
Reel/Frame 062981/0807 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20240310469A1 · Sep 19, 2024
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