IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,627,491
Granted Patent B2
US 12,627,491 · App. 18/780,348 · Granted May 12, 2026

Key and counter management in wireless systems

Inventors: Anand Palanigounder (San Diego, CA); Adrian Edward Escott (Reading, GB)
Assignee: QUALCOMM Incorporated
H04L9/0894H04L9/0643H04W12/72
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,627,491
App. No.
18/780,348
Granted
May 12, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

Disclosed are wireless communications systems and techniques. For example, a wireless communication device (e.g., a user equipment (UE)) compares a first key identifier (generated from a key stored in a first storage unit, such as a universal subscriber identity module) to a second key identifier (stored in a second storage unit, such as non-volatile memory) to identify a mismatch between the key identifiers. Based on the mismatch, the device replaces, in the second storage unit, the second key identifier. In some examples, the device verifies integrity of a message using the key, replaces the second key identifier with the first key identifier, and updates a counter based on the message. In a second illustrative example, the device replaces the key with a replacement key, replaces the second key identifier with the third key identifier based on the replacement key, and resets a counter.

Claims (38)

1 . An apparatus for wireless communications, comprising:

at least one memory comprising instructions; and

at least one processor coupled to the at least one memory and configured to:

identify a change associated with a removable storage unit;

set, in response to the change, a Key Set Identifier (KSI) to a predetermined value; and

invalidate, in response to the change, a security context, wherein the security context is not the KSI.

2 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

delete, in response to the change, a key.

3 . The apparatus of claim 2 , wherein the key is an Authentication Server Function (AUSF) key K AUSF .

4 . The apparatus of claim 2 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

initiate an authentication procedure to cause a new instance of the key to be generated to replace the key.

5 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the removable storage unit is a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) that corresponds to the security context, and wherein the change associated with the removable storage unit includes a removal of the USIM from the apparatus.

6 . The apparatus of claim 5 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

delete, in response to the change, a key that corresponds to the USIM.

7 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the removable storage unit is a first universal subscriber identity module (USIM) that corresponds to the security context, and wherein the change associated with the removable storage unit includes a change from the first USIM to a second USIM.

8 . The apparatus of claim 7 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

delete, in response to the change, a key that corresponds to the first USIM.

9 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the removable storage unit is a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) that corresponds to the security context, and wherein the change associated with the removable storage unit includes a key being stored on the USIM and a counter being not present on the USIM, wherein the counter is associated with at least one of Steering of Roaming (SoR) or User equipment Parameters Update (UPU).

10 . The apparatus of claim 9 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

delete, in response to the change, a key that corresponds to the USIM.

11 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the removable storage unit is a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) that corresponds to the security context and that stores a first instance of a key, and wherein the change associated with the removable storage unit includes the USIM storing a second instance of the key that is different from the first instance of the key.

12 . The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

delete, in response to the change, the second instance of the key from the USIM.

13 . The apparatus of claim 11 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

delete, in response to the change, the first instance of the key from a second storage unit.

14 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the predetermined value is 111.

15 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the predetermined value indicates that a key is invalid.

16 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

initiate an authentication procedure to cause a new security context to be generated to replace the security context.

17 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one processor is configured to:

initiate an authentication procedure based on the KSI being set to the predetermined value.

18 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the KSI is a next-generation KSI (ngKSI) associated with a fifth-generation (5G) cellular network.

19 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the security context includes at least one of Steering of Roaming (SoR) context or User equipment Parameters Update (UPU) context.

20 . The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein, to invalidate the security context, the at least one processor is configured to delete the security context.

21 . A method of wireless communications, the method comprising:

identifying a change associated with a removable storage unit;

setting, in response to the change, a Key Set Identifier (KSI) to a predetermined value; and

invalidating, in response to the change, a security context, wherein the security context is not the KSI.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Sep 17, 2024
From: PALANIGOUNDER, ANAND; ESCOTT, ADRIAN EDWARD
To: QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
Reel/Frame 068604/0425 →
Continuity (2)
Provisional Application 63517794 · Aug 4, 2023
Related Publication 20250047479A1 · Feb 6, 2025
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