IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,671,994
Granted Patent B2
US 12,671,994 · App. 17/983,548 · Granted Jun 30, 2026

Integrity protection failure handling method and apparatus, and user equipment

Inventor: Qian Zheng (Guangdong, CN)
Assignee: VIVO MOBILE COMMUNICATION CO., LTD.
H04W12/106H04W76/30
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,671,994
App. No.
17/983,548
Filed
Nov 9, 2022
Granted
Jun 30, 2026
Kind
B2
Art Unit
2436
USPC
726/22
Abstract

An integrity protection failure handling method and apparatus, and user equipment are provided. The method includes: performing, by a first user equipment, a security control operation in at least a case that an integrity check failure indication for a sidelink signaling bearer is received.

Claims (48)

1 . An integrity protection failure handling method, applied to first user equipment, wherein the first user equipment performs side link communication based on a destination address, and the integrity protection failure handling method comprises:

performing a security control operation in at least a case that an integrity check failure indication for a sidelink signaling bearer is received;

wherein the integrity check failure indication is sent by a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) entity;

wherein the sidelink signaling bearer is at least one of sidelink signaling bearer 2, and sidelink signaling bearer 3;

wherein the sidelink signaling bearer 2 is sidelink signalling radio bearer 2 (SL-SRB 2), the sidelink signaling bearer 3 is sidelink signalling radio bearer 3 (SL-SRB 3);

wherein the security control operation specifically comprises at least one of the following operations:

releasing a data bearer corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address;

releasing a signaling bearer corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address;

releasing a sidelink interface radio resource control (PC5 RRC) connection corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address; and

discarding configuration information corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address.

2 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

performing the security control operation in a case that a sidelink radio link failure is detected.

3 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 1 , wherein the security control operation specifically further comprises at least one of the following operations:

discarding a security key corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address; and

stopping a timer corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address, or stopping all timers for the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment.

4 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 1 , in the case that the integrity check failure indication for the sidelink signaling bearer is received, after the performing the security control operation, further comprising:

sending an radio resource control (RRC) message to a network-side device, wherein the RRC message is used to report that the sidelink communication with the destination address by the first user equipment fails.

5 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 4 , wherein the RRC message is further used to indicate that a cause of sidelink communication failure is integrity check failure.

6 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 1 , in the case that the integrity check failure indication for the sidelink signaling bearer is received, after the performing a security control operation, further comprising:

sending indication information to an upper-layer entity of the first user equipment, wherein the indication information is used to notify that a PC5 RRC connection has been released.

7 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 6 , wherein the indication information is further used to notify that a cause of the PC5 RRC connection being released is integrity check failure or failure of the PC5 RRC connection.

8 . The integrity protection failure handling method according to claim 1 , further comprising:

sending a PC5 RRC message to second user equipment corresponding to the destination address, wherein the PC5 RRC message is used to indicate the second user equipment to stop the sidelink communication performed based on the destination address;

wherein the PC5 RRC message carries a sidelink configuration reset indication.

9 . A User equipment, wherein the user equipment performs sidelink communication based on a destination address, the user equipment comprising a processor, a memory, and a program or an instruction stored in the memory, wherein when the program or the instruction is executed by the processor, the user equipment implements:

performing a security control operation in at least a case that an integrity check failure indication for a sidelink signaling bearer is received;

wherein the integrity check failure indication is sent by a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) entity;

wherein the sidelink signaling bearer is at least one of sidelink signaling bearer 2, and sidelink signaling bearer 3;

wherein the sidelink signaling bearer 2 is sidelink signalling radio bearer 2 (SL-SRB 2), the sidelink signaling bearer 3 is sidelink signalling radio bearer 3 (SL-SRB 3);

wherein the security control operation specifically comprises at least one of the following operations:

releasing a data bearer corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address;

releasing a signaling bearer corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address;

releasing a sidelink interface radio resource control (PC5 RRC) connection corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address; and

discarding configuration information corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address.

10 . The user equipment according to claim 9 , wherein when the program or the instruction is executed by the processor, the user equipment further implements:

performing the security control operation in a case that a sidelink radio link failure is detected.

11 . The user equipment according to claim 9 , wherein the security control operation specifically further comprises at least one of the following operations:

discarding a security key corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address; and

stopping a timer corresponding to the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment based on the destination address, or stopping all timers for the sidelink communication performed by the first user equipment.

12 . The user equipment according to claim 9 , in the case that the integrity check failure indication for the sidelink signaling bearer is received, after the performing the security control operation, the user equipment further implements:

sending an radio resource control (RRC) message to a network-side device, wherein the RRC message is used to report that the sidelink communication with the destination address by the first user equipment fails.

13 . The user equipment according to claim 12 , wherein the RRC message is further used to indicate that a cause of sidelink communication failure is integrity check failure.

14 . The user equipment according to claim 9 , in the case that the integrity check failure indication for the sidelink signaling bearer is received, after the performing a security control operation, the user equipment further implements:

sending indication information to an upper-layer entity of the first user equipment, wherein the indication information is used to notify that a PC5 RRC connection has been released.

15 . The user equipment according to claim 14 , wherein the indication information is further used to notify that a cause of the PC5 RRC connection being released is integrity check failure or failure of the PC5 RRC connection.

16 . The user equipment according to claim 9 , wherein when the program or the instruction is executed by the processor, the user equipment further implements:

sending a PC5 RRC message to second user equipment corresponding to the destination address, wherein the PC5 RRC message is used to indicate the second user equipment to stop the sidelink communication performed based on the destination address;

wherein the PC5 RRC message carries a sidelink configuration reset indication.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Nov 9, 2022
From: ZHENG, QIAN
To: VIVO MOBILE COMMUNICATION CO.,LTD.
Reel/Frame 061705/0070 →
Priority Claims (1)
CN 202010415321.3 · May 15, 2020 · national
Continuity (2)
Continuation PCTCN2021093828 · May 14, 2021
Related Publication 20230070757A1 · Mar 9, 2023
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