IP Library › Granted Patent US 12,745,089
Granted Patent B2
US 12,745,089 · App. 18/744,386 · Granted Sep 22, 2026

Avoiding communications over risky non-terrestrial networks

Inventors: Raymond E. Reeves (Orlando, FL); Simon Youngs (Overland Park, KS)
Assignee: T-Mobile USA, Inc.
H04W12/122H04W12/06H04W84/06
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Quick Facts
Patent No.
US 12,745,089
App. No.
18/744,386
Granted
Sep 22, 2026
Kind
B2
Abstract

A wireless device receives a signal from a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN) and initiates verification of the legitimacy of the purported NTN. The wireless device detects an actual angle of arrival of the signal from the purported NTN and determines an expected angle of arrival of the signal from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device, based on the device's current location orientation, or speed. The purported NTN is legitimate if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal, and the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal.

Claims (85)

1 . A wireless device comprising:

at least one hardware processor; and

at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, cause the wireless device to:

receive a signal identifying a transmitter of a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN), wherein the transmitter is unknown to the wireless device;

in response to the received signal, cause the wireless device to initiate a verification of a legitimacy status of the purported NTN; and

in response to the initiation of the verification of the legitimacy status of the purported NTN:

detect an actual angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device from the purported NTN,

determine an expected angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device,

based on at least one of a current location of the wireless device, a current orientation of the wireless device, or a current speed of the wireless device, and

determine a legitimacy status of the purported NTN based on a comparison between the expected angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device and the actual angle of arrival of the signal at the wireless device,

wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal, and

wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual angle of arrival of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected angle of arrival of the signal.

2 . The wireless device of claim 1 further caused to:

in response to making the determination that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate, allow the wireless device to connect to the purported NTN.

3 . The wireless device of claim 1 further caused to:

in response to making the determination that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent, prohibit the wireless device from connecting to the purported NTN.

4 . The wireless device of claim 1 ,

wherein the legitimate NTN is known to the wireless device from flight path characteristics and a current operational status of at least one network node of the legitimate NTN received from a manager function disposed in a home terrestrial telecommunications network of the wireless device,

wherein the flight path characteristics of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN include a location, a direction of travel, an azimuth, an elevation, or a speed of travel of the network node, and

wherein the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN comprises an indicator for whether the network node is on air, off air, access-restricted, undergoing a planned service outage, or undergoing an unplanned service outage.

5 . The wireless device of claim 4 further caused to, in response to the wireless device determining that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate:

configure the wireless device to encrypt communication with the manager function using at least one encryption key assigned by the wireless device; and

initiate a minimization of drive testing (MDT) function on the wireless device to periodically measure and report network measurements of the purported NTN to the manager function,

wherein the network measurements of the purported NTN reported to the manager function include received signal strength, received signal quality, network latency, network jitter, traffic volume, network reliability, network availability, peak data throughput, user data throughput, spectral efficiency, connection density, energy efficiency, mobility, configured spectral bandwidth, identifier of the network node of the purported NTN, or a device model and software version of the wireless device.

6 . The wireless device of claim 4 caused to:

receive flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN from the manager function during a start-up sequence of the wireless device.

7 . The wireless device of claim 4 further caused to, upon receiving the flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN from the manager function:

initiate a timer measuring a staleness status of the received flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node; and

upon expiry of the timer, initiate a request to the manager function to send updated flight path characteristics and current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN.

8 . A wireless device comprising:

at least one hardware processor; and

at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, cause the wireless device to:

receive a signal identifying a transmitter of a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN), wherein the transmitter is unknown to the wireless device;

in response to the received signal, cause the wireless device to initiate a verification of a legitimacy status of the purported NTN; and

in response to the initiation of the verification of the legitimacy status of the purported NTN:

detect an actual Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device from the purported NTN,

determine an expected Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device,

based on at least one of a current location of the wireless device, a current orientation of the wireless device, or a current speed of the wireless device, and

determine a legitimacy status of the purported NTN based on a comparison between the expected Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device and the actual Doppler pattern of the signal at the wireless device,

wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate if the actual Doppler pattern of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected Doppler pattern of the signal, and

wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual Doppler pattern of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected Doppler pattern of the signal.

9 . The wireless device of claim 8 further caused to:

in response to making the determination that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate, allow the wireless device to connect to the purported NTN.

10 . The wireless device of claim 8 further caused to:

in response to making the determination that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent, prohibit the wireless device from connecting to the purported NTN.

11 . The wireless device of claim 8 ,

wherein the legitimate NTN is known to the wireless device from flight path characteristics and a current operational status of at least one network node of the legitimate NTN received from a manager function disposed in a home terrestrial telecommunications network of the wireless device,

wherein the flight path characteristics of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN include a location, a direction of travel, an azimuth, an elevation, or a speed of travel of the network node, and

wherein the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN comprises an indicator for whether the network node is on air, off air, access-restricted, undergoing a planned service outage, or undergoing an unplanned service outage.

12 . The wireless device of claim 11 further caused to, in response to the wireless device determining that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate:

configure the wireless device to encrypt communication with the manager function using at least one encryption key assigned by the wireless device; and

initiate a minimization of drive testing (MDT) function on the wireless device to periodically measure and report network measurements of the purported NTN to the manager function,

wherein the network measurements of the purported NTN reported to the manager function include received signal strength, received signal quality, network latency, network jitter, traffic volume, network reliability, network availability, peak data throughput, user data throughput, spectral efficiency, connection density, energy efficiency, mobility, configured spectral bandwidth, identifier of the network node of the purported NTN, or a device model and software version of the wireless device.

13 . The wireless device of claim 11 caused to:

receive flight path characteristics and a current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN from the manager function during a start-up sequence of the wireless device.

14 . The wireless device of claim 11 further caused to, upon receiving the flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN from the manager function:

initiate a timer measuring a staleness status of the received flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node; and

upon expiry of the timer, initiate a request to the manager function to send updated flight path characteristics and current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN.

15 . A wireless device comprising:

at least one hardware processor; and

at least one non-transitory memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, cause the wireless device to:

receive a signal identifying a transmitter of a purported non-terrestrial network (NTN), wherein the transmitter is unknown to the wireless device;

in response to the received signal, cause the wireless device to initiate a verification of a legitimacy status of the purported NTN; and

in response to the initiation of the verification of the legitimacy status of the purported NTN:

detect an actual radio frequency (RF) fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device from the purported NTN,

determine an expected RF fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device from a legitimate NTN known to the wireless device,

based on at least one of a current location of the wireless device, a current orientation of the wireless device, or a current speed of the wireless device, and

determine a legitimacy status of the purported NTN based on a comparison between the expected RF fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device and the actual RF fingerprint of the signal at the wireless device,

wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate if the actual RF fingerprint of the signal is within a threshold deviation of the expected RF fingerprint of the signal, and

wherein the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent if the actual RF fingerprint of the signal is not within the threshold deviation of the expected RF fingerprint of the signal.

16 . The wireless device of claim 15 further caused to:

in response to making the determination that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate, allow the wireless device to connect to the purported NTN.

17 . The wireless device of claim 15 further caused to:

in response to making the determination that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is fraudulent, prohibit the wireless device from connecting to the purported NTN.

18 . The wireless device of claim 15 ,

wherein the legitimate NTN is known to the wireless device from flight path characteristics and a current operational status of at least one network node of the legitimate NTN received from a manager function disposed in a home terrestrial telecommunications network of the wireless device,

wherein the flight path characteristics of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN include a location, a direction of travel, an azimuth, an elevation, or a speed of travel of the network node, and

wherein the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN comprises an indicator for whether the network node is on air, off air, access-restricted, undergoing a planned service outage, or undergoing an unplanned service outage.

19 . The wireless device of claim 18 further caused to, in response to the wireless device determining that the legitimacy status of the purported NTN is legitimate:

configure the wireless device to encrypt communication with the manager function using at least one encryption key assigned by the wireless device; and

initiate a minimization of drive testing (MDT) function on the wireless device to periodically measure and report network measurements of the purported NTN to the manager function,

wherein the network measurements of the purported NTN reported to the manager function include received signal strength, received signal quality, network latency, network jitter, traffic volume, network reliability, network availability, peak data throughput, user data throughput, spectral efficiency, connection density, energy efficiency, mobility, configured spectral bandwidth, identifier of the network node of the purported NTN, or a device model and software version of the wireless device.

20 . The wireless device of claim 18 further caused to, upon receiving the flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN from the manager function:

initiate a timer measuring a staleness status of the received flight path characteristics and the current operational status of the at least one network node; and

upon expiry of the timer, initiate a request to the manager function to send updated flight path characteristics and current operational status of the at least one network node of the legitimate NTN.

Assignments (1)
ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNOR'S INTEREST Recorded Jun 14, 2024
From: REEVES, RAYMOND E.; YOUNGS, SIMON
To: T-MOBILE USA, INC.
Reel/Frame 067736/0810 →
Continuity (1)
Related Publication 20250386195A1 · Dec 18, 2025
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